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TO THE READER.

XENOPHON'S
MEMORABILIA OF SOKRATES,

Translated from the Text

OF

RAPHAEL KÜHNER.

WITH NOTES AND PROLEGOMENA.

BY

GEORGE B. WHEELER, A.B.

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S. L. R.

TO THE READER.

THE following pages are intended to be a strict and literal translation of the *Memorabilia* of Sokrates. Whether I have succeeded in my intention, must be left to the decision of others; but I may say this much,—that I have never been induced to stray from my author by a desire to insert a fine phrase, or to adopt a well-rounded period. Mistakes occur in the most carefully prepared books, I can hardly hope that mine is wholly devoid of them; many do present themselves, I trust they are but trifling.

I have added a selection of notes, partly intended to elucidate the text, and partly to account for my adopting a different translation for some passages than others have chosen. The geographical and historical notes are intended for the English reader solely, and consequently are very brief. The *Prolegomena* is formed of five papers of Raphael Kühner, which tend to explain the character of Sokrates and his Philosophy.

I have had frequently to return thanks for a kind reception: and may perhaps hope, that the favour shewn to some previous books of mine, will, in some degree, be extended to this also.

GEORGE B. WHEELER.

23. TRIN. COLL. DUB.
Nov. 1st, 1847.

The sale of a large edition, and the demand for another, have given me an opportunity for revising this translation with considerable care. I by no means suppose that the success of this book is due to anything I have done for it, so much as to the papers on the Philosophy of Sokrates. Those who wish for an elaborate essay, conveyed in a clear impressive style, and conceived with masterly scholarship, will study Mr. Grote's History of Greece, (Vol. VIII. conclus.) Of such a composition it would be unjust both to the author and reader, to give merely an abstract.

G. W. B

RACEFIELD, Dec. 1851.

PROLEGOMENA.

I.—CONCERNING THE DESIGN AND PLAN OF THE FOLLOWING BOOKS.

The design of Xenophon, in these books, is to defend Sokrates, his beloved instructor, from the accusations of his prosecutors, and to prove that he had been a citizen most useful to individuals and to the state. That this defence might have the greater weight, he is not contented merely to review and refute the charges laid against Sokrates, but devoting merely the first two chapters of the first book to this part of his subject, he then introduces Sokrates. and represents him disputing with his pupils, friends, and even with sophists, upon the most important topics of morality, and that part of Philosophy which treats of the reformation of human conduct.

If we except the commencement of the first book (1 chap. § 1 & 2) Xenophon rarely addresses his readers in his own person, and then, only premisses a few words to the discourses of Sokrates, to inform us whence the discussion arose, and to render it more intelligible: or, at the close of a disputation, he briefly draws an inference with reference to the teaching or mode of life of Sokrates. Hence while we read these books a living representation of the Philosopher arises before us. For these discourses embrace a great variety of subjects, and are addressed to men of every class and station, and so graphically exhibit Sokrates in the act of addressing individuals, as to shew how aptly he suited and modelled his language to the condition or disposition of each. And hence we may clearly perceive the manifold powers of Sokrates in discussion, his skill in addressing men of every class, his noble natural endowments, his life and character.

Xenophon does not profess to have taken down at the moment, and bequeathed to us, the very words of Sokrates. If, however, we consider the diversified style of argument in these discussions on various subjects, we can hardly entertain a doubt that Xenophon has modelled his style and diction to the closest resemblance with the style and diction of his master. We may the more readily believe the language to be closely assimilated, if we consider how easily from long intimacy and familiarity, Xenophon could invest his language with a true Sokratic colouring. Hence, the mild and gentle tenour which pervades all the writings of Xenophon, that native and ingrained simplicity, redolent with all the graces and beauties of Atticism, while it entices the reader by its simple elegance, appears admirably adapted to depict the amiable character

of Sokrates, his candour, and insinuating affability in his conversation with his fellow-men. To omit other points, one example will prove how admirably Xenophon has adumbrated the peculiar character of his master. It is well known that by the Greeks of old, Sokrates was called ὁ ἑῖπων, from that irony or dissimulation, by which he appeared to grant all they claimed, to frivolous pretenders to Philosophy, while he himself assumed the disguise of ignorance on all subjects : and this artifice he used most skilfully for the express purpose of confounding them at the close, and convincing them of their ignorance and folly. In many passages so elegantly and naively has Xenophon represented this irony, that we cannot entertain a doubt that it is drawn from living nature. The extraordinary affection, and sincere love towards his master manifested in these books, gives them a most pleasing and grateful charm.

II.—ON THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE SUBJECTS IN THE FOLLOWING BOOKS.

Although Sokrates spent the entire period of his life in the study of wisdom, and was the first to construct Philosophy on firm and solid foundations, yet he never studied to reduce his discoveries to any art or system ; but just as an occasion presented itself he discoursed on whatever tended to a proper course of life, to reform character, and conduct to happiness : as *e.g.* on piety, beauty, justice, temperance, fortitude, the body politic, the duties of a state minister, the government of men, and, in fine, on all topics the knowledge of which would render men honourable and excellent, while ignorance of them would degrade men to a servile condition. Hence in the full glare of active life, and in the throng of men, he was ever found, scattering his words to persons of every condition, illuminating their minds with the light of his instruction, and guiding them on the path which led to happiness. And so, we must not think it strange that Xenophon did not arrange these discourses of Sokrates according to any similarity of argument or subject, or did not form a scientific system from them. Those who have expected to find such an arrangement or system in these books, were utterly ignorant of the method of teaching pursued by Sokrates, and of the object of these books ; for if Xenophon had systematized, according to the rigid rules of art, the precepts of Sokrates, he would not only have deviated from the method of his master, but have left us only a meagre and imperfect picture of his mind, and broken down the whole vigour and power of his defence. Hence with entire freedom he has narrated the discussions of Sokrates, and appears rather to have followed the chronological order of their delivery than the arrangement or connection of their subject matter. Yet in the larger portion of the work it is not difficult to trace some slight attempt at regular arrangement. For the first two chapters are employed in a general defence of Sokrates against the charges of his accusers. And then in the following portion, the general defence is proved by particular instances. This chiefly consists of *viva voce* discussions between Sokrates and his friends. The third chapter of the first book is closely connected with the

preceding portion : it recalls the points asserted before, but in such a way as that when previously it was generally stated that Sokrates worshipped the gods and was eager in the pursuit of virtue, now he explains the *method* in which he worshipped the gods : and his temperance in his mode of life, and his freedom from passion is more fully shewn. He demonstrates too, the falsehood of the assertion of many, that Sokrates indeed could exhort men to the pursuit of virtue, but was unable to guide them up to its consummation.

The subjects contained from chap. v. Book I, down to chap. ii. Book II, follow each other without any attempt at arrangement. But from chap. ii. Book II, to chap. vii. Book III, it is clear that the discourses are linked together by a similarity of subject and thought.

For in (ii. 2.) he treats of filial piety towards parents, then (4—10) on friendship, next (iii. 1—4) of the duties of the chief magistrate, next (5) how the Athenians might recover their former glory and felicity ; and finally (6—7) he treats of the right method to administer the state. The remaining portion of the third book has no connecting order.

In the fourth book, all from the first chapter to its final close, is most closely united and connected together. The design of all the discourses therein contained is plainly to shew the extraordinary talent possessed by Sokrates, in judging of and managing the dispositions of the young : and to describe his plan of training them in self-knowledge, piety towards God, justice, temperance, and other virtues pertaining to happiness of life.

The closing chapter of the fourth book is added as an epilogue, and proves that the death of Sokrates was most glorious, most happy, and most dear in the sight of heaven. The whole concludes with a brief summary of the subjects treated of in the work.

III.—THE PRECEPTS OF SOKRATES REDUCED TO A SYSTEM.

That the whole doctrine of Sokrates may be placed in a clearer light, we must collect into one body, the limbs, as it were, scattered throughout the book, and reduce all to some sort of system.

It is well known that the Moral Philosophy of the ancients was usually divided into three great heads.

I.—Of the good, and highest good = *de bonis, et de summo bono.*

II.—Of virtue = *de virtutibus.*

III.—Of duties = *de officiis.*

The good (*bonum*) is defined to be “that which is produced by the efficacy of virtue,” and the highest good (*summum bonum*) is “the union of all goods which spring from virtue.”

Virtue (*virtus*) is a constant and perpetual power of the mind, by which power, good (*bonum*) is produced.

Duty (*officium*) finally is the rule and standard, to which, in the conduct of life, virtue should conform herself.

A. And now we must first consider, what is the nature of that which Sokrates, as set forth by Xenophon, defines to be good (*bonum*).

THE GOOD, which should be the object of man's pursuit, is *the*

useful (ὠφέλιμον, χρήσιμον, λυσιτελέεις, *utile*). The useful, is defined to be the "end of action," or the result which we expect by action. Every thought and act of man should be *useful*, i.e. should have reference to some special end.—Independently then, and in itself, nothing is good; but only becomes such, by special reference to its object. The same statement is made regarding the BEAUTIFUL (*pulchrum*) iii. 8, 3, 6, 7, 10. iv. 6, 9.—The highest end, for which man should strain his utmost, is ΠΑΡΡΙΝΕΣΣ. The good therefore is that which is useful to aid us in obtaining that highest end, happiness of life. The good and the beautiful therefore differs not from the useful. Independently and of itself nothing is useful, nothing is good, nothing is beautiful, but only becomes so by special reference to its end severally (iii. 8, 3, 6, 7, 10, iv. 6, 9.) Whence it follows that what is useful to some, may be prejudicial to others, iv, 6, 8. The highest good (*summum bonum*) is happiness of life (εὐδαιμονία), but this happiness is not perceived by reason of external goods, or those presented by chance, but only by those goods which man has acquired for himself, by toil, industry, exertion, and exercise of his natural powers, that is by good and honest morals. Happiness of life, therefore, and honourable morals are the same. The less one is dependent upon external things, the closer is his resemblance to the Deity, (i. 10, 6). But seeing that things which have relation to our happiness, are not of themselves good, but if made use of, in an improper manner or at an improper time, may prove evils to us: we must take especial care, least we rashly confide in them; and must use the utmost anxiety, circumspection, prudence, and perseverance, that we may use those things only so far as they may tend to increase, not to impede our happiness, (iv. 2, 34.) To obtain virtue, there is need for the exertion of all our powers: without toil we cannot reach to her (i. 2, 57; iii. 9, 11, 11, i. 20.) For happiness is not good luck (εὐτυχία) but good action (εὐπραξία *actio bona*.) If one, though making no search, casually lights upon what he requires (τὰ δεόντα), that is good fortune (εὐτυχία): but if any one by diligent study and zealous care conducts affairs with good success, that is good action (εὐπραξία). Those men are the best and most acceptable to heaven, who rightly perform their duty with success, whether it be as agriculturists, as physicians, or in state employments. They who perform nothing rightly, are good for nothing and rejected by the gods, (iii. 9, 14, 15).

THE GOODS, BY WHOSE UNION, THE HIGHEST GOOD (SUMMUM BONUM) i.e. HAPPINESS IS OBTAINED ARE THESE.

1.—GOOD HEALTH, AND BODILY STRENGTH:—for these contribute much to render our life praiseworthy, honourable, and useful to our country and its citizens. For health of frame is useful not only for all things which are performed by the body, but also for the right execution of all that is performed by the mind and intellect. We should, therefore, cultivate gymnastic exercises, as by these not only the body. but the mind itself is strengthened (iii. 12.)

2.—SANITY OF MIND, THE POWER OF THOUGHT AND MENTAL FACULTIES, (iii. 12, 6); but sanity of mind very much depends on sanity of body, wherefore, as we have seen above, care must be taken to ensure good bodily health.

3.—ARTS AND SCIENCES; which are most useful for living well and happily. But we must confine the extent of our studies in them, to that which will be practically useful in life. Speculations which spring beyond the sphere of daily life, on things mysterious and concealed from the eyes of men, are useless and withdraw us from pursuits of other things which may be practically useful (iv. 7.) Under this head is mentioned the science of DIALECTICS, or the art of examining concerning the good, useful, and beautiful, and other points tending to happiness of life, in such a way, as to find out the essential properties of things, and then define and lucidly explain them, (iv. 6). Whosoever has acquired clear notions of things, no matter in what sphere of life he may be placed, will always select the best course, and consequently will be the more fitted to transact affairs (iv. 5, 12). ARITHMETIC (so far as accounts, &c.) GEOMETRY, and ASTRONOMY are enumerated and limited (iv. 7).—All arts, in fine, which have reference to the uses of life, are clearly to be referred to the heads of goods. Those arts indeed peculiar to handicrafts (*βαρανακαί*) are, according to the idea of the ancients, to be excluded from among goods, since they are practised by those who are ignorant of the good, the beautiful, or the just, iv. 2, 22) and enfeeble both body and mind (Econ. iv. 2, sq.) Sokrates appears to have classed among the goods, the more refined arts, as PAINTING and STATUARY (iii. 10), but has not expressly informed us of their relation to his test, utility. Yet since he has maintained that nothing is beautiful but what is useful, we may infer that these arts also be encouraged from an idea of their utility.

4.—FRIENDSHIP, is a good of the highest value. No good is more precious, lasting or useful as a sincere friend. He regards the interests of his friend as if they were his own, he participates with him in prosperity or adversity, and provides for his safety and property as much as for his own, nay even to a greater degree. (ii. 4). The value of a friend should be estimated from the love and tender affection with which he clings to his fellow friend, from his zeal, benevolence and duty, in deserving well of him. That friendship may be more lasting, we should endeavour to be esteemed of the highest value by our fellow friend. Friends should be temperate, for men given to gluttony, wantonness, sleep, inactivity, luxury, or avarice, can be of no utility to us, nay, often prove a detriment. They should be faithful and ready to perform services, and push the interests of their friend, (ii. 6, 1—5). Friendship cannot exist, unless between the good and honourable. For they who are useless can never gain the useful as their friends (ii. 6, 14—16). And though, since good men often desire the same goods, and hence contention may arise among them, yet their innate virtue will appease and calm, beneath the influence of

reason, those desires which have caused dissension (ii. 6, 19—28). Friendship arises from an admiration of virtue. This admiration inspires good will, and urges us to bind our friend closely to us by every kind of attention. Truth is the foundation of friendship, and hence, the shortest, surest, and most honourable way to gain friendship, is to endeavour really to be the character, you would wish your friend to think you.

5.—CONCORD BETWEEN PARENTS, CHILDREN AND BROTHERS, for these have been created by God, in order that they may give mutual aid (ii. 2, 11, 3).

6.—CIVIL SOCIETY OF THE REPUBLIC, which, if well constituted affords the greatest benefits to its citizens (iii. 7, 9). Accordingly if any one be naturally endowed with talents fitted to govern and administer a state, it is his duty to apply his whole powers to the administration and amplification of his country, (iii. 7).

B. Now follows his doctrine concerning VIRTUE. In order to gain those goods, in which happiness consists, we must furnish our minds with virtue, *i.e.* with a constant and unceasing power of intellect by which we obtain for ourselves all those goods on which happiness of life depends. In order that a more accurate idea of virtue might be presented to us, the ancient Philosophers laid down certain primary parts of virtue; and these primary parts, they called the "CARDINAL VIRTUES." In general four cardinal virtues are enumerated. PRUDENCE (*φρόνησις*, *Prudentia*). FORTITUDE (*ἀνδρεία*, *Fortitudo*). JUSTICE (*δικαιοσύνη*, *Justitia*). and TEMPERANCE (*σωφροσύνη*, *Temperantia*). In these books, however, and also in the writings of Plato, Sokrates fixes only THREE Cardinal virtues: *e.g.* Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice. *Prudence*, (*φρονήσις* or *σοφία*) he deemed to be a peculiar virtue. If four virtues be enumerated, then the term virtue has a twofold application, seeing that Prudence is perceived by *mental science*, the others by *action*. Now the faculty of judging concerning the good and honourable (*i.e.* useful, according to his meaning) and of the evil and depraved (*i.e.* prejudicial) and of adopting the former and avoiding the latter, Sokrates would not allow to be separated from *action*, but laid down that Prudence (*σοφία*) was identical with virtue in its widest sense. Accordingly Prudence is not a singular species of virtue, but embraces all virtue, (iii. 9, 4, 5), so that Fortitude, Justice, and Temperance are parts of it. The wise man (*σοφός*, *sapiens*) is he who thoroughly knows what is good and excellent (*i. e.* useful) and moulds his life in strict accordance with this principle of good and excellent which is comprehended and grounded in his mind. For he who is wise, *i.e.* who knows what is good and excellent, will always *do* what harmonizes with that good. For all things which are done virtuously, *i.e.* temperately, justly, and bravely, are excellent and good. On the other hand, all that is done in opposition to virtue, are evil and disastrous. Since the wise man knows this, not only by his mental assent will he prefer what is good and excellent, to what is evil and prejudicial, but also effect the former in action

On the contrary, the unwise, seeing that they know not what may be good, not only mentally prefer the evil and prejudicial to the excellent and useful, but even effect them in action: and even when they endeavour to prefer good to evil, they will err (*i. e.* easily they will fall into a wrong judgment in the distinction of good and evil) through ignorance. Therefore he who knows the virtues, will also practise them, but whosoever knows them not, will not be able to practise them even should he wish to do so. Since therefore, all that is excellent is effected by virtue, it is clear that virtue is wisdom (iii. 9, 5). Theory and practice accordingly cannot be severed. The conviction of the excellent, influences us to suit our actions to it; and he who is devoid of this conviction is the fool. (i. 1, 16, 11, 19, iv. 6, 10 sq.)

And now for the several parts of the division of Virtue.

1. TEMPERANCE (*ἐγκράτεια*, *Temperantia*) is called by Sokrates, "the foundation of virtue (*ἀρετῆς κρηπίς*)."¹ This virtue is perceived in the calming and curbing the appetites and desires, so that they be obedient to right reason, and not violate the settled convictions of the intellect (i. 5, 11, 1—7, iv. 7). Without it we can do nothing vigorously or strenuously, (i. 5, 5); we can neither benefit ourselves or others, or be welcome in the society of our friends, (i. 5, 1—3). If we be ensnared by the allurements of pleasure, or overcome by weariness of toil or difficulty we will surely fail in our duty (ii. 1, 1—7). Temperance causes us to undertake all labours with a cheerful spirit, because we follow good and useful counsel, and expect that the most ample fruits will redound to us from these toils (ii. 1, 17—20.) Effeminacy and pleasure oppose the health of the body, and prevent us from providing our minds with laudable knowledge. Zeal, and energy carry us through to excellent and good results. Without labour and toil nothing noble is granted to us by the gods. In short, we cannot reach true happiness, unless we be temperate (ii. 1, 19 sq.) Temperance should be, as it were, the foundation of every action we undertake. He who renders himself subservient to pleasure, makes himself subject to the heaviest slavery (iv. 5, 3—5). Intemperance, by depriving us of wisdom, and confounding the notions of good and evil, forces us to elect the evil instead of the good, and plunges us in every species of depravity, (iv. 5, 6—7). Temperance, on the other hand, by placing our desires beneath the regulation of reason, and preserving sanity of mind, urges us in every circumstance and phase of life, ever to elect the good, and therefore renders us fit for the transaction of important affairs (iv. 5, 7—12).

2. Fortitude (*ἀνδρεία*, *Fortitudo*) is the science by which we conduct ourselves with prudence and energy in perilous or dangerous affairs. They are not to be reckoned as brave, who do not fear dangers from ignorance of them. For so, many insane and cowardly persons would be brave. Nor can they be considered brave who are cautious regarding things not to be feared. Those only are brave, who know the nature of the danger, and in it act with constancy and energy, (iv. 6, 10, 11).

γ. JUSTICE (*δικαιοσύνη*, *Justitia*) is the knowledge of the laws in force among men, and which must be obeyed. But there are two species of laws, either the written or unwritten. Written laws are those, which the body politic unanimously adopt for their common safety, concerning what men should do, or avoid doing. From strict observance of these laws, many other important advantages are obtained by men, but what is more than all, Concord, the strongest bulwark and foundation of happiness, and the highest good not only to individual members of a state, but to the whole community. That state, whose citizens render the greatest obedience to the law, is not only best constituted in peace, but is unconquerable in war, (iv. 1, 10—18). But seeing that these laws should provide for the safety of the state and its citizens, observance of them is not independently and of itself just, but only so, when that safety is the object of obedience. Hence it happens, that the same action, under different circumstances, or regarding different men, either by whom or against whom it may be done, can be both just or unjust (iv. 2, 13—19).

UNWRITTEN LAWS (*ἄθροια*) are those given to man by the deities themselves, and which in the same manner are observed throughout the universe. For instance, to cherish parents, not to form marriages between the parent and child, to feel gratitude towards our benefactor, &c. That these laws are of divine origin is proved from the fact, that immediate and unavoidable punishments visit those who violate them.

C. THE THIRD PART of Moral Philosophy is concerning duty (*officium*). DUTY is a law which must be followed by us in life's conduct. And this law should harmonize with the doctrine of the highest good. Since then, in the doctrine of Socrates, the good is the same as the useful: it follows, that the law of duty should urge us in every proceeding to follow that line of conduct which may appear to be most useful. But since it often happens, that owing to the various nature of occasions, situations or circumstances, the same thing may be in one case beneficial, in another prejudicial: we must use anxious care and circumspection as to what we should follow, and what avoid. Thus, for instance, to speak falsehood, to deceive, to pilfer, to plunder, are forbidden by justice, yet often in war these are just, *i.e.* useful (iv. 2, 11—17). The chief heads of duty are briefly enumerated in ii. 1, 23, *e. a.* If you desire that the gods should be propitious to you, you must worship these gods—if to be loved by friends, these friends must be benefited; to be honoured by your state, you must materially serve that state. If you desire the earth to yield an abundant produce, you must cultivate the earth—to be enriched by the produce of your herds, you must take diligent care of them—if you are anxious to increase your means by war, and to become able to liberate your friends and master your enemies, not only should you learn the arts of war, but also by constant practice learn how to use them. Finally, if you desire to be robust in body, your body must be under the direction of your intellect and trained to endurance of

toil and labour. In proportion as the goods of human life are fleeting and transitory (iv. 2, 31) so much the more should we endeavour to require as few auxiliaries as possible to life (i. 6, 10). But since nothing is good independently and of itself, but all things uncertain and doubtful, very frequently the intellect of man does not clearly see, what line of conduct alone it should pursue. But for this our feebleness and imbecility, a most sure and unerring aid is found in DIVINATION. The beautiful order of the universe, the whole construction of the human frame, the noble and erect stature of man, the powers of his intellect, &c. all prove that the gods exist, that they keep together by their power the extended universe, and provide for the wants and requirements of mortals. With piety and purity therefore should the gods be worshipped; and if we faithfully do this, we may surely be persuaded that in mysterious or doubtful matters the gods will readily enlighten man (i. 4, iv. 3).

IV.—WHETHER THE GENUINE DOCTRINES OF SOKRATES HAVE BEEN HANDED DOWN TO US BY XENOPHON.

Having given a sketch of the whole moral doctrines of Sokrates, as represented by Xenophon, we now arrive at a question difficult of satisfactory elucidation, namely, whether this be really the genuine doctrine of Sokrates, or be that of Xenophon himself, attributed to his master. This question has been agitated and discussed by many critics of former times, and in our own age has been treated of with great talent and learning by Louis Dissen: Fran. Schleirmacher: Ch. A. Brandis: H. Th. Rottcher: and lately by Car. Rossel. These writers have pursued severally a different line of criticism, yet all excepting Rottcher, are unanimous in deciding that the genuine doctrines of Sokrates have not been handed down to us in the writings of Xenophon.

Dissen, having proved that the whole doctrine of Sokrates, as given by Xenophon, rests upon the sole basis of UTILITY, hesitates not to assert, that so far from being the whole system of Sokrates, it does not even pertain to it in any way, and should be judged altogether unworthy of that Sokrates, to whom Plato would have ascribed all his doctrines. He grants indeed that Sokrates would not have disputed with such subtlety on Moral Philosophy, as has been done by Plato; yet it can hardly be questioned that Sokrates would have thought that HONOUR (*honestum*) should be eagerly sought for and embraced, as being the sole source whence salvation could be found for the human race. How then does it happen that Xenophon has described the doctrine of his master thus, in this commentary? This question he thus answers: "Sokrates was in the constant habit of holding discussions with men of every grade, and exciting them to fortitude, justice and temperance. For this latter purpose he could propose no better inducement than by setting before them the emoluments to be thence derived. When Xenophon whose talent lay not in investigating the more subtle questions of Philosophy, heard these discourses, he described Sokrates as to one part only of his teaching, that, namely, which at first

view was presented to those whom nature formed for active business in life, not for calm speculation. He therefore has drawn a picture of a Philosophy, which measures all things by the standard of utility, seeing that he desired to represent Sokrates as wholly averse to subtle and refined speculations, while his aim was to exhort all to a proper regulation of active life. A Philosophy, however, whose system he did not clearly understand himself."

Schleiermacher also thinks that the true and correct view of the Sokratic Philosophy is to be derived from the writings of Plato, not from those by Xenophon.

But since it is clearer than light, that all the dogmas laid down in the dialogues of Plato, have not proceeded from Sokrates, BRUNDS adopts the authority of Aristotle, as a text and standard by which to distinguish the doctrines of Sokrates from those of Plato. Xenophon he considers not to have had capacity fitted to comprehend thoroughly the system of his master, and he utterly rejects his statement and authority.

ROSSEL examined anew the various tracts upon this subject and arrived at the conclusion, that not only should all which is stated by Aristotle, as the doctrines of Sokrates, be considered as his: but also thinks that a much wider extent of subjects could be found in those passages, where Plato endeavours to connect his close drawn conclusions with the notions of his master. He judges of Xenophon, even more harshly than Dissen.

RÖRTERER, finally, endeavours to vindicate the faithfulness and authority of Xenophon in his statements regarding the doctrine of Sokrates: and thinks that his commentaries form the purest and clearest source, whence the genuine doctrine of Sokrates can be drawn.

It is time, however, clearly to state what may be my own opinion regarding this subject. I acknowledge that at an earlier period of my life I was strongly in favour of that opinion regarding Xenophon's authority, held by my preceptor Dissen, worthy as he was of my unceasing affection. But the more frequent and careful has been my perusal of the Sokratic books of Xenophon, the more I began to doubt the truth of the conclusions of Dissen and the others above stated. And at last was I convinced that they should be wholly rejected, and that the true and genuine doctrines of Sokrates have been handed down to us by Xenophon alone. The writers above enumerated, appear to me to have chiefly erred, because they did not examine the doctrine of Sokrates as described by Xenophon, by itself and independently: but have compared it with the doctrines attributed to Sokrates by Plato, and endeavoured to reduce it to conformity with them. The necessary result was, that the unadorned and inartificial simplicity of Sokrates as described by Xenophon, was at once overwhelmed by the richness and splendour of the Philosopher described by Plato. As the former called down Philosophy from heaven to earth, and adapted her to the necessities and plans of every day life, so the latter raised her from earth to heaven, and formed her by the divine images of all that is honourable, beautiful or just.

And assuredly if we should follow no other authority regarding Sokrates save that of Xenophon; yet, if we weigh the matter with diligence, and unbiassed by a preconceived opinion, we must needs confess, that the deserts of Sokrates as a Philosopher are illustrious and immortal. For he first scrutinized the secret corners of the human heart, and keenly examined the nature of the mind, laid open the source of thought, and so reared the fabric of Philosophy upon a firmer and surer foundation. All the Philosophers who taught before him, were engaged upon the discovery of mysterious things, or matters wrapt in secrecy by Nature herself. From these physical investigations, which conduce in no respect to honourable life, Sokrates led Philosophy to the examination of the soul of man and his life, and thus became the first teacher of all moral doctrine. Although the brilliancy of such a Philosophy is eclipsed by the burning light of Plato's splendour, yet if we consider that it was the elder, it is most worthy of our admiration. Add too, that by discovering the fount of human thought, Sokrates scattered the frivolity and vanity, and broke down the authority of the Sophists who placed the science of all things, not in thought or intellect, but fondly persuaded themselves that it existed in the senses, and endeavoured to unsettle the minds of their fellow citizens, by an unmeaning jargon of empty words, and a wild confusion of ideas. Add too, that by the integrity of his life, and the purity of his character, Sokrates led the way for his countrymen, on the path of righteous life: and by his most glorious death established the sincerity of his doctrine. If we embrace all this in thought we will cease to wonder, how that Sokrates, such as he is described by Xenophon, could have obtained from all men such celebrity and fame; and even in the divine genius of Plato could excite such admiration, that he attributed all his discoveries to his glorious master, from whose lips he had caught the first principles of all true investigation.

But to proceed to our immediate subject. The moral doctrine of the Xenophontian Sokrates seeks in every action, what may be its especial good. The moral doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates on the other hand, sets forward the highest good, in the abstract *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, i.e. the Deity. All that the human mind can reach which is good or beautiful, that he asserts is the most perfect exemplar of all virtue, which we should look to and follow all our life through. Who will assert that this doctrine is not most exalted and divine? but that it is Sokratic I vehemently deny. Can any art or science be found, which at its very origin springs forth finished and perfect in all its parts? Nay, it is natural to the matter itself, that he by whom the first foundation of Moral Philosophy was laid, should refer all science and all virtue to the standard of utility, i.e. to the test regarding the end of action; and should in every action seek, what might be its particular good, i.e. what each thing may contribute to the obtaining of happiness of life, which happiness is life's highest end. Dissen, and the followers of his opinion regarding the Xenophontian Sokrates,

interpret that utility which Sokrates shews should be followed in every action, as if it were perceived alone by certain advantages external to the action itself: but in this opinion they are wholly deceived: nay, that utility must be nothing else than the express end of action, or that which each looks to in action. Hence Sokrates laid down, that nothing can be good, unless it be useful (*ὠφέλιμον*.) *i. e.* unless it be that which has a close connection with happiness of life, while this happiness is not placed in pleasure but in virtues. And accordingly Sokrates is said to have usually execrated those, who first in thought severed the virtuous from the useful, united and coherent as these are by nature.

Besides what we have above stated as to the nature of the moral Philosophy of Sokrates, many other considerations exist against our calling in question the genuineness of the doctrine laid down by Xenophon.

And firstly, Xenophon was a most attentive auditor of Sokrates, and although less adapted by natural endowments for the more recondite disquisitions of Philosophy, yet he excelled in so many brilliant characteristics of mind and talent, that among all the friends and companions of Sokrates none was more fitted rightly to catch the true spirit of his master's teaching and faithfully hand it down to us. We do not insist upon his candour, purity of character, sterling judgment, his acquirements in literature, the gracefulness and elegance of his genius, his love of truth, and his whole life passed amid the bustling throng of men. Yet all these points wonderfully coincide with the disposition, character and life of Sokrates. If any other, Xenophon peculiarly should be called Sokratic. For he had imbibed in his heart the whole principles of his master, so that not only do all his writings breathe the same Sokratic spirit which we see stamped upon these commentaries, but his whole life is modelled and directed upon the principles of his precepts. Finally, from the very fact that Xenophon's natural talent was not such as to influence him to amplify his master's doctrine and enrich it with new discoveries, the strongest argument for his authenticity is derived. The fact is far otherwise in the case of Plato. The latter yielded not to Xenophon in love or admiration for his master, but from a certain divine exuberance of genius, an incredible acuteness of mind, an admirable faculty for conceiving imagery, born and formed as it were for the pursuit of the most recondite Philosophy, he could not rest within the limits of his master's teaching, or remain satisfied with his discoveries. But the first principles of Philosophy received from him he amplified by the celestial magnificence of his mind, and elevated from the humility of actual life, to his divine ideality. Neither the acuteness nor subtlety of the Platonic Philosophy, nor the sublimity and majesty of his style, harmonize with the genius of Sokrates, who daily conversed in the workshops and public streets, on virtue and vice, on good and evil. Of the whole system of Sokrates, (excepting a few of his axioms, such as that all virtue consists in knowledge,) Plato appears to have adopted nothing

else but his new^{*} and admirable mode of argument, by which he first acutely examined the principles of the human mind, and laid a secure foundation for thought. Nor are there any traces found in Plato, from which we can certainly conclude that the true and genuine doctrine of Sokrates is contained in his Dialogues. Nay, if with diligent study we read his Dialogues we clearly see many doctrines in the progress of time to be gradually improved, and at length perfected by Plato : and hence it is evident, that Plato did not hand down a philosophy already completed and imparted to him by another, but wrote a system of philosophy wholly and peculiarly his own, proceeding in improvement as his age increased. A difficult and dangerous line of argument they appear to me to have adopted, who conclude from the doctrine of a pupil, what the doctrine of the instructor should be, or be not ; especially if the disposition, life, and design of both were most different. On the other hand, Xenophon in his Commentaries, desired not to act the part of a Philosopher, but to support the character of a simple narrator, and in describing the life and teaching of his master, to defend him against the accusations of his enemies. He should accordingly have made it his highest care, religiously to preserve historical accuracy in all his statements. If we will cast an imputation of doubt upon Xenophon, we must confess that all the sources of ancient writers are impure, and the whole truth of antiquity on slippery ground.

It cannot indeed be asserted that Xenophon has given the dialogues of Sokrates in his express words unaltered. Since that does not appear to have been his own intention, and in many places he states his desire to mention " what he had treasured up in memory," while he often relates discussions related to him, by ear and eye witnesses. But it cannot be questioned that Xenophon, enjoying the closest intimacy with his master, most diligently observed his whole life, and made himself fully acquainted with his mode of disputation, constantly reviving by memory and meditation his sentiments and arguments. Nor is it at all unlikely that he set down briefly the heads of the discussions he heard from Sokrates.

The very form and style of the Sokratic sentiments in Xenophon is everywhere so moulded, that every portion presents the appearance of truth, and seems to be drawn from actual life. Moreover the same argument is frequently handled in different and separate discourses ; and if these were united together the subject would be completed with much more clearness and accuracy. Hence we may fairly conclude that Xenophon did not unite or compound his master's discussions, at his own fancy, but wrote them down as he had heard them delivered, if not in the precise words, at least preserving the sentiments and arguments.

Finally, it is no slight proof of Xenophon's authenticity, that he composed this commentary to defend the life and doctrine of his preceptor against the accusations of his adversaries. To this design what could be more abhorrent than to draw up a set of discourses from mere fiction, language which Sokrates had never uttered, and

to publish facts and sentiments at variance with his Philosophy, known as it was, to so many persons? Xenophon himself too in express terms tells us, that he relates either what he heard with his own ears, or from the lips of those who did.

Unless we are inclined to believe that Xenophon was so poorly endowed by nature, as to be unable to comprehend a Philosophy not speculative and remote from daily life, but a popular system formed and improved amid the throng of men; or so lost in reason, as by the corruption and alteration of his master's doctrine, not to see that he would enfeeble the whole power and force of his defence; or so guilty, as not to blush to recommend falsehood for truth, and thus overturn all faith and accuracy of statement; or finally of so weak a mind, as to prefer the petty reputation arising from a display of his own talent, to the glorious fame of a faithful and veracious writer: unless we are inclined to lay down this, we must acknowledge that Xenophon has handed down the true and genuine doctrine of Sokrates.

And yet so far am I from supposing that the entire and complete Philosophy of Sokrates is contained in the writings of Xenophon that I certainly believe much to have been delivered by Sokrates to his pupils and followers, which was unknown to Xenophon, or unconnected with the especial object of this book. Many subjects also, which are here cursorily and briefly touched upon by Sokrates, I believe to have been treated of more fully and accurately in other discourses. Yet, I also believe, that whatever may have been the nature of those discussions, which are not contained in this commentary, they all closely harmonized with the doctrine of Sokrates, as it has been here set forth by Xenophon.

V. ON THE DÆMON OF SOKRATES.

In all ancient writings concerning Sokrates, mention is constantly made of a Dæmon (*δαίμων*), which was, as it were, his constant companion through life. Since not only in ancient times, but even in our own day numerous and various opinions, often far-fetched and portentous, have been propounded, we are called upon to declare what conclusion we have come to regarding it, from a diligent comparison of all those passages in Plato and Xenophon, in which mention is made of the Dæmon, and also of a book specially written upon the subject by Plutarch.

And first we must remark that the word *δαίμων*, in general, signifies the same as *θεῖον*, i. e. "divine," whatsoever proceeds from the gods. Thus, in Mem. 1, 1, 9, "τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἶναι τῶν τοιοῦτων οἰομένους εἶναι δαίμονιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς ἀνθρώπου γνῶμης," the word *δαίμωνιον*, is opposed to all that springs from the operation of the human intellect. Hence τὸ δαίμωνιον (with the article) has the same meaning as τὸ θεῖον, "the deity," "the divinity," as in Mem. 1, 4, 2, λέξω . . . ἃ ποτε αὐτῷ ἤκουσα περὶ τοῦ δαίμονιον συμβαλέμενον. 10: οὔτοι . . . ἐπεροῦν τὸ δαίμωνιον. and iv. 3, 14: ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ ἀνθρώπων γε ψυχῇ, ἢ ἐπὶ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τοῦ θεῖου μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν διασκέδει ἐν ἡμῖν, φανερόν, ὁρᾶται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτῇ, Ἄ χρη κατενοῦντα μὴ

καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον (where it has evidently the same meaning as τοῦ Θεοῦ above). Hence also the plural form τὰ δαιμόνια, has usually the same meaning as οἱ Θεοί, as amongst the Germans, *die Gotthieten* for *Götter*: thus in Mem. 1, 1, 1, οὗς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει Θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἔτερα δὲ κατὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν; and similarly in numerous passages.

And first let us consider the passages in Xenophon relating to this subject.—See Mem. 1, 1, 2--5.

From that passage it clearly appears that the *Dæmon* (τὸ δαιμόνιον) was a certain divine voice or intimation which Sokrates mentally felt, and which either discouraged him from the performance of any act, or encouraged him in the performance of it. That this voice was divine, Sokrates concluded, because it never deceived him, but always eventuated true. This certain truth regarding future things could proceed from nothing except a deity. Nor was the perception of this voice limited only to his own immediate concerns, but aided him in assisting others by his counsel. In fine, what auguries, oracles, and other external signs of the divine will, were to the rest of men, his *Dæmon* was to Sokrates. Nor is there a less important passage in Mem. iv. 3. 12, 13. Where by many arguments having proved that the gods take diligent concern for the human race, he gives as the last proof of divine providence the fact, that the gods have granted divination to man, by which future events are discovered. To this Euthydemus replies, "To you, Sokrates, the gods seem to be more benign than to other mortals, since, even though not interrogated by you, they signify beforehand, what it is right you should do, and what not:" in which words Euthydemus alludes to the *δαιμόνιον* of Sokrates). To this Sokrates replies: ὅτι δὲ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένῃς, ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν Θεῶν ἰδῇς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῆ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς Θεοὺς. Ἐννόει δὲ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ Θεοὶ οὕτως ὑποδεικνύουσιν, &c. From this passage it is clear that Sokrates did not consider that the *δαιμόνιον* was given specially to himself alone, as a peculiar gift, by the Deity, but was common to him with other men. Other men indeed did not acknowledge this *δαιμόνιον*, simply because they had not faith in it, so as to be satisfied with perceiving its effects by their understanding, but wished to behold it bodily with their eyes. But in order that this divine voice may be heard by us, we worship the gods with piety and sanctity. Akin to these passages are Mem. iv. 8. 1: Εἰ δέ τις, ὅτι φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ (τοῦ Σοκράτους) τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐντῷ προσημαίνειν ἅ τε εἶσι καὶ ἅ μὴ εἶσι πράττειν, ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος, οἶεται αὐτὸν ἐλέγχεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου ψευδόμενον, ἐννοησάτω πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι, &c. Where Xenophon endeavours to prove that they were deceived who thought, because Sokrates was condemned to death and could not escape capital sentence, that therefore he had spoken falsely as regarded his *δαιμόνιον*; seeing that he asserted it to signify beforehand to him what he should do, and what he should

not. And Xenophon proves so by this argument, that the *δαίμωνιον* was right in allowing Sokrates to be put to death, since by death, no evil, but on the contrary, the highest good, was provided for him. Comp. § 5 and 6. Ἀλλὰ νῦν τὸν Διᾶ, φάναι αὐτόν (Sc. Σωκράτην), ὃ Ἑρμῶγενες, ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοῖς εἰκαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἡναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον. Καὶ αὐτὸς (Ἑρμογενες ἔφη) εἰπεῖν θανάσται λέγεις τὸν δὲ Σωκράτην, θανάσις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θιῶ ἔοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτᾶν τὸν βίον ἤδη; where Sokrates expressly says, that the advice of the Dæmon, was that which was pleasing to the Divinity. Sentences to the same purport are found Apol. 1. 2—13, where Sokrates calls his Dæmon “the voice of God,” *θεοῦ φωνήν*.

The passages from Plato, are as follows, Apol. p. 31. C. D. ἐμεῖς ἰμοῦ πολλακις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντας, ὅτι μοι θεῶν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίνεται ἰμοι δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἥ, ὅταν γένηται, αἰὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. Here we see that Plato agrees with Xenophon in explaining the power and meaning of this Dæmon: but disagrees in this, that while Xenophon, in many passages, asserts that Sokrates was not only prevented by the Dæmon from undertaking any act, but also was urged to undertake others, Plato expressly declares that the Dæmon had only a dissuasive power, never a persuasive. Nor less clearly is the latter's opinion stated in many places, *e. g.* Theag. p. 128. D. ἔστι γάρ τι θεία μοῖρα παροπόμενον ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἥ, ὅταν γένηται, αἰὶ μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τοῦτον ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε καὶ γὰρ τις μοι τῶν φίλων ἀνακρινώται καὶ γένηται ἡ φωνή, τάντων τοῦτο ἀποτρέπει, καὶ οὐκ ἐγὼ πράττειν καὶ τούτων ἱερὴν μάστιγος παρεξομαι. This extraordinary discrepancy may be removed, if with Tennemann we suppose that Xenophon d'd not accurately distinguish between the results to which the divine voice referred, and those which Sokrates himself inferred from its silence. If this voice, whenever it was heard by Sokrates, was a sign of discouragement, it follows of necessity, that as often as the voice was silent, its silence was a sign of encouragement and exhortation. In the Apology also, p. 40. A. B. C. it is clear that Sokrates took the silence of the Dæmon, as a sign of assent. And in Phædr. 242. B. C.: ἡνίκ' ἐμὲλλον τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημείον μοι γίνεσθαι ἐγένετο· αἰὶ δὲ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, where the words καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημείον are added as explanatory, “The Dæmon,” *i. e.* that well known sign.

Besides the above passages we may also compare, Euthyphr. p. 3. B. Theætet. p. 151. A. Polit. vi. p. 496. C. Alkib. i. p. 103. A. Those passages in Theages, a dialogue unjustly attributed to Plato, differ from those in Xenophon and Plato, because in them such power and efficacy is attributed to the Sokratic Dæmon, as that they who experienced the intimacy of Sokrates, although they had embraced none of his doctrine, by his mere presence and propinquity, advanced in virtue: yet not all, but only those whom the Deity,

willed should, (*ἐὰν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ*). This idea of the Sokratic daemon approaches nearest to that invented at a later period, and which attributed to Sokrates a sort of tutelary spirit or genius.

In Plutarch (*de Sokratis Genio*) many statements are made, partly strange, partly ridiculous, but yet some sentiments here and there interspersed, are admirable. In chap. x. Theokritus says, "that the daemon was given by God to Sokrates as his guide in life, to afford him light on obscure points, and knowledge in things not comprehended by human intellect, and to inspire his counsels by a certain divine spirit (*ἐπιθειάζον τῷ αὐτοῦ προαιρέσει*)." But what is afterwards related of the power of this daemon is ridiculous, *e. g.* "Sokrates wished once, with some of his friends, to enter the house of Andocides, but suddenly stopped in his way, being warned by his daemon. Having meditated in silence for a time, he then proceeded to his destination, not by the straight course, but by another route. Many of his friends followed him, but some, desirous of proving the daemon of Sokrates to be false, go by the straight course; as these latter proceeded, a herd of swine, covered with filth, meets them; and since they had no way to avoid their path, the swine overthrow some, and cover others with filth." Although this is a ridiculous and jocular anecdote, and the matter, if true, is rather to be attributed to chance than to the effect of the daemon, it is intended to prove that the daemon warned Sokrates not only in matters of great, but even in those of little importance. Which Plato also asserts in the passage cited above, *Apol. p. 40, chap. xi.* Plutarch agrees with Xenophon in attributing to the daemon both a persuasive and dissuasive force, (*δαμόνιον εἶναι τὸ κωλῶν ἢ κελεύον*. And then, having opposed the opinion of a certain Megarean, who thought the daemon of Sokrates to be "a sneeze," he thus proceeds:—"Αἱ δὲ Σωκράτους αὐτοῦ ὁρμῆς τὸ βέλβαιον ἔχουσιν καὶ σφοδρότητα φαίνονται πρὸς ἅπαν, ὥς ἂν ἐξ ὀρθῆς καὶ ἰσχυρᾶς ἀφαιρῆναι κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς; the whole life of Sokrates and his death, is not that *ἀνδρός ἐκκληθόνων ἢ πταρμῶν μεταβυλλομένην, οἷε τόχοι, γνώμην ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μείζονος ἐπιστασίας καὶ ἀρχῆς ἀγομένου πρὸς τὸ καλόν.* But, omitting other passages which do not tend to explain the matter, we proceed to one of considerable importance (*chap. xx.*)

(*Συμρίας*) Σωκράτην μὲν εἶπε περὶ τούτων ἐρόμενος ποτὲ μὴ τυχεῖν ἀποκρίσεως, ἵνα μὴδ' αὐτῷ ἐρίσθαι πολλάκις δ' αὐτῷ παραγενέσθαι τοῖς μὲν εἴ' ὅπως ἐντυχεῖν εἴη τινὶ λέγοντας ἀλαζόνας ἡγουμένους, τοῖς δ' ἀκοῦσαι τινος φωνῆς φάσκουσι προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν καὶ διαπνεύσαντες μετὰ σπουδῆς ὡς ἐν ἡμῖν παρίστατο, σκοποῦμένους ἵνα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὁποροῖν, μὴ ποτὲ τὸ Σωκράτους δαμόνιον οὐκ ὅψις, ἀλλὰ φωνῆς τινος αἰσθῆσις, ἢ λόγου νόησις εἴη, συνάπτοντος ἀτόκῃ τινὶ τρόπῳ πρὸς αὐτόν ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ὕπνον οὐκ ἔστι φωνή, λόγων δὲ τινῶν δοῦσας καὶ νοήσεις λαμβάνοντες, οἶονται φθεγγομένων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄναρ ἢ τοιαύτη σύνεσις γίνεται, δὲ ἡσυχίαν καὶ γαλήνην τοῦ σώματος, ὅταν καθεύδῃσι, μόλις ἐπήκουον ἔχουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν κρειττόνων· καὶ περὶ-

OF THE DÆMON OF SOKRATES.

γμῖνοι γε θορόβῳ τῶν παθῶν καὶ περιωγῇ τῶν χρητῶν
εἰσακούσαι καὶ παρασχεῖν τὴν εὐνοίαν οὐ δύνανται τοῖς
ἐηλουμένοις. Σωκράτης δὲ ὁ τοῦ καθαρῶς ὄν καὶ ἀπαθὲς τῷ
σώματι μικρὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν καταμειγνὺς αὐτόν, εὐαφὴς
ἦν καὶ λεπτός ὑπὸ τοῦ προσπνέοντος ἀέρος μεταβαλεῖν τὸ ἐν
προσπίπτειν οὐ φθάγων, ἀλλ' λόγον ἂν τρεῖς κάσιε δαίμονος,
ἀνερφονῆς ἰφιαπτόμενον αὐτῷ τῷ ἐηλουμένῳ τοῦ νοούντος.

Nor must we pass over in silence Cicero's opinion regarding the same demon "ut igitur," he proceeds: - "qui se tradet ita quieti, preparato animo quum bonis cogitationibus, tum rebus ad tranquillitatem accommodatis, certa et vera cernit in somnis: sic castus sensus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum et ad avium reliquorumque signorum et ad extorum veritatem est paratior. Hoc nimirum est illud, quod de Sokrate saepe dicitur, esse divinum quiddam, quod *δαίμόνιον* appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit, nunquam impellenti, saepe revocanti."

It remains now, from a comparison of these passages, briefly to state our own opinion regarding this point.

From all that has been cited above, it appears most clearly that the demon was not considered to have any external form or appearance; nor to have been any thing externally perceptible by the senses, but to have been a more intense emotion of the mind, which Sokrates called *δαίμόνιον*, from a persuasion that that emotion arose within him from the Deity. It is called indeed a divine voice, but we must understand by this a voice not heard by the bodily ears, but mentally perceived. This divine voice, which from his boyhood, as Plato states, was the lot of Sokrates, and never left him during his whole life, was always heard by him, as often as he was about to do any thing neither rightly or honourably: its silence he considered to be a sign of approbation; and so this demon is thought by Xenophon to have had both a persuasive and dissuasive power. Not only in matters pertaining to Sokrates alone, but also in those of others, in subjects of great or little importance, this voice was heard in warning; it never deceived, but always spoke the truth; and hence Sokrates was convinced of its divinity. Nor did Sokrates consider that divine voice to be any peculiar benefit given by God to himself alone, but to be shared also with other men: that its power could be mentally perceived by all men who worship the gods with piety and truth, and are pure and chaste. Hence it is clear that this demon was nought else than an emotion of the mind, by which Sokrates was dissuaded from his design of performing any thing; an emotion common indeed to all other men, but not having the same efficacy in all, but in proportion to the purity and integrity of each, in proportion to his acuteness and vigour of intellect, to his upright thoughts and chastity of character, so the more vivid and efficacious. It should not be wondered at that this emotion of an interior power in the majority of men should be so trifling and powerless as not to be perceived at all, while in Sokrates it was most vigorous and impulsive. For Sokrates was imbued with the most delicate

sense of honour, rare purity of character, heartfelt piety towards God, and a firm persuasion of his providential care. Endowed, moreover, with a wonderful acuteness of intellect, vigour of mind, and clearness of judgment, he investigated the whole nature of the human mind, and paid the closest attention to its emotions. But this *καὶρόν* did not shed its light alike on all subjects, but only on those which could not be embraced within the scope of human thought. For since reason was given by God to the human race, Sokrates considered it impious to strive after divine forewarnings, in all things which man could discover by the exertion of that intellect alone.

XENOPHON.

THE MEMORABILIA OF SOKRATES.

FROM THE TEXT OF RAPHAEL KÜHNER.

BOOK 1.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.—Sokrates was condemned to death, because of two charges which were laid against him; *α.*—that he did not worship the gods of his country, but introduced strange divinities. *β.*—that he corrupted the youth (§ 1.) The first charge Xenophon endeavours to answer by the following arguments:—

1. Sokrates publicly made offerings to the gods of his country as other Athenians did (§ 2.)
2. He made use of divination. He alleged indeed that the *τὸ δαιμόνιον* foretold the future to him, but in this he did not differ from other Athenians: who observed sacrifices, auguries, and similar rites, not because they thought these rites, &c. knew of themselves what might be useful to man, but that the gods would indicate it, by their instrumentality. He differed, however, from them in this, that the many stated they were dissuaded from, or persuaded to, any act by these auguries, or other signs: while Sokrates never concealed his genuine sentiments, but boldly stated that the *τὸ δαιμόνιον* gave *direct* indications to himself. Whence it is evident, that this *δαιμόνιον* was no novel deity, introduced by Sokrates (as his accusers stated), but a certain divine essence, innate in the minds of men, which impelled or recalled them, in their attempts. (§ 5. does not belong to this discussion.)

Moreover regarding matters of action which must be done, no matter what the result may be, he assisted his friends by his advice. but on obscure points only, and those hidden from the minds of men, he thought the gods should be consulted. To

question the gods regarding things which could be known by mere human intellect, he considered a great crime (§ 6—9.)

3. Although Sokrates was ever engaged in public, yet no one ever saw or heard from him, an impious act or word. Rejecting all investigations on physical matters, to which the philosophers of that day had wholly devoted themselves, he thought that matters of human conduct should be discussed by man; and that those questions only should be treated of, the knowledge of which tended to make men better, as on virtue—vice—the state—human government, &c. All other questions regarding abstruse points of philosophy, which never could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, he thought were useless and vain (§ 10—17.)
- But honesty and probity of morals, he not only inculcated on others, but gave an example in his life; this Xenophon proves by an instance, namely, the refusal of Sokrates to vote for the death of the nine generals (§ 18—20.)

Although it cannot be doubted that Sokrates rejected all the superstitious and frivolous rites of his contemporaries, yet to prevent confusion and disturbance in the public worship, he appears desirous to retain all these rites and ceremonies of religion, by which the idea of divine excellence, providence, and supremacy was typified. Accordingly, blest with a purer notion of the divine character, and real piety towards the gods, he endeavoured to reconcile his opinions, and amalgamate them, with the public ordinances, and to set forth their result as a strong example to his citizens, by the holiness of his life, and the effect of his good example. All this, he thought would enlighten and reform his fellow countrymen, so that, even with the retention of their old ritual of observances, they would mentally conceive a superior mode of worshipping the deity.

In these books Sokrates has so very frequently mentioned oracles and prophecy, that it cannot be questioned but that he believed the gods foretold events to man. And this opinion, originating from the pious feelings he entertained, was strengthened by his belief, that whenever he was about doing any act, which would not be proper or right, he felt a certain emotion of the mind which dissuaded him from its accomplishment. This emotion is indeed common to all men, but none felt it in a stronger or more powerful form than Sokrates.—Regarding the statement that Sokrates utterly rejected all physical questions, we will offer some remarks on Book IV. Chap. VII.

1. FREQUENTLY have I wondered, by what arguments in the world, the accusers¹ of Sokrates convinced the Athenians, that he was deserving of death at the hands of

¹ The accusers of Sokrates were *Meletus*, a wretched composer of tragedies and second rate songs; *Anytus*, a leather dresser, and *Lycon*, one of the public orators.

the state. For the indictment against him was nearly of this purport; "Sokrates violates the law, in not² worshipping the gods whom the city worships, and by introducing other strange divinities.³ He violates the law also by perverting our youth."

2. With regard to the first charge, then, "that he did not worship the gods whom the city worships," what proof did they make use of? For he was frequently observed sacrificing both in his own court-yard,⁴ and frequently also, at the public altars of the city: clearly too did he manifest his belief in prophecy: for it was rumoured abroad, how Sokrates used to say that the divinity⁵ gave him special indications: from which circumstances indeed, more than any other, they appear to me to have derived the charge against him, of introducing strange divinities.

3. Yet he introduced nothing more strange than others, who believing in divinations, consult the omens from birds,⁶ and voices, and signs, and victims: for even these suppose not that birds, or the men who casually meet them, know of themselves what will prove beneficial to the consulter of divination, but that by these, as instruments, the gods indicate such things: and such was his belief also.

4. Still the majority of persons say, that by ominous birds, or casual meetings, they were diverted from their purpose, or urged to it: but Sokrates so spoke, as he really believed, for he said it was the divinity, which gave him these indications. And frequently he forewarned many of his associates to do some things, and not to do others, asserting that the divinity had previously warned himself: and those who obeyed his suggestions, found it advantageous, but those who happened to neglect them, repented.

² Νομίζει θεούς, which Kruger interprets *deos more publico* (τῷ νόμῳ) *receptos colere*: while ἡγῆται θεούς is simply *deos esse credere*.

³ Sokrates, in joke and irony, used to swear "by the dog and the plane-tree, &c." See Plat. Ap. Soc. 24. Luc. Βιωτ. πρ. § 12.

⁴ Οἶκος, i. e. in the court yard, ἀνὰ τῷ: as the Romans used to sacrifice in the *compluvium*.

⁵ See Prolegomena, § v.

⁶ Φήματα, *sunt omnia quæ capiuntur e vocibus hominum*.—ΚΥΗΝ.

5. And yet who would not at once acknowledge¹ that he desired neither to be considered a fool or a boaster, by his associates? And undoubtedly he would have appeared to be both, if he forewarned them of matters as if they were foreshewn by God, and then was proved to be a liar. It is clear, then, that he would not have foretold these matters, unless he trusted his words would prove true. And in whom could one trust regarding future events, except in a deity? How then could he who trusted in gods,² not believe that gods existed?

6. Towards his friends, certainly, he acted conformably to this belief: for matters which were necessary whatever their result, he advised them so to do, as they thought these would be best effected: but regarding matters, uncertain in their issue³ if accomplished, he sent them to consult the oracles whether they should be done.

7. And he asserted, that those who intended to regulate advantageously their families, or states, had need of prophecy; for as regarded architecture, or smith-work, or agriculture, or command over men, or quick perception⁴ in such occupations, or reasoning ability, or skill regarding economy or strategy, all such being subjects of art, he considered could be fully known by the force of human intellect alone.

8. Yet so as to say that the more important results arising from these subjects, the gods reserved for them-

¹ Xenophon departs from the immediate subject of discussion, and turns to a new statement, not referred to in the accusation. The charge was, "that Sokrates introduced new deities," not that he wholly disbelieved in the gods.

² The sentiment runs thus, "a certain knowledge of future events can be attributed to none but God; if therefore any one fully confides in the truthful result of omens, he must refer this confidence in future events to the gods, who alone know and decide future events."

³ *i. e.* he advised his disciples to consult the oracle, on acts, which if accomplished, no one could pronounce how they would eventuate.

⁴ ἑξαστητικός, *i. e.* one who can well demonstrate the excellencies or defects of different works, although he never personally engaged in them: one who is engaged in θεωρία (speculation) not in πράξις (workmanship).

selves : and that not one of these was self-evident to humanity. For it was by no means certain to him who had admirably cropped his land, who should reap its fruits : nor was it clear to him who had well built a house, who should inhabit it : nor was it clear to the man of ability in generalship, whether it would be for his advantage to take the field : nor to the individual versed in state affairs, if it would be beneficial to him to be the state-minister of his city. Nor to him who had married a beautiful woman to complete his happiness, was it certain whether he should not be agonized⁵ through her means : nor was it evident to the person who had acquired relatives powerful in the state, whether he should not be banished from the state by them.

9. Those who supposed that none of such results depended upon heaven, but all on human intellect, he said, were mad ; and mad also were they who consulted oracles regarding subjects which God had granted men to know by human faculties : as for instance, if one were to question, whether it were better to take to drive the team,⁶ a person skilled in driving steeds, or one who was not : or whether it were better to place over his ship a skilful pilot, or one who knew not how to steer : or regarding matters which we can have accurate knowledge of by counting, or measuring, or weighing : those who made inquiry of the gods upon such questions, he thought, acted most unrighteously. And consequently he asserted, that we should seek human instruction on matters, which God had ordained that man when instructed should himself perform : but that regarding subjects veiled to mankind, it was lawful to try by means of prophecy to gain information from the gods ; for the gods always give indications to those, towards whom they are propitious.

10. Now, in the first place, he constantly lived in public : for at early morn, he used to go to the public

⁵ Ἀνάσσειται . . . στερήσεται . . . passive accipienda. . . Thuc. iii. 2. ΚΥΘΥΝ, who proceeds “ facile fieri posse, ut quis ex pulchra uxore, vel ex potentioribus affinibus detrimentum caperet.” I cite this for the benefit of the reviewer of the previous edition of this book.

⁶ Ἐπὶ ζεύγος, = *ad vehendum*, seeing that the article is omitted. On the contrary, ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν below, is = *in navem quam quis habet*. The article frequently having the force of a pronoun possessive.

walks¹ and gymnasia ; and at the time of full market² he was to be seen there ; and the remaining portion of the day he spent where he was likely to meet with the greatest number of associates : and he constantly held his conversations : and all who pleased, had the privilege of hearing him.

11. Nor did one individual ever know of his committing³ any act or uttering any word characterized by impiety or unrighteousness. For he did not so discuss concerning the nature of the universe, as the majority of philosophers⁴ did : by forming speculations,⁵ as to how that which is called by sophists⁶ "the world" was at its origin constituted : or to what necessary laws⁷ each celestial body is obedient. Nay, he considered that they trifled, who scrutinized such subjects.

12. And of such persons he used to question, whether from an idea that they had accurately acquired a

¹ Περιπάτους, porticoes built for the use of the public, to take air and exercise : similarly, *ambulatio* is used by the Latins to denote *ambulacrum*. See Cic. Tusc. iv. 4--7.

² Πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς, the antemeridian time was divided into two parts, the second of which was usually styled *περὶ πλήθουσαι ἀγορᾶν*, or as in the text.

³ Σωκράτους . . . εἶδεν : *εἶδεν* construed with a genitive by a sort of attraction, from the sequence of *ἤκουσεν*.

⁴ It is plain from Xenophon himself (Symp. vi. 6.), that Sokrates did not abstain from discussions on physical subjects ; but he rejected all vain inquiries as to the origin of the world, the primal cause of heavenly objects, and other obscure points, which were the only subjects of discussion held by preceding Philosophers, excepting Archelaus. He investigated chiefly what was the divine efficacy, the nature of man, and its connexion with that of the Deity, &c. See below, iv. § 7.

⁵ Φροντίζοντες, "accusativum ubi adsciscit hoc verbum, transitivum vim induit significatque scrutari, investigare, studiose curare aliquid."—Künz.

⁶ The earlier Philosophers were all called *Σοφισταί*. Pythagoras first is said modestly to have styled himself *Φιλόσοφος*.

⁷ *i. e.* what he just before called *Φύσις ἡ τῶν πάντων*, not merely the heaven and the stars. Pythagoras is said to have first used the term (Phot. Bib. Cod. 659). The Latin word *mundus* corresponds exactly to the Greek.

⁸ Ἀνάγκαι=*nature leges*, Ἀνάγκη, sing. is properly "fatal necessity ;" ἀνάγκαι plur. parts of that necessity, *i. e.* "laws." See Eurip. Hec. 834.

knowledge of human conduct,⁹ they therefore proceeded to speculate on heavenly matters ; or whether, by shewing contempt for human matters, and speculating on celestial, they thought they were acting as became them.

13. He wondered, too, how it did not strike them that it is impossible for man accurately to discover such things ; since even those who pride themselves most for their investigations on these subjects, by no means agree in opinion with each other, nay rather, are disposed towards each other as madmen.

14. For of madmen, some fear not what is really terrible, others are again affrighted at things by no means formidable ; and some consider it not disgraceful to speak or do any act whatever before the crowd, while others think they should not come before men at all. Some honour neither temple, or altar, or any other thing dedicated to the gods, while others venerate common stones, and stocks,¹⁰ and beasts ; and so, of those speculators concerning the nature of the universe, some suppose there to be but one world existing,¹¹ others that there is a countless multitude ;¹² some, that all things are in a state of unceasing agitation,¹³ others, that they are never agitated at all ;¹⁴ some, that all things have an origin,¹⁵ and consequent destruction, others, that nothing has either origin or dissolution.

⁹ *Τὰνθρώπινα*=quod ab homine factum sit : *ἀνθρώπεια*, without the article, *quod humana naturæ conveniat* : but this distinction is not always observed.

¹⁰ *Ἔθλα*. Schneider thinks *statues* of wood or stone to be intended ; but the epithet *τὰ τυχόντα*, disproves this. Xenophon alludes to the principle of Fetichism.

¹¹ Thales, Pythagoras, Empedokles, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Melæsius, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, maintained *ἓνα τὸν Κόσμον εἶναι*. Xenophanes, founder of the Eleatic school, *ἐν εἶναι τὰ πάντα καλούμενα*.

¹² He alludes apparently to Leukippus, the author of the Atomic theory (A. C. 500), or his pupil Demokritus, who carried out the doctrines of his master ; on whom Epikurus and Lucretius have modelled their philosophical system.

¹³ Herakleitus, of Ephesus, surnamed *σκοτεινός* (A. C. 500), thought all things to be involved in constant vicissitude and change, which he called *τὴν τῶν πάντων ῥοήν*. See *Enc. βιωτ. πρ.* 10.

¹⁴ The opinion of Zeno, of Elia, (A. C. 460).

¹⁵ Leukippus, who thought all things to arise from the concurrence

15. He considered also thus concerning them: whether,—as those who have learned human arts, think that they are able to practise for themselves, or for any other whom they may feel inclined, that art which they have learned—do speculators on celestial things similarly imagine, when they have ascertained the immutable laws to which each thing is subject, that they, when they will, can form winds, or water, or seasons, or any other such thing they may require; or, whether they do not absolutely expect that power, but are satisfied merely to know the cause by which each thing arises?

16. Such were his sentiments regarding speculators on these points; but oft as he had opportunity¹ he conversed on subjects regarding man, investigating what was pious, what impious, what beautiful, what depraved, what just, or unjust, what self-restraint, what madness, what manliness,² what servility, what the nature of a city, or one engaged in civil life, what the nature of government over men, or of him who was skilled in such government; as also regarding such other objects, by the knowledge of which he supposed men would become honourable and worthy;³ while they who were ignorant of them, should justly be called servile.

17. With respect to those subjects, however, which he did not openly express his opinions concerning, it is by no means strange that his judges should have viewed him unfavourably:—but, is it not wonderful, that they never thought of those his opinions which all men knew?

18. For when elected Senator,⁴ he took the oath (σύγκρισις) of atoms, or their dissolution (ἐνέκρισις). The following sentence may be referred to the tenets of Zeno of Elia.

¹ Such is the force here of the particle *ἀν*, with the indic. past tenses, see Herm. Vig. p. 820.

² *ἀνδρεία*, from the adjective *ἀνδρεῖος*, *virilitas*. The other reading is *ἀνδρία*, from *ἀνдр*, *virtus*.

³ The *καλὸς καγαθὸς*, is one not only perfect in every virtue both of body and mind, but also in the elegancies and refinements of civilized society—the perfect gentleman. *ὁ εὐγενὴς καὶ γενναῖος*.

⁴ *Βουλευσας* = *senator factus*, such is the force of the aorist. The Athenian Senate consisted of 500 members, chosen in fifties from each of the 10 tribes. These 500 were divided, according to their tribes into 10 bodies of 50 each, called *πρυτανεαὶ*, each *Prytaneia* presided over the state for 35 or 36 days, and from them

prescribed for the office, in which was a clause "that he would give his vote in strict accordance with the law:" and being High President in the State on that day when the populace wished to put to death Thrasyllus and Erasinides, and their fellow Generals,⁵ by a single vote,⁶ in violation of the laws: he would not put the question to the vote, although the populace were enraged against him, and many influential persons threatened him. Nay, he considered it far more precious to observe the purity of his oath than to gratify the people in violation of all justice, or protect himself against those who menaced him.

19. For he considered that the gods had a deep concern for men, but not in the manner many supposed: for these imagine that the gods know some things, and know not others: but Sokrates believed that the gods knew all things, both words, and deeds, and silent counsels,—that they were omnipresent, and gave indications to men concerning all human objects.

20. I wonder then, how in the world, the Athenians were persuaded that Sokrates had not right views regarding the deities⁷—a man, who never spoke, and never did a single impious word or act towards them: nay, on the other hand, did so speak and so act regarding them, as that any other who thus spoke and acted, would not only really be, but should also be considered, the most pious of mankind.

were by lot elected, 10 πρόεδροι, for each 7 days, whose office was to preside in the senate. The chief of these 10, had the key of the treasury, and was called ἐπιστάτης, his office lasted but a day.

⁵ In the year 406 B.C., the Athenians conquered the Lacedæmonians at the islands Arginusæ. After the combat was decided a violent storm arose, by which the Athenian generals were prevented from collecting and burying the slain: for this, all, excepting Conon, were accused and condemned to die.

⁶ This was in direct violation of the law which ordered κρίνειν ἕκαστον, to judge each accused person separately.—He mentions these two particularly, for Erasinides voted that the Athenians should sail with all speed to where the enemy were, off Mitylene. Thrasyllus, left some ships to collect the dead, but despatched others against the enemy. This was the first time Sokrates held any political office.

⁷ Σωφρονεῖν περὶ τῶν θεῶν=recte sentire ratione habita deorum.—Kuhn.

CHAPTER II.

INTRODUCTION.—The second charge, that Sokrates corrupted the young, Xenophon opposes by the following arguments :—

1. Sokrates dissuaded the young from impiety, contempt of law, intemperance and effeminacy, by inspiring them with a love of virtue, and with the hope that they would, if they pursued her, be excellent and worthy men.—His instruction had the more weight, for his life was a living exemplar of his doctrines (§ 3—8.)
2. His whole teaching tended to the rejection of force, or violence, and to shew the superior effect of persuasion (§ 9—11.) Nor are the examples of Kritias and Alkibiades to be urged against him, since they attended him merely to acquire political knowledge :—nor were they tyrannical, until long after they had departed from Sokrates (§ 12—18.) And virtue, unless in constant practice, is gradually weakened, and at length overcome (§ 19—23.) They were corrupted rather by the bad example of other men, (§ 24—28) not by Sokrates, who omitted no pains to recall them from depravity, and eventually rendered them his enemies (§ 28—48.)
3. The assertion that Sokrates endeavoured to teach contempt of parents, friends, &c. by quoting verses of certain poets, in a perverted meaning, depends wholly on idle and frivolous assertions (§ 49—55.)
4. Finally that is absurd, which the accusers assert of Sokrates, that he interpreted verses of celebrated poets, in a bad meaning, and thus by their authority taught youths ill-will to the Commons, and a love of tyranny (§ 56—60.) On the contrary, his whole life had but this one object, to benefit all men gratuitously (§ 61.) And seeing that such was his character, he deserved, so far from meeting with punishment, the highest honours from the state (§ 62—64.)

1. It seems strange to me, also, how certain parties were persuaded that Sokrates perverted the young; since while he had the greatest self-restraint of all men, as regards sensuality and appetite, he was also the most endurant of frost, and heat, and toil of every kind. Moreover, he was so trained to require but little, that though he possessed only very trifling¹ means, he readily had a sufficiency.

2. How then, when such was his own character, would he be likely to render others impious, or illegal, or gluttonous, or intemperate in love affairs, or effeminate

¹ Sokrates says, (Oecon. 11, 3.) that if he met with a liberal purchaser, he might possibly get for his house, and all he had, five minæ, about £21.

with respect to toil? Nay, rather, by inspiring a desire of virtue, and affording hopes, that if the young would cultivate their own minds, they would eventually become excellent and worthy, he diverted them from such vices.

3. And yet he never pretended to be an instructor in this course; but through his own character being clearly such, he caused all those who frequented his society,² to entertain a hope, that by a constant endeavour to imitate him, they would eventually become of similar character.

4. With respect to the body, he neither was neglectful himself, nor did he commend those who were. He disapproved of violent labour when one was gorged³ with an over-hearty meal, but approved of duly digesting by occupation, the food which the appetite⁴ received pleasantly: for such a habit he asserted was admirably adapted for health, and did not embarrass the cultivation of the intellect.

5. Most certainly, however, he was by no means effeminate or ostentatious⁵ in his upper robes, or sandals, or any other habit of life; nor, on the contrary, did he render his associates avaricious: for, firstly, he caused them to forego all other worldly desires, and, secondly, he exacted⁶ no reward from those who desired his instruction.

² Σκνῆταισιβάρται, Sokrates never calls those who attended his instructions μαθηταί, but uses the terms συνούρται, γυμνάσιον, ἐπιτηδείοι, &c. In this Sokrates opposed his manner to the Sophists, who assumed to teach fully all sciences to their pupils. He merely studied the same subjects as his fellow-learners. See Grote, Vol. viii. p. 555.

³ He alludes to the Athletes, whose voracity was proverbial. Comp. Cic. Tusc. ii. 17, 40. "Subduc unum diem Athletæ: Jovem Olympium, eum ipsum, cui se exercebit, implorabit: ferre non posse clamabit."

⁴ Ψυχῇ, denotes not only the "life," or mind, but its inclinations and powers, like Lat. *animus*; hence its powers of sustentation, *appetite*; as here, and Cyrop. viii. 7, 4.

⁵ In opposition to the Sophists, who assumed magnificent and costly apparel.

⁶ The passage is remarkably concise, as Sokrates desired to restrain his pupils from *all desires*, he checked the passion of cupidity, by shewing himself to be above the ruling passion for money. Here too he alludes to the contrary practice of the Sophists. Diogenes however asserts that Sokrates made a regular trade of teaching. See Grote, Vol. viii. p. 549.

6. And by refraining from this, he considered he secured his own liberty. Those who took money for their lectures, he styled enslavers of themselves; seeing that thus, of necessity, they were forced to converse with those from whom they might have acquired reward.

7. He wondered, too, how any panegyrist of virtue could bargain for money; and not think he would have the greatest blessing, by securing for himself a faithful friend, and rather should fear that he who thus became most excellent and worthy would not entertain the liveliest gratitude to his greatest benefactor.

8. Sokrates, however, never professed so much to any one, but did believe that those of his disciples, who received his opinions, for all future time would be faithful friends to himself and to each other. How, pray, could such a character pervert the young? unless, forsooth, the pursuit of virtue be corruption.

9. But, by Jove, quoth the accuser, he caused his pupils to despise our established laws, by stating how ridiculous it was to elect magistrates¹ for a city, by the hap-hazard of a lot by the beam; ² and that no individual desired to employ constantly³ a lot-elected pilot, or architect, or one in any other profession, in which if error be committed, it causes by far less injury than errors regarding a city's administration. Such statements as these, the accuser says, excited the young to despise the established form of government, and rendered them violent.

10. Yet I, for my part, think that the cultivators of intellectual power, and who believe they will be able, eventually, to instruct⁴ their fellow-citizens in vital interests, by no means become violent: aware as they

¹ Καθίστασθαι τινα=*aliquem sibi collocare vel creare*: καθιστά-
ναι τινά=*aliquem alii collocare vel creare*: K.—Sauppe erroneously supposed καθίστασθαι to be used passively here.

² The Athenian magistrates were elected by lot: the lots were white and black beans: whence they are called οἱ ἀπὸ κνύμου ἀρχοντες, and κνήμεντοί.

³ Κεχρησθαι, the perfect has the idea of continuance. See Butt. ii. 256. Cyrop. viii. 2, 23.

⁴ The future here indicates a matter that will surely result on certain conditions. "Ego vero credo eos, qui animi cultui operam dant, seque putant, si tempora vel res ita ferant, idoneos futuros esse civium præceptores," &c.

are, that to violence is always attached hostility and danger, while by means of persuasion, the same results are gained, unattended by danger, and with the advantage of friendship. For men, when forced by compulsion, hate as if they had been robbed, while those who are persuaded, love as if grateful for services received.⁵ It is not the part, assuredly, of those who cultivate the mental powers to act by compulsion, but of those who possess brute force without intellect.

11. Moreover, undoubtedly the man who dares to commit open force has need of allies not a few; he who uses persuasion requires none; for even if deserted by others, he would still hope to be able to persuade. Further, it is by no means likely that men of such character would commit bloodshed: for who would reasonably prefer rather to slay a man, than to experience him as a loving subject voluntarily?

12. But the accuser asserted that Kritias⁶ and Alkibiades, from their connection with Sokrates, committed the greatest evils upon the state. For of all in the oligarchy, Kritias was the most avaricious and most violent; and on the other hand, Alkibiades was the most intemperate and insolent, and violent of those in the democracy.

13. And for my part, I will not make any defence for them, if they committed any evil to the state: but I will narrate simply respecting their intimacy with Sokrates, how it was.

14. For these two personages were by nature the most ambitious of all the Athenians, both being desirous that all things should be managed by themselves, and that they should be the most celebrated of all. They were aware that Sokrates lived, most independently, upon the most trifling means; that he was most continent in all

⁵ Κεχαρισμένοι = *beneficiis affecti*, Kuhn. thus the opposition is plain between κεχαρισμένοι and ἀφαιρεθέντες = *spoliati*. Schutz interprets the word by *gratificati*.

⁶ Son of Kalliaschrus, and one of the thirty tyrants imposed on the Athenians after the end of the Peloponnesian war (403 B. C.) He conducted his office with the greatest cruelty, and was at length put to death by Thrasybulus.

pleasures; and that by his reasonings he dealt with all who held converse with him, exactly as he pleased.

15. Since they saw all this, and were such characters as I have stated, whether would any one assert, that solely through a desire of such a life as Sokrates led, and such temperance as he practised, they were eager for his intimacy? and not rather from a consideration, that if they associated for a time with him they might become most powerful both in eloquence and politics?

16. Most certainly, I think, that if the Deity granted them one of two alternatives,—either to pass their entire life, exactly as they saw Sokrates passing his, or to die,—they would much prefer to die. And they proved this by the acts they perpetrated; for the moment they considered themselves superior to all their compeers, straightway they bounded away from Sokrates, and took part in state affairs, the very object for which they sought for Sokrates.

17. Perhaps some one may reply to this, that Sokrates ought not to have taught his followers the science of public life, until he first had inculcated self-restraint. To this I make no reply at present;¹ however, I do see that all teachers both make themselves an example to their pupils, in order to shew they practise what they teach, and also train them up to similar conduct by arguments.

18. I know, accordingly, that Sokrates proved to his pupils that he was an excellent and honourable man; and that he discoursed most admirably regarding virtue and the rest of human conduct. And I know that these restrained themselves as long as they associated with Sokrates, not through fear lest they should be punished Or beaten by Sokrates, but from a persuasion at that time that such was their best line of action.

19. Perchance many of those who style themselves philosophers may allege, that a just man never could become unjust, nor a modest man insolent: and that regarding any other object, of which there is a method of teaching, he who once became acquainted with it could

¹ This accusation Xenophon now does not answer. It is fully met in Book iv. 3, 1.

not ever become ignorant. But I do not so consider regarding these points : for I see, that as those who do not constantly exercise their bodily powers,² are not able to execute the works proper to the body, so that those who do not constantly cultivate the mind are not able to accomplish the works proper to the mind ; for they have no ability to effect what they ought, or to refrain from what they should.

20. And therefore fathers restrain their sons, even though these be moral of themselves, from the company of evil men : as if intimacy with the virtuous were a sort of practice of virtue, but association with the guilty its deterioration. The poet gives his testimony in my favour, saying,³

“ By worthy men you will be taught worthy acts, but if with the evil you associate, you will destroy even the intellect you have.”

And he who says,

“ The worthy man is sometimes erring, sometimes excellent.

21. And to these I join my testimony ; for I see, as they who do not keep up their practice, forget the metrical compositions of Epic song ; so also an oblivion of precepts of instruction gradually steals over those who neglect them. And when once an individual forgets the words of admonition, he forgets also the emotions, under whose influence the mind desires wisdom : and when he has once forgotten these, it is by no means wonderful that he should forget wisdom herself.

22. I see also those who are led on to a love of drinking, and those involved in affairs of gallantry,⁴ less competent either to attend to their necessary duties, or to

² The opinion of Sokrates, that virtue could be acquired by instruction and improved by practice, see more fully stated below, iii. 9, 1, and iv. 1. Whether virtue was to be obtained by learning, and was not a natural quality, was frequently discussed by the ancient philosophers. See Hecuba, 460.

³ The following distich is borrowed from Theognis, v. 35, 36. Sokrates appears to have been fond of quoting it. See Xen. Symp. ii. 4 ; Plat. Mem. 95, D. Whence the other verse is taken is not known.

⁴ Ἔρωτας, the different species and degrees of love. See above, § i. 11, on ἀνάγκαι.

refrain from what they should not do; for many who were able to refrain from money before they first felt a passion for it, when once smitten with its desire, no longer can do so; and if they have spent their money, they no longer abstain from such means of gain, as they formerly despised, from a belief that they were disgraceful.

23. How then is it not possible, that a man of temperance heretofore may become intemperate: or that he who was inclined to act with justice, could become unjust? My own opinion is, that all that is honourable and excellent is acquired by practice, and not least so, self-restraint. For voluptuous passions,¹ growing in the same body with the soul itself, persuade it not to exercise self-government, but as quickly as possible to gratify themselves and the bodily frame.

24. Kritias, in fine, and Alkibiades, while they remained with Sokrates, were enabled, assisted by his alliance, to master dishonourable passion; but when they left him, Kritias fled into Thessaly, and there associated with men living in lawlessness² rather than justice; but Alkibiades, on the other hand, courted by many females of high rank, for his great personal beauty; and flattered by many, whose flattery had weight with him, for his power both in the city and among the allies,³—honoured, too, by the populace, and without a compeer the foremost man of all, became neglectful of self-cultivation: as often the foremost Athletcs in gymnastic contests neglect the practice of their art.

25. When such occurrences happened to both, elated by their lineage, proud for their wealth, puffed up by

¹ *Αἱ ἡδοναὶ*, thus *voluptates* is used by the Latins to express the *desires* of pleasure.—For the plural, see preced. note, and 1, 1, 11.

² The whole nation of the Thessalians were proverbial for their licentiousness of life, perfidy, and treachery. See Plat. Crit. 53, D.

³ *Τοὺς δυνατοὺς κολακεύειν*, this does not mean “men able to flatter,” “skilled in flattery,” = *δεινοὶ κολακεύειν*: but men likely to influence Alkibiades by their flattery, as being rich, powerful, eminent for rank or splendour of life, whose praises would have weight.

their power, enervated⁴ by numerous courtiers, and corrupted by all these means; when too they had for a long period deserted Sokrates, what wonder if they became too insolent?

26. Then, pray, if they committed any outrage, does the accuser lay this to the charge of Sokrates? and does not the same Sokrates appear to his accuser's eyes to deserve any praise, because when they were young, —a period at which they were naturally rebellious and ungovernable,—he rendered them discreet?

27. Assuredly all other matters are judged of in this way; for what professor of the flute, or harp: or what teacher of any class, who instructed his pupils fully: if they attached themselves to others, and became worse, is to be blamed for this result? What father, pray, if his son should be chaste, while dwelling with one; but afterwards on abiding with another, should become dissolute, would blame the former? Would he not rather praise more highly his former master in proportion to his inferiority under another? Nay, even fathers abiding with their sons, are not blamed, if these sons commit outrage, provided they themselves are sober-minded.

28. And so it were fair to judge of Sokrates: if he committed any evil act, naturally he would have appeared to be wicked; but if throughout his whole life he continued prudent, with what justice can he be charged with baseness no way connected with himself?

29. Still, even though he performed no evil act himself, if when he saw others acting wickedly he praised⁴ them, justly would he have been censured. On this point, then, having perceived that Kritias was enamoured of Aristodemus, and endeavoured to obtain⁵ his favours,—

⁴ Διαθροπτομένος “aptum vocabulum de eo, qui incantatione quasi emollitur. frangitur et corrumpitur.” Cyrop. vii. 2, 23.

⁵ Most commentators consider the active *περιῶντα* to be used here for the middle. Kühner considers such an usage quite unexampled in Xenophon; he accordingly removes the punctuation after *Εὐθύδημον*, and supplies *αὐτὸν* to *περιῶντα*, thus explaining the whole passage, “Quum Sokrates animadverteret Kritian Euthydemum amore captum esse, eumque (i.e. ejus pudicitiam) tentare, ut eo potiretur, *περιῶν τινα*, ut Lat. *tentare*, significat *ad amorem pellicere, pudicitiam tentare*.”

like those who use their bodies for love affairs alone,—he endeavoured to dissuade him by saying it was illiberal, and inconsistent with honour or excellence, to beseech the object of one's passions, in whose eyes he desired to appear exceedingly worthy, by supplication like a beggar,¹ and by praying him to grant his favours, and that for no good purpose.

30. When Kritias hearkened not to this advice, nor ceased from his pursuit: Sokrates is reported, before Euthydemus and many witnesses, to have said, "That Kritias seemed to him to have something of the pig about him, since he was eager to rub close to Euthydemus, as swine do against stones."

31. From all this Kritias hated Sokrates so violently, that when, being one of the thirty² tyrants, in conjunction with Charikles he became Nomothete, then he remembered him for evil: and proposed among his laws "that none should teach the art of disputation³;" openly insulting him: and since he had not a pretext to seize him, he turned against him the taunt uttered by the many against all philosophers, and calumniated him to the populace. For I never at any time heard this art professed by Sokrates, nor do I remember to have heard any other asserting that he did.

32. But it soon appeared evident,⁴ (that Sokrates was the person aimed at) for when the Thirty had slain many of the citizens, and those not of the common

¹ Προσαιεῖν, a word peculiarly applied to mendicants.—Μηδενὸς ἀγαθοῦ: μηδὲν ἀγαθόν is "vice," "sin," the "not good" of which this degrading love is a part.

² Charikles alone is named beside Kritias the chief of the tyrants, seeing that a few years later he conspired with Kritias against the rest, and obtained unbounded authority and power.

³ Λόγων τέχνην, this does not mean "rhetoric," but the art of disputing on all questions, public or private, which have reference to philosophy or general literature. The common charge against all the moral philosophers was, that they endeavoured "to make the worse appear the better reason," τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. This charge was brought against Sokrates by Aristophanes. See the *Clouds passim*.

⁴ Ἐδήλωσε, thus Lange reads, supplying Kritias, "Critias ipse patefecit, quum Sokrates eum cum bubulco comparasset." Kuhner prefers to take the word for δῆλον ἐγένετο: "It appeared clear."

stamp,⁵ and swerved to acts of injustice 'on numerous persons. Sokrates casually observed, that he wondered whether, if any herdsman who had got the care of a number of cattle, should render the cattle fewer in number and inferior in degree, he would not be considered by all a bad herdsman : and that it was more wonderful if any person became president of his city, should not blush with shame, or believe himself to be an evil president of his city, even though he rendered the citizens fewer and inferior.

33. This being related to them, Kritias and Kallias summoned Sokrates, and not only pointed out the law to him, but further forbade him for the future to hold any converse with the young. And Sokrates inquired whether he would be allowed to ask a question regarding any point of their enactment which should not be clear to him : and they assented.

34. Then, said he, I am ready to obey your laws ; but lest unwittingly, from ignorance, I should transgress in any matter, I wish to learn this clearly from you. Whether, considering this art of reasoning to consist in language rightly delivered, or in language not correctly expressed, you order us to refrain from it ? For if it consist in language properly expressed, it is clear we must refrain from correct speaking ; but if in words incorrectly expressed, it is clear we must try to speak correctly.

35. Charikles, violently incensed against him, exclaimed ; Since, Sokrates, you are ignorant, we will give you an order somewhat more easy to be understood—do not speak with the young at all. Then Sokrates rejoined, —that this may not be ambiguous, so that I should do aught in violation of your order, define for me the particular years up to which we ought to consider men to be youths ; and Charikles replied,—As long as they are not allowed to fill the office of Senator,⁶ as not yet being of prudent mind ; do not therefore hold discussions with men younger than thirty years.

⁵ Compare Sallust, *Catil.* 31.

⁶ Citizens could not be elected to the office of senator, until they were at least thirty years old.

36. If I am inclined to buy any thing, which a person less than thirty years old would sell, shall I not ask him at what price he sells it?—You may ask such questions as that, said Charikles.—But, Sokrates, although you are fully aware how most things are constituted, yet you are in the habit of interrogating regarding them; do not, therefore, again interrogate on such matters.—If any one, then, should by interrogation inquire of me where Charikles lives, or where Kritias may be, shall I not give him an answer?—Yes, questions of that sort you may reply to, said Charikles.

37. But Kritias said, it will be necessary for you, Sokrates, to refrain from those leather-dressers,¹ and smiths, and artists in brass, for I think that they are quite worn threadbare—talked deaf by your loquacity.²—Accordingly, said Sokrates, I must abstain from all reasonings which follow from those illustrations, namely, on justice, piety, and other points of right.—Yes, by Jove, replied Charikles, and also from “herdsmen;” if you do not, beware lest you also may make the heifers fewer.

38. Thereupon it was plain, that his similes regarding oxen had been repeated to them, and hence their wrath against Sokrates. The nature of the intercourse of Kritias with Sokrates, and how they were affected towards each other, has now been stated.

39. I would assert, that no one ever derived any instruction from a master who was not agreeable to him. Kritias and Alkibiades associated with Sokrates, as long as their intimacy lasted, though he by no means pleased them. Nay, straightway from the first, their object was to have the command of the state, and even while attached to Sokrates, they desired to hold discussion with none but those most versed in state affairs.

¹ Σκυτέων, a briefly expressed sentence. In his disputations Sokrates was wont to derive illustrations for his statements, from common life, from fullers, leather-dressers, cobblers, grooms, potters, &c. The Sophists pursued a directly contrary method, seeking the most refined imagery for their illustration.

² Κατατετριφθαι διαθρολουμενους. Properly the *exempla*, illustrations, are said to be *contrita*, *trita*: here jocularly the term is applied to the men who afforded them, and from whom Sokrates was wont to borrow them.

40. For it is said, that Alkibiades, before he was twenty years of age, discussed after the following manner with Perikles, his guardian, and their chief minister of the state.

41. Tell me, said he, Perikles, can you inform me, what is a law?—By all means, assuredly, replied Perikles.—By the gods immortal, said Alkibiades, inform me; for, since I hear certain individuals praised, for their observance of the law, I do not think that he can justly obtain this praise who knows not what law is.

42. You desire no very difficult matter, Alkibiades, said Perikles, by your wish to know what a law is: for all these are laws, which the Commons having assembled and having approved of, cause to be enrolled, declaring, what one should do, and what one should not.—And whether do they enact that we should do good, or do evil?—Good, by Jove, my child, but evil by no means.

43. But if not the Commons, but a few, (as happens where an oligarchy is established) assembling were to enact what men should do; what are these enactments?—All orders, replied he, which the sovereign power of the state, after having deliberated what their subjects should do, may enroll, is called a law.—And if a tyrant, ruling over the city, should prescribe to his citizens what conduct they should pursue, is this also a law?—Yes, whatever a tyrant, in actual authority prescribes, this also is a law.

44. But violence, asked he, and lawlessness, what are they, Perikles? is it not when the stronger compels the weaker, not by persuasion, but by open force, to do what pleases him?—So I imagine, said Perikles.—Well, whatsoever a tyrant prescribes, without persuading the citizens, and compels them to perform, is not this subversion of law?—So I think, said Perikles, for I retract my assertion, that whatever a tyrant prescribes, without the consent of his subjects, is a law.³

45. And whatsoever a few prescribe, not by consent

³ Ἀναριθμεῖναι, "change," "correct my opinion," literally, "alter my moves," a metaphor derived from the game of draughts, in reference to the immediate correction of a false move—the opposite of this phrase is *θεῖναι περτοῦς*.

of the many, but by the strong hand, whether shall we call it violence, or not?—I think, said Perikles, that all points which one, without his consent, compels another to do, whether by regular order, or not, is violence rather than law.—Accordingly then, what the whole body of the Commons lording it over the wealthy classes prescribes, without their consent, would be more properly styled violence than law?

46. Assuredly, said Perikles, when I was of your age, Alkibiades, I was skilled in such investigations: for we discussed and philosophized on such subjects as you now appear to be engaged on.—But Alkibiades said, would that I had then associated with you, Perikles, when you surpassed¹ even yourself in these matters.

47. And so when Kritias and Alkibiades, supposed themselves superior to the then existing statesmen, they no longer came to Sokrates, (for even in other respects he was not agreeable to them, and if they did approach him, they were chagrined at being confuted for their errors), but they devoted themselves to state measures, the precise object for which they had at first approached Sokrates.

48. But Krito also was a pupil of Sokrates: and Chærephon, and Chærekrates, and Hermokrates,² Simmias, Kebes, Phaidon, and others: all of whom associated with him, not that they might become leaders of the populace, or legal pleaders, but in order to become good and worthy men, and able excellently to conduct themselves towards their household dependants,³ connections, friends, city, and fellow-citizens:—and no one of them, whether in youth or more advanced age, ever committed any evil, or was even accused of doing so.

49. But Sokrates, says the accuser, taught children

¹ For δεινότερος Fritsch proposes to read δεινότερος, “when you were more powerful in these studies than now.”

² A celebrated leader of the Syracusans in the Peloponnesian war. Although mentioned by Plato in the *Kritias* and *Simias*, he does not appear to have been intimate with Sokrates; hence Creutzer conjectures we should read for Hermokrates, *Hermogenes*, a friend and pupil of Sokrates.

³ Οἰκεῖν=*propinqui*, οἰκέται=*servi*, that is when the terms are opposed, as here.

to work, was good — to be idle, evil ; yet he also stated, that those alone really work, who do something good, and are beneficial workmen : while those who gamble, or do aught else wicked and reprehensible, he called idle : and in accordance with these sentiments the saying of the poet is correct :

“ Work is no disgrace, the true disgrace is idleness.”

58. The accuser also stated, that Sokrates frequently quoted the following passage of Homer, regarding Ulysses :

Whatsoever kingly chief or leading man he found
He stood beside, and with mild words endeavoured to restrain,
“ Infatuate man, it fits not you, thus dastard-like to tremble ;
Pray seat yourself, and cause the folk in peace to sit them down ;”
But of the common whom he saw and loud in clamour found,
Him, with his truncheon oft he smote, and in harsh accents chode,
Mad man, be silent, hear from others prudent counsel now ;
Others, superior far to thee, thou coward ! void of strength !
Thou, counted not in warlike ranks, nor in the Senate wise.

And he asserted, that Sokrates interpreted the passage, as if the poet recommended us to assault men of common station,² or poor means.

59. But Sokrates never thought thus, (for by the same reasoning, he would have inferred that he himself should be beaten) : but he did say, that those who were useful neither in word or deed, who were unable to serve an army, or city, or even the common people ; especially too if they were of insolent spirit ; should be curbed in every way, even though they might be very rich.

60. Nay, on the contrary, Sokrates evidently was a friend to the Commons, and a lover of mankind ; for though he received numbers of persons desirous of hearing him, as well citizens as strangers, he never at any time exacted payment for his instruction, but supplied all abundantly from his own stores of knowledge : some of whom having received fragments of his philosophy thus gratuitously, sold them at an enormous price to others ;³ and these were not, like him, lovers of the Commons, for they desired not to hold conference with any who had not money to bestow.

² Δημοτὰς used for δημοτικούς. See *Cyrop.* ii. 3, 7.

³ He aims directly at Aristippus, who was the first of the school of Sokrates who taught for pay.

61. But besides all this, Sokrates conferred far more honour upon the state, than Lichas¹ (so celebrated for this) did on Lacedæmon. For the latter, at the festival called *Gymnopædia*,² banquetted all the strangers then sojourning in Lacedæmon. But Sokrates, through all his life, by freely imparting all he knew, benefited in the most important manner all who felt inclined to receive it; for he did not dismiss them, until he had made them better men.

62. In my mind, since such was his character, Sokrates appears to be worthy rather of honour from the city, than of death: and any one considering strict legal points, may see this clearly: for in the strict letter of the laws, death is appointed for transgressors only when they are convicted of open robbery, or stealing³ of apparel, or cutting purses, or housebreaking, or kidnapping, or sacrilege. Of all such enormities, he was the most innocent of mankind.

63. Nor does he ever appear to have been the cause of any war resulting unfortunately for the city, or of sedition, or treason, or any other disaster whatsoever; nor, in a private capacity, to have despoiled any man of advantages, or to have involved him in calamity; nay, he never was even suspected of any such act.

64. How then could he deservedly have been subject to the indictment? Who, instead of disbelieving in the gods—as was written in the process,—evidently respected the gods, to a far greater degree than others did; and instead of depraving the young—for the prosecutor accused him of this—was clearly proved to have checked from their pursuit, those of his pupils, who entertained evil desires, while he inspired them with a love for virtue, the fairest and most excellent. Seeing he accomplished this, how was he not deserving of the highest honour from the state?

¹ Λίχας, was son of Arkasilaus and the co-rival of Sokrates.

² A festival at Sparta in the month of Hekatombaron, in which naked boys danced in honour of those who fell at Thyrea, and led the chorus round the statues of Apollo *Kapreiov*.

³ Thieves who stole any articles from the public baths, were punished with death, if the article stolen was ten drachms in value.

CHAPTER III.

INTRODUCTION.—In the preceding chapters the defence of Sokrates against the accusation of his enemies might appear to be drawn to a close. What follows, is added with this design, that the preceding defence might be strengthened in its several particulars; that his mode of discussing, and the subjects of these discussions might be placed in a clear light, that the malignity of his adversaries might be more evident, and the whole life of the philosopher be set forth as an exemplar of all virtues.

The subjects of the preceding chapters are resumed; but here his manner of worshipping the gods, and his temperance in mode of life, and management of the passions, is set forth in detail. In the worship of the gods he observed his country's institutions, and persuaded others to do the same (§ 1.) In prayer to the gods we should simply ask them for what they thought good for us, as they knew what would prove so far better than man (§ 2.) In sacrifices the gods look not to the costliness of the oblation (§ 4.) The indications of heaven are superior to human counsels (§ 4.) In food, drink, and love he was personally most temperate, and advised others to be so too (§ 5—15.)

1. Now, on the other hand, he appeared to me to benefit⁴ his pupils—partly by example, thus exhibiting his own character, and partly by his discourses, I will now, at length, write whatsoever I hold in memory. Accordingly, as regards service to the gods, he evidently acted and spake, in conformity with the answers⁵ of the Pythoness to those who interrogate her, how they ought to act regarding sacrifice, or worship of their departed ancestors, or any other such matter. For the Pythoness answers, that those who should act in conformity with the laws of their respective cities, would act with piety; and thus both Sokrates himself acted, and exhorted

⁴ *Καὶ ὠφελεῖν*. We have seen that Sokrates did not injure his pupils, we must now consider whether he did not greatly benefit them.

⁵ *ὑποκρίνεται*. This appears to be the original meaning of the word, and to have obtained not only among the Ionians but Attics also. See Thucyd. vii. 44-5; below iv. 3, 16.

others to do the like; while he considered those who acted in any other way to be superstitious and vain.

2. His prayer¹ to the gods, was simply that they would grant him whatever things were good, because the gods knew best what real blessings were. Those who prayed for gold, or silver, or tyranny, or any other similar object, he considered to pray as unreasonably as if they should pray regarding gambling, or contests, or any matters clearly uncertain as to their result.

3. And when, from his little means, he offered humble sacrifices, he considered he offered in no way inferior to the many and wealthy persons who offered numerous and costly sacrifices. For he said it would not be honourable in the gods, if they rejoiced in costly sacrifices rather than humble; for, if so, the offerings from the wicked would be more grateful by far than those from the worthy: nor would it be worth while for a man to live, if the oblations of the wicked should be more grateful to heaven than those from the good. But he considered the gods rejoiced most in the oblations from the most pious. He quotes, too, with approbation this verse—

“According to your ability offer sacrifice to the immortal gods;”

and said, that as regards friends, and hosts, and all the other ties of life, that was a noble exhortation, “to do, according to your ability.”²

4. But if he believed anything to be intimated to him from the gods, it was as impossible to persuade him to act in violation of this indication, as it would have been were one to persuade him to take as the guide of his journey, a blind man, or one who knew not the way, instead of one blessed with sight, and acquainted with it; and he censured the follies of others, who act contrary to the intimations of heaven, lest they

¹ Compare the verses cited by Plat. Alkib. ii. 142:—

Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἰσθλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνέυκτοις
 Ἄρμυϊ εἶδον, τὰ δὲ βίαια καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν.

² From Hesiod, ἔργ. καὶ ἡμ. 336.

should meet the derisive sneers of mankind. He despised all human prudence in comparison with the counsel given by heaven.³

5. His mind and body he trained by such a course of life, as that if any person adopted the same (unless the Deity interfered to prevent it), he would pass his life confident in spirit, and robust in health, nor would he ever need means for the cost of such a mode of living. For he was so frugal, that I know not if any one could earn so little as not to receive a competency for Sokrates. He took only such a quantity of food as he could eat with a comfortable appetite; and in order to enjoy⁴ this with pleasure, he came to it with such preparation, by exercise, that the desire of food served for a sufficient relish.⁵ Every sort of drink was pleasant to him, because he drank not unless really thirsty.

6. And if ever on invitation he desired to go to a dinner, he very easily guarded against an inconvenience which many find most difficult to avoid, namely, surfeiting repletion. Those who were unable to restrain themselves in this, he advised to abstain from viands which induce men to eat without being hungry, and to drink without feeling thirst; for he said these indulgences destroyed the stomach, and head, and mind.

7. And jocularly he used to say, that he fancied *Kirkê*⁶ transformed men into swine by feasting them on such superfluities; but that Ulysses, by the suggestion of Mercury, and through his own self-restraint, and because he avoided touching such things beyond what

³ There appears to be a want of connection here, the transition from piety towards the gods to every day life, appears harsh; Kuhner thinks Xenophon naturally passes from the duties of men towards God, to their duties towards their fellow men.

⁴ Ἐπὶ τοῦτο. "Scil. ut cum sanitas ederet, ad cibum, sic paratus, accedebat, &c."—KUHNER.

⁵ Ὀψον, every thing used with bread was called ὄψον, and thence even without bread, as fleshmeat, fish, &c., and thence every sort of more delicate food, sauces, condiments, &c. Compare Cicero, Tusc. v. 34, 97. "Sokratem ferunt, quum usque ad vesperem contentus ambularet, quasitumque esset ex eo, quare id faceret, respondisse: se, quo melius cœnaret, opsonare ambulando famem."

⁶ See Odyss. ii. 239.

was proper, for these reasons was not transformed into a swine.

8. Regarding such matters he spake thus sportively, yet still with earnest feeling. But concerning love affairs, he enjoined them strongly to avoid beautiful persons; for he said it was by no means easy for a man to act with continence who had any connection with such. Nay, at one time, learning that Kritobulus¹ kissed the beautiful son of Alkibiades;¹ on an occasion when Kritobulus was present, he asked Xenophon—

9. Tell me, said he, O Xenophon, did you not consider Kritobulus to have been a prudent rather than a daring person, and one of the temperate rather than of the thoughtless and debauched? Undoubtedly, said Xenophon.—Think him then now to be most passionate and incontinent, he would even throw himself upon naked swords,² and bound into fire.

10. Having seen him commit what action, said Xenophon, do you thus condemn him?³ Has he not, replied Sokrates, dared to kiss the son of Alkibiades, who is most comely in form, and in the flower of youth?—Surely, if such were a most reckless deed, said Xenophon, I fancy that even I could venture to undergo similar danger.

11. O wretched man, said Sokrates, what think you a man suffers by kissing a beautiful person? Does he not on the moment become a slave instead of a free man? Does he not lavish his means on sinful pleasures? Is he not deprived of all capacity to meditate on any excellent or wise subject? Is he not compelled to be anxious for that regarding which even a madman would feel no anxiety?

12. By Herakles, said Xenophon, what a wonderful effect you mention from a kiss! And do you wonder at this? said Sokrates; are you not aware that the

¹ Cobet thinks this to be impossible, and for 'Αλκιβιάδου, proposes to read 'Αξιόχου, *i. e.* Klinias, son of Axiochus.

² Male and even female dancers of Greece, used to dance rapidly within circles formed of swords. On account of the dangerous nature of the game the phrase became proverbial.

³ Κατέγνωκας αὐτόν. See iii. 7, 3.

Tarantula,⁴ not even as large as a half obolus,⁵ by touching merely with its mouth grinds men down with pain, and deprives them of their reason?—Yes, by Jove! replied Xenophon, for the Tarantula emits into the wound some virus when it stings.

13. O fool, said Sokrates, do you not think that beautiful persons instil some poison into their lovers which you see not? Do you not consider that this animal,⁶ which they call beautiful and in its bloom, is so much more terrible than the Tarantula, since the latter by actual contact, the former not even touched—nay, even if one should behold it from a long distance—instils some charm so potent as to cause madness?

And perhaps the Cupids are called “archers” for this reason, because the beautiful wounds from a distance. And I advise you, said Sokrates, when you see a beautiful person, to retreat without once looking behind. You, Kritobulus, I advise, to take your departure for a year; for, perhaps, though with difficulty, you may in that time be healed of the wound.

14. Men who are not sufficiently fortified against love, he thought ought to indulge in this passion⁷ only as one which the mind would never admit, unless the body absolutely required so: and which, if the body did absolutely require, ought to cause us no perplexing trouble. On these points he was so perfectly trained, that he felt it easier to refrain from the fairest beauties in the flower of their bloom, than others did from the most disagreeable and aged. Regarding eating and drinking, and amorous passion, he was thus mentally armed; and he believed he had no less perfect pleasure by continence, than they who spend much exertion to gratify these passions: and, besides, he was visited with far less sorrow.

⁴ Φαλάγγια, an insect resembling a spider or scorpion, frequent in Italy, about the region of *Tarentum*, whence its name. Doubts are entertained at the present day regarding its poisonous and dance-exciting power, but the ancients admitted with good faith all the stories told regarding it.

⁵ The comparison arises from the round form of the body of the animal.—SCHNEID.

⁶ Ὠρίον, of man, as below, 111, 11, 11.

⁷ Ψυχῇ, use ● to denote vehement passion of the mind. See 1, 2, 4.

CHAPTER IV.

INTRODUCTION.—Xenophon combats the opinion of some, who allowed that Sokrates was powerful in exhorting men to virtue, but did not know how to train them to perfection in it. As an instance, he gives his dispute with Aristodemus, who habitually disregarded the gods (§ 1—2.) The chief points of this discussion are as follows :—

- 1.—All works which bear marks of an evident purpose for utility, we cannot consider to have been produced by chance, but from a superior reason (§ 3—4.) The whole form and shape of man is perfect in all its parts, and admirably adapted to his mode of life, the Deity therefore must have taken forethought for man (§ 5—7.) Not only in the nature of man, but in the wide universe, the wisdom of Divine Providence may be traced, although we cannot see it by our eyes (§ 8—9.)
- 2.—From the superior structure of man, as compared with that of the lower animals, especially from the endowment of reason, the providence of God, and his care of man is conspicuous (§ 10—14.) Besides the gods indicate to man what should be done by them and what should not.
- 3.—That the gods neglect no single individual, but equally provide for all, appears evident (α')—they forewarn all men by sure signs of coming events (β')—they have imbued the human race with the opinion that they can do well or ill for man (γ')—the more ancient states and eldest men are most pious towards the gods (δ')—As our minds govern our bodies, so the providence of God governs the world; if men will but worship them in purity and truth, they will find reason to believe that the gods are omnipresent and omniscient. (§ 16—19.)

1. BUT if any one consider Sokrates—as some persons both speak and write concerning him, from mere conjecture¹—to have had admirable power to exhort men to virtue, but as by no means fitted to point them out the road to it;² let him consider—viewing not merely his confutations, by interrogation, of those who boasted they

¹ Τεκμαίροντοι, not knowing the nature of his doctrine and sentiments, but forming opinions from mere conjecture.

² Προάγειν = *viam monstrare*. Hotibbius reads προσαγαγεῖν, *perducere aliquem ad virtutem*. But the meaning is, Sokrates is supposed by them merely to have been able to excite in his pupils a love of virtue, but not to shew the path to it.

knew all things,³ in order to check them; but also his daily conversation with his associates—whether he were able to render his disciples of a better character.

2. I will mention first the sentiments I heard him deliver concerning the Deity, to Aristodemus⁴ surnamed the Little. For when Sokrates had heard that he neither sacrificed to the gods, nor prayed, nor believed in divination, but even ridiculed all those who did,—Tell me, said he, Aristodemus, is it the case that you admire any men for their intelligence?—Most certainly, answered he.—Tell me their names, said Sokrates.

3. In Epic poetry I most particularly admire Homer; in Dithyrambic,⁵ Melanippides;⁶ in Tragedy, Sophocles; for statuary, Polycleitus;⁷ for animal painting, Zeuxis.

4. Whether do they who form representations devoid of soul or motion, appear to you more worthy of admiration than they who formed living animals with reason and energy?—Far more, replied he, they who formed living animals, if they did so not by means of chance,⁸ but from efficient reason.—Well, of things which are wholly unknown to us as to the cause for which they do exist, and of things which clearly have their being for beneficial purposes, which of the two would you judge to be the results of chance caprice? which the result of wisdom?—Undoubtedly, what exists for beneficial purposes, we should consider to be the result of reason.

5. Does he who first created men, appear to you

³ Again alluding to the worst class of Sophists, who claimed universal knowledge.

⁴ A most devoted friend, and constant companion of Sokrates.

⁵ For *Διθυράμβω* Cobet reads *ἑθιρυράμβων*, scil. *ποιήσαι*, the word never being used in the singular, when expressive of poetry.

⁶ He lived 520, B.C.

⁷ A native of Sicyon, and famous statuary, 430, B.C. Zeuxis, born at Heracleia (or Ephesus), the most celebrated painter of antiquity, 430, B.C.

⁸ The cases are beautifully varied here, *τόχῳ* the dative denoting the "instrument," "means;" *ἐπὶ γνώμῃς*, the effecting cause. An analogous and striking instance is found in Eurip. Med. 852. Comp. my note on Pind. Olym. ii. 125.

to have added for beneficial purposes those members by which perception is acquired—the eyes, to see what is visible—the ears, to hear what is audible? What advantage would sweet perfumes be to us, unless nostrils had been additionally given? What perception would we have of sweets and acids, or all the pleasant savours acquired by means of the mouth, unless the tongue were made to be a test of them.

6. Besides does it not appear to you that this should be thought¹ the agency of prescience, that, since the eye is delicate, it should be guarded by eyelids, like doors, which open when there may be need to use the sight, but in sleep are closed? Moreover, lest winds may injure it, that eyelashes should grow as a screen!—and over the eyes the eyebrows should be placed as a coping,² that the sweat from the head should not injuriously affect them; that the faculty of hearing should perceive all species of sounds, yet never be filled to satiety; and that the front teeth in all animals should be adapted for cutting, while the back teeth are formed to receive the food from them and masticate it: that the mouth, through which animals admit what they desire, should be placed near the eyes and nose; and since the fœces are unpleasant, that they should turn their passages away, and remove them, as far as possible, from the senses:—when these things have been formed with such extraordinary forethought, can you hesitate whether they are the results of chance caprice, or wisdom?

7. No, by Jove, replied Aristodemus, when I consider it in this light, they appear to have been effected by the art of some wise architect, and benevolent to living things.—And that they should naturalize in us a love of progeny, and in mothers engender a love to rear their offspring; and when they are reared, the strongest desire for their life, and the greatest apprehension of their death?

¹ *Εοικέναι* = *putari*, *haberi*, not simply *similem esse*.

² *Ἀπωγισσώσαι*, Comp. Cicer. N. D. 11, 57. “Primum enim superiora, superciliis obducta, sudorem a capite et a fronte defluentem repellunt.”

—Certainly³ these appear to be the contrivances of one who had resolved that animals should exist.

8. And do you think you are endowed with reason?—(Interrogate⁴ me, and I will shew you by my answers)—Do you think that no being endowed with reason existeth any where else? and this when you know, that in your frame you have but a little portion⁵ of the earth which is so boundless, or of fluid which is so abundant; and that your body is compacted for you, by your receiving a scanty fragment of all other elements which are so immense; while, luckily, you have somehow seized for yourself intelligence, which alone existeth nowhere else! and all these things so supremely great, and so countless in multitude, are skilfully arranged by some idle folly!

9. Undoubtedly; for I do not see the working powers, as I do the artists of all formations here.—In sooth you have spoken well, for neither do you behold your own soul, which is the mistress of your body; so that by parity of reasoning you may assert that all you do, you do not by reason, but by chance caprice.

10. And Aristodemus replied, By no means, Sokrates, do I despise the Divinity, but I deem him far too magnificent to need my service.—It follows rather, said Sokrates, that since he is so magnificent, in proportion to his tender care vouchsafed to you, so much the more should he be honoured by you.

³ Ἀμελεί = *confidently, prorsus, omnino*, the word should thus be accented as an adverb. In general it is written ἀμέλει, as if an imperative.

⁴ LANGEIUS thus explains this passage, "Since modesty prevented Aristodemus from expressly affirming, and truth prevented his denial, he answers guardedly and cautiously thus: 'Interrogate⁴ then, and I will answer,' i. e. by my answers you will know that I φρονιμῶν τι ἔχων." ZEENIUS thus, "Interrogate me on other points, which necessarily follow from this, and which you usually collect from premises of this kind, and then you will find me prepared to give an answer." This last depends on the Socratic mode of disputation, which was to draw out conclusions from an opponent by interrogations.

⁵ Μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι, thus join. Schutz, strangely enough, joins λαβόντι τὸ σῶμα = *tum cum corpus nanciscerere*.

11. Be well assured, replied Aristodemus, that if I thought the gods had any care of man, I would by no means neglect them.—And can you imagine they exert no care for man? they, who, in the first place, formed man erect,¹ alone of all other animals. And this uprightness of stature gives the power of more distant vision, and of seeing more fully what is above; and so these parts suffer less injury, in which, too,² the gods have placed the countenance, the faculty of hearing and of language. To all other animals he hath given feet, without which they would be reptiles,³ and these give merely the power of proceeding; but to man they have also given hands, which accomplish the greater part of those objects by means of which we live happier than they.

12. And though every animal has a tongue, of man alone have they formed that organ so, that—by touching at different times different portions of the mouth—it should articulate vocal sounds, and we should indicate all things we desire to each other. The pleasures of love, too, they have given to all other animals, yet prescribing to them a particular season of the year for its enjoyment, while they afford these pleasures continually to us until old age.

13. It did not content the Deity to take such diligent precaution for the body merely, but, what is far more important, he implanted in man the soul, which is his lordliest part. For, first, of what other animal does the soul perceive the existence of the gods who have arranged the most stupendous and beautiful works?—what other

¹ See Cicero, N. D. 11, 56.

² Οἷς καὶ ὄψιν, &c., this is the admirable correction of Kuhner, for καὶ ὄψιν. His interpretation is “hominem erecta statura efficit, ut minus ledantur eae partes corporis, quibus καὶ ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ στόμα dii ingeneraverunt.” He also understands ὄψιν in a wide sense, for the whole countenance, containing eyes, nose, and mouth, and στόμα not for the organ of taste, but of speech and language.

³ Ἐρπετοῖς. Many commentators have wondered how animals could be called ἕρπετα, Weiske explains thus, “Sokrates hic animalium tantum truncum spectare debebat, quia de pedibus eorum deinceps dicturus erat, sine his enim serperent, si possent, et essent quasi reptilia.”

race, save that of men, venerates the gods? What soul is more fitted than that of man to take precautions against hunger or thirst, or frost or heat? or to heal diseases, or acquire strength by practice? or to labour hard to gain instruction,⁴ or what more capable of remembering what it may have heard, or seen, or learned?

14. Is it not altogether clear to you, that in comparison with other animals, men live as gods, holding supremacy by nature, by body, and by mind? For should an ox retain his own form, though he had the intellect of man, he would not be able to accomplish his desires; nor could those animals which have hands, but are devoid of reason, effect aught more. Yet, though you are blessed with both these most glorious endowments, you think the gods take no concern for you! What pray! is that, which when the gods perform, you will then think they care for you?

15. When they send advisers, said Aristodemus, as you assert they send to you, regarding what it is right to do or not to do.—And so, when they give answers to the Athenians inquiring anything by means of oracles, you do not think they address you also? or when, by sending their portents, they give warnings to the Greeks, or when they warn all other men? But separating you alone from all mankind, do they hold you in neglect?

16. And can you imagine the gods would have engendered in man a belief that they are able to benefit or injure, unless they were really able so to do? and that men, if they were deceived thus through all time, would not perceive it? Are you not aware that the most abiding and wisest of human institutions, cities and tribes, are also the most pious, and that, the most prudent ages are also the most respectful towards the gods?

17. My good sir,⁵ learn that even thy own soul, while present in thy body, governs that body as it pleases; and so it is right to consider that the Intelligence in the universe disposes the universe in such a manner

⁴ Ἐκπονεῖν, here used intransitively.

⁵ Ὠγαθί, a friendly formula of admonition, like the Lat. *O Bone*. The Greeks also use ὦ βέλτιστε.

as may be pleasing to itself. It is by no means proper to suppose, that your sight indeed has ability to reach the length of many furlongs, while the eye of the Deity cannot at one view see all things : or that thy mind has power to reflect concerning affairs here and in Egypt, and in Sicily, but that the intelligence of God is not able to regard all concerns at the one moment.

18. If, undoubtedly, as by your paying court to men, you perceive they wish to court you in return, and by your granting favours they favour you again ; and if, as by taking counsel with men you learn who may be prudent ; so by serving them, you should make trial of the gods, as to whether they are inclined to advise you regarding matters hidden to other men ; then you will know that the Godhead is so mighty and of so powerful a nature, as at the same moment to see all things, hear all things, be present everywhere, and at the same moment feel concern for all.

19. While I say this, it does appear fitting that *my* disciples should act thus ; and not only when they may be seen of men should refrain from impiety, injustice, and impropriety, but also when they are in solitude ; since they should consider, that no single act, at any time, whatever they may attempt, escapes the cognizance of God.

CHAPTER V.

INTRODUCTION.—SELF-RESTRAINT (Ἐγκράτεια = *Temperantia*) is recommended for the following reasons:—

If any one is devoid of continence he can be useful neither to himself or others (§ 1—3.) He will not be desirable to meet with in a circle of friends (§ 4.) Continence is the foundation of all virtue, our minds should therefore be deeply imbued with it (§ 5.) Sokrates not only recommended this virtue by words, but also by deeds showed himself an exemplar of it (§ 6.)

In Book II. Chap. I., Sokrates is represented as discussing on continence much more fully.

1. SINCE, no doubt, continence is both an honourable and excellent possession for a man, let us consider whether he promoted¹ this virtue by discussions of the following kind concerning it.—My friends, if when war were coming upon us, we desired to select a leader, by whom we might be defended, and also might fully master our enemies,² would we select that man whom we should know to be the slave of gluttony, or wine, or sensuality, one incapable of bearing toil, or given to sleep? How pray, could we expect that such a person would either defend us, or master our foes?

2. And if, arriving at the close of life, we should wish to commit to any one the guardianship of our male children, or the care of our virgin daughters, or the preservation of our wealth, would we consider the intemperate man most worthy of our confidence in these matters? Would we entrust to an intemperate slave our herds of cattle, our granaries, or the direction of agricultural works?³

3. Would we be inclined, even as a present, to receive an agent or steward of such a character? Now, if we

¹ Προὔβιβάζε, see 1, 2, 17.

² Τοὺς πολεμίους κρατῆσαι = *subigere hostes*. Τῶν πολέμιων κρατῆσαι is less emphatic = *vincere hostes*.

³ Ἔργον, like the Latin *opus*, frequently denotes agricultural occupations, thus Latin *opus facere* for *agrum colere*. See Ruhnken, on. Ter. Eun. 2, 1, 14.

have an aversion to accept an intemperate slave, is it not worth while to be careful that a man's own self becomes not a similar character? For the intemperate man, by being injurious to others, is not beneficial to himself (like the avaricious, who by stripping others of their property, appear to enrich themselves); but while he is an evil-doer to others, he commits the greatest wrong also to himself, since it is most guilty to ruin not only one's own household, but also his body and his soul.

4. In society, too, who could be delighted with a person, whom he knew to rejoice rather in the viands and the wine, than the intercourse of friends, and who desired harlots more than companions? Is it not the duty of every man, who considers temperance to be the foundation¹ of every virtue, to lay this first securely in his soul?

5. For without this, who could worthily learn or practise any good thing? What slave to voluptuousness does not degrade both his body and mind? By Hera,² it appears to me that a free man indeed should pray never to meet with such a slave, but that the slave to pleasure should entreat of heaven that he might find masters of worthy character: for so only could such a one avoid destruction by reformation.

6. While these were his expressed sentiments, he exhibited his own continence rather by acts than by words; for not only was he invincible to all pleasures derived from the bodily senses, but also to those arising from pecuniary acquisitions; since he thought that he who received money from every casual person, raised up a master over himself, and served in a slavery not less disgraceful than any other.

¹ *Κρηπίδα*, properly the base on which a pillar is erected; see Lidd. & Scott. Thus Pind. *Pyrh.* iv. 138. *βάλλετο κρηπίδα ἐπίων* = *fundamenta* ponebat sapientis sermonis. As to the sentiment, comp. Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 13, 20.

² This form of adjuration, constantly used by Grecian females, was adopted by Sokrates. See below, iii. 10, 9. 11, 5, &c.

CHAPTER VI

INTRODUCTION.—This chapter embraces three discussions with the sophist Antiphon.

1. Antiphon charges Sokrates with being but a mere teacher of misery. He ridicules his mode of life and poverty. To this Sokrates replies—

(α') When one does not exact pay for his instruction he is not obliged to hold discussions with every man, but may make choice of his audience. (β') An humble mode of living is more wholesome and easily procured; a garment, unchanged either on account of heat or cold, hardens the body to endure both. (γ') Sensuality, gluttony, and other desires, are utterly despised by the man who aspires not only to immediate pleasures, but to those which last; and the greatest happiness arises from the knowledge of self-improvement. (δ') He who is contented with but little will far better fulfil all his duties to the state, than he who requires expensive viands, &c. to gratify his appetite. (ϵ') The happiness of life is not fixed in luxury or extravagance; nay, in proportion as each requires least, so he will be nearer the character of the divinity (§ 4--10.)

2. Antiphon asserts that Sokrates was merely a just man, but by no means wise; the latter he asserts Sokrates must be aware of, since he exacted no money in payment for his instructions. Sokrates replies that to sell wisdom is to prostitute it, and that more good is gained by the acquisition of worthy friends than of mere money (§ 11--14.)

3. To the same Antiphon, doubting whether Sokrates could train men in the business of social life, since he interfered not in state matters himself, Sokrates replies, that he trained numbers to be fit to manage state affairs, while if he in person had interfered in them, the state would have gained but one agent, and lost many (15.)

1. It is fitting as regards him, also, not to omit his discussion with Antiphon the sophist; for Antiphon, at one time, wishing to seduce away his pupils, coming up to Sokrates, while they were present, spoke thus:—

2. Sokrates, I considered that philosophers ought to be far happier than other men; but you appear to have reaped fruits of the adverse kind³ from your philosophy:

Τάρανττα, i. e. "misfortune," "unhappiness."

you live so wretchedly that no slave treated thus by his master would remain with him. You eat food and take drink of the worst description, and you are clothed with a garment, not only wretched of its kind, but the same throughout both summer and winter; and you continue shoeless, and without an inner garment.¹

3. Yet, you receive no money, which gladdens men when they receive it, and causes those who have acquired it to live more liberally, and pleasantly. If then,—as those who instruct in other occupations cause their apprentices to imitate themselves,—you, too, should so train your hearers, you must think yourself but a professor of misfortune.

4. To these words Sokrates replied, You seem to me, Antiphon, to have concluded that I live so wretchedly, that, I am persuaded you would prefer death, rather than to live as I do. Come, then, let us investigate what is the particular hardship you discover in my mode of life.

5. Whether is it this,—seeing those who receive money must of necessity work out that for which they receive the sum— that since I receive no money I feel no necessity to hold discussion with any one I may not wish? or is it my diet you censure, as if I eat less healthy food than you, or less nourishing to the strength? or is it because it is more difficult to procure my food as being rare and most expensive? or is it that what you provide is sweeter to you than what I get? do you not know that he who eateth with the greatest pleasure is he who least requires condiments; and he who drinketh most agreeably least requires drink difficult to procure?

6. Do you not know that they who change their apparel do so for the sake of coolness or heat, and put on sandals lest they should be prevented from walking by obstructions which annoy the feet? Yet have you ever perceived me remaining at home more than another,“

¹ Ἀχίτων, not to be understood as if he covered his naked body with only the outer cloak. Sokrates usually wore only the shirt, ὑπενδύτην, but not the second covering over that, ἐπενδύτην, which κατ' ἐξοχὴν the ancients called the “tunic.”

² Μᾶλλον = “me, etsi calceis non utor, magis quam alium, qui calceis utitur, domi mansisse.”—ΚΕΥΗΝ.

on account of the cold ; or from the heat, contending with any one for the cool shade ; or not proceeding where I would, for any annoyance to my feet !

7. Know you not, that the naturally weak in body, by practice, become more powerful in what they practise, and more easily bear the toil, than the naturally strong who neglect exercise ? And do you not think that I, by constantly practising to endure bravely with my body everything which may occur to it, bear all with far more ease than you who do not practise so ?

8. And with regard to my freedom from servitude to appetite, or sleep, or incontinence, do you think there is any cause more effectual than this, that I hold other things far more agreeable to me than these,—which not only delight me at the moment of enjoyment, but afford a hope that they will benefit me for ever ! And, assuredly, you know this, that they who suppose their affairs to be unprosperous³ are not delighted ; but they who consider their occupation—whether it be agriculture, or seamanship, or any other source of employment—to succeed favourably for them, are delighted, as if happy in their efforts.

9. Do you imagine there can arise from all these objects so great a pleasure as the belief that you are becoming more virtuous yourself, and are acquiring friends of superior character ? I will accordingly continue to hold these opinions. But if it should be required to benefit one's friends or the city, which will have the most leisure to concern himself for this, he who lives as simply as I now do, or he who lives in what you call happiness ? Which of the two would easier conduct an army in the field,—the one who could not live without expensive food, or he to whom whatever he could easiest find would be sufficient ? Which of the two would sooner be captured by siege, the man who needed things most difficult to be acquired, or he who lived contentedly on the easiest to be met with ?

10. You seem, Antiphon, to think happiness to con-

³ Εὖ πράττειν, there is a play upon words here, and in the conclusion of the paragraph, = *to be happy* in their endeavours, *i. e.* to succeed in them ; and *to be happy*, in mind, with joy, &c.

sist only in "luxury or extravagance: I think, on the contrary, that to need nothing is the attribute of God: to need as little as possible approachest nearest to the lot of divinity: and that the Godhead is supreme in happiness: but to be nearest to the attributes of God is nearest also to happiness supreme.

11. Again, upon another occasion, Antiphon disputing with Sokrates, said—Sokrates, I consider you to be a just man, but by no means to be a wise one: and you seem to me to be aware of this, for you exact no money for your instructions; and yet, if you considered a garment, or house, or any other possession to be worth money, so far from giving it to any one gratuitously, you would not part with it unless you received its full equivalent.

12. It is clear that if you believed your instruction to be worth anything, you would exact for it no less money than it is worth. You may, indeed, be a just man, because you do not deceive men for self-aggrandisement, but wise you cannot be, knowing only what is worth but nothing. To this Sokrates replied—

13. Antiphon, with us it is believed, that with honour, and equally with dishonour,¹ one can part with the flower of his youth, or wisdom: for if one were to sell, to whosoever would buy, the flower of his youth for money, him men call a fornicator; but if he were thus to make a friend of one whom he knew to be an honourable and worthy admirer, we consider him to be wise. Similarly they who sell philosophy to whosoever would buy, for lucre's sake, these they call sophists, as it were prostitutes of wisdom; yet,² whosoever makes one his

¹ Kuhner thus arranges the construction of the passage, *παρ ἡμῖν νομίζεται ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιτίθεσθαι* = "apud nos existimatur et pulchrum et turpe esse pulchritudinem et sapientiam aliis venundare," i. e. it is bad to *sell* either for lucre's sake, it is honourable to *give* either, to gain a firm friend. The word *ἐπιτίθεσθαι*, is properly used of merchants who expose their goods for sale, here, to the sophists who sold their knowledge to all who could afford to pay.

² *Πόρνοισι* = quasi sapientiæ prostibulorum. Sokrates means to say, that from their inordinate love of gain the name of *sophist* was marked with the infamous idea of the grossest venality.

friend whom he may know to have a noble disposition, by teaching him what he knows himself, this person we consider to act as becomes a wise and worthy citizen.

14. And, Antiphon, just as another is delighted with a good steed, or hound, or falcon, so, to a greater degree, am I delighted with worthy friends; and if I know³ any good I impart it to these, and recommend them to other masters by whom I consider they will be benefited in any way for virtue. The treasures of the wise men of old,⁴ which they have left by writing in their volumes, I go through perusing these together with my friends, and if we find any good therein, we select it, and think it great gain if thus we become dearer friends⁵ to one another. As I heard these sentiments, Sokrates appeared to be both happy himself, and to excite those who heard him to all that was good and honourable.

15. And again, when Antiphon asked him how he imagined he could make men versed in the business of state affairs when he himself never interfered in politics, if, indeed, he knew aught about them.—Whether Antiphon, said he, would I to a greater degree manage state affairs, if I alone should personally interfere in them, or if I should endeavour to train as many as possible to a fitness for conducting them?

³ Ἐχρην, *tenere, scire*. See below, iii. 10, 1-11; 2, 6.

⁴ Τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν, “*de poetis intelligendum*.”—HEAM. But it may mean also the Old Philosophers, whose works were studied by Sokrates, in order to select any good thing he might find.

⁵ *i.e.* We were formerly bound by the ties of amity, and even if we found not much to select, yet by the common course of study, we thought we gained a great advantage, for we became even more attached.

CHAPTER VII.

INTRODUCTION.—This chapter is a dissuasive from ostentation.

The arguments used are chiefly as follows :—

The best mode of gaining renown is actually to be what one professes. He who professes to be what he really is not, incurs heavy expense, and eventually great ridicule and infamy ; if he succeed in persuading men that he has qualities which really are not in him, he both incurs great danger to himself, and commits great detriment upon the state.

1. LET us consider, too, whether by dissuading his disciples from ostentation he exhorted them to the pursuit of virtue. For he ever said, that there was no fairer road to good reputation than that by which any man should really become the good character he wished to be supposed.

2. And that he spoke the truth, he thus proved. For,¹ he said, let us consider, if any one not really a good flute-player should wish to be thought so, what must he do? would he not imitate really good flute-players, in all the external equipments² of their art? And first, seeing that they acquire splendid paraphernalia, and lead about with them numerous followers, these must be provided by him : and again, seeing that many claqueurs applaud them, he must procure also numerous applauders : but never should he attempt a public exhibition of skill, or straightway he would be detected to be a fit object of ridicule, and not only to be a wretched flute-player, but also a vain-boaster. And yet, after his large expense, while he is not a whit benefited, and moreover has acquired an infamous notoriety, must he not live laboriously, uselessly, and ridiculously ?

¹ *Γάρ*, which refers to the preceding discourse of Sokrates, in which incidental mention was made of ostentation.

² *Σκεύη*, the Grecian flute-players wore robes most splendidly ornamented, and had paraphernalia of the most costly kind. We learn from Demosthenes that this *χόρος ἀνθρώπων*, was the most expensive of all the Dionysiac choruses.

3. And in the same way, if any one, not being skilled in strategy, or in pilotage, would wish to be thought so, let us consider what would be the natural result to him. In the first place, if when he desired to be thought capable of effecting such works, he should not be able to persuade others to believe he was, would not this be annoying? and still more wretched if he could persuade them? For it is clear that an unskilful person, if he were appointed to steer a vessel, or conduct an army, would both lead to destruction those whom least of all he wished, and also would have to retreat³ in disgrace and evil plight.

4. Similarly it appeared injurious to be supposed wealthy, or courageous, or powerful in strength, when not really so. For then, said he, duties are imposed upon these men far above their strength;⁴ and proving unable to accomplish them, while they are supposed to be able, they obtain no indulgence.

5. He called him, also, no trifling impostor, whosoever having procured money, or furniture, on credit by persuasion, should defraud his creditor; but the greatest impostor he pronounced him to be, who really being worthless, deceived the state, by representing that he was fully capable to guide the city. To me he appeared to divert his disciples from ostentatious vanity by addressing⁵ to them sentiments of this kind.

³ Ἀπαλλάττειν = "turpiter et male discedat."

⁴ Μείζω ἢ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, a similar construction is found iv. 4, 24—7, 10, and in a passage which has given much trouble to critics in Eurip. Med. 675. edit. Klotz.

⁵ Διαλέγομενος, not restricted to *dialogue*, but "de omni oratione quæ ducta est e dialogo." See below, ii. 4, 1.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.—1. Sokrates suspecting that Aristippus, a votary of pleasure, was desirous to take part in state affairs, demonstrates that "continence" should be an essential qualification, lest, enticed by the allurements of pleasure, or affected by the trouble and anxiety of public business, the public leader should fail in his duty (§ 1—7.)

2. When Aristippus states that his views tend only to a life of leisure and tranquil enjoyment (§ 8—9), Sokrates introduces a new discussion; Whether the governors or the governed live most happily? (10.) Aristippus replies, that he wished neither to command or serve, but to enjoy perfect freedom (11.) Sokrates then shews that such liberty as was desired by Aristippus, was at variance with the principles of human society (§ 12—13.)
3. Aristippus stating his intention not to remain in any one state, but to visit and sojourn for a while in all, Sokrates shews that by such a course he only increased the dangers he would be exposed to (§ 14—16.)
4. Finally, when Aristippus, baffled in his previous arguments, accused of folly those who voluntarily prefer a life of toil and privation in order to qualify themselves for management of public affairs (§ 17), Sokrates shews the great difference between those who suffer privation from free will, and those who do so from compulsion (§ 17—19.) He declares that nothing good or valuable is given by heaven to mortals, without perseverance and toil on their part, and quotes the sentiments of Hesiod and Epicharmus to prove his opinion (§ 20.) He then introduces the beautiful narration by Prodikus, THE CHOICE OF HERAKLES.

1. It appeared to me, also, that by the following arguments, he encouraged his associates to practise continence as regards the desire for eating, and drinking, and lasciviousness, and sleep: and to endurance¹ of

¹ The original contains some difficulty, for though we may correctly say *ἐγκράτεια πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου*, yet we cannot so well explain the connected

cold, and violent heat, and toil. And learning that one of his pupils was intemperately disposed in regard to these objects, he said: Tell me, Aristippus,² if it were required of you to take two youths and educate them, one, so that he might eventually be suited to hold command, the other, so that he would not desire authority, how would you instruct them severally? Do you wish that we should consider the subject by commencing from their nutriment, as from their first rudiments?—And Aristippus said: Truly nutriment appears to me to be the first rudiment indeed; for, unless he acquired nutriment, no one whatever could live.

2. Is it not right, therefore, that both should have a natural desire to partake of food when the proper hour should come?—Certainly, it is right, said Aristippus.—But which of the two should we train up, so that he would prefer to accomplish some urgent business, rather than to indulge his appetite?—The person, by Jove, educated for command, lest under his government, the duties of the state should be left unaccomplished.³—Accordingly, said Sokrates, when both would be inclined also to drink, should we enjoin on the same person ability to endure the pangs of thirst?—Most certainly, replied he.

3. But to be temperate in sleep, so as to be able to retire to rest at a late hour, and to rise up at early dawn, and to remain awake the whole night through if it be necessary, on which would we enjoin this?—This also,

words ἐγκράτεια πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν ῥίγους καὶ θάλαπον καὶ πόνον. Krüger and Sauppe suppose Xenophon to have confused two constructions, intending to say ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ, κ. τ. λ. and then, as if πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν did not proceed, he added, ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν ῥίγους, κ. τ. λ. This is the simplest explanation, and similar instances of neglect of strictness in style occur with the best authors. DINDORF reads καὶ ῥίγος καὶ θάλαπος καὶ πόνον. JACOBS expunges the words πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν, and considers ἐγκράτειας in the first clause to mean *temperantia*, in the second *tolerantia*.

² Aristippus, a disciple of Sokrates, was born at CYRENE, a city in Africa. He eventually founded the Cyrenaic school. He considered the *summum bonum* to be pleasure, the greatest evil to be pain. See below, iii. 8.

³ Ἀπρακτα γίγνηται = “ne res publicæ infectæ vel neglectæ relinquantur.”—KÜHN.

said he, on the same?—What further? said he, to be temperate in amatory passions, so that he might not be impeded from active exertion in duty, to which should we attach this characteristic?—This also, said he, to the individual instructed for command.—And further, said he, not to shrink from toil, but willingly to undergo it, from which would we require?—The one trained for government, said he.—What then? said Sokrates, if there be any branch of instruction adapted to teach us how to master our antagonists, which of the two should with more propriety learn this?—Far more, said he, the individual trained to hold command; for there would be no use whatever of all his other qualities without instruction of this kind.

4. Does it not appear to you, then, that an individual thus instructed would be far less likely to be ensnared than other animals? for many of those are ensnared by appetite; and even though some be exceedingly shy, yet, attracted to the bait by a desire to gratify their appetite, are captured, and others are entrapped by drink.—It is by all means the case, said he.—Are not others, said Sokrates, destroyed by their lasciviousness? Do not, for instance, quails and partridges, at the counterfeit cry of the female,—decoyed by desire and hope of enjoyment, and shaking off all consideration of danger,—fall into the trap?—Aristippus assented also to this.

5. Does it not appear to you degrading to a man to be taken by the same snares as the most senseless beasts are? For instance,¹ adulterers enter into closets, knowing well, that the adulterer is exposed to the danger of suffering all the penalties the law threatens, and of being entrapped, and, if detected, of being most violently treated. And though such great danger and infamy impend over the intriguer, and though there are many pursuits which can dissipate² amorous desires, yet they are borne headlong into imminent peril; does not such conduct appear to be that of one possessed?—I think it is, said Aristippus.

¹ "Οἱ κεραι, "veluti, ut his utar; ut exemplum afferam." See iii. 3, 12.—Κῦνκ.

² Ἀπολυσόντων, see below. ii. 2, 4—8. 3. iii. 8, 2.

6. And although the most numerous and most necessary employments of men must be performed in the open air (as, for instance, war, agriculture, and not the least important of other occupations), yet still, that the majority of mankind should be wholly untrained to bear cold or heat, does it not appear to be gross neglect?—He assented to this.—Does it not seem to you that the future prince should practise to endure with ease these hardships also?—By all means, said Aristippus.

7. Accordingly, if we class those who are disciplined in all these points with men fitted to bear command, shall we not class those incapable to endure all this with those who will feel no desire for authority?—He assented to this also.—What then? since you know the rank appointed for each class of these individuals, have you ever considered with yourself into which of the two ranks you could justly assign yourself?—I have, said Aristippus; and assuredly I do not assign myself to the class desirous of government.

8. For since it is indeed a difficult task to procure for oneself the necessities of existence, it appears to me the part of a very silly man not to be satisfied with that occupation,³ but to impose on himself the additional task of procuring for his fellow-citizens all they require. And is it not utter folly that while he denies⁴ himself many things he desires, he should, by becoming the president of the state, render himself liable to punishment, if he should not accomplish everything that state might fancy?

9. For states think it but just to use their magistrates as I use my slaves; for I require my domestics to provide me the necessities of life in great abundance, while they refrain from touching anything; and so, states think it the duty of their magistrates to provide for them most numerous advantages, but think that these magistrates should abstain from them. Individuals inclined

³ Μη ἀρκεῖν τούτο, Scil. αὐτῷ, lit. that that occupation should not suffice him. The verb ἀρκεῖν is often found without the dative of the person, as in ii, 2, 6. iv. 4, 9. Nothing is of more frequent occurrence in Greek writers, than that the *subject* of the preceding clause, should become the *object* in the succeeding.

⁴ ἑαλεῖν τι ἑαυτῷ, est “*sibi denegare*.”—Künn.

to undergo continual troubles themselves, and to afford the same to others,¹ I would place among men fitted to govern, when they should have been thus trained. Myself, undoubtedly, I rank with those who wish to pass their lives in the way most easy, and most agreeable.

10. And Sokrates said: Do you wish, then, that we should examine this point also, whether the governors or the governor lived with more happiness?—I much wish it, said he.—First, then, among the nations of which we have any knowledge, in Asia the Persians hold rule, but the Syrians, Phrygians, and Lydians² are held in subjection; and in Europe the Scythians govern, but the Maotians are subject: and in Libya the Karthaginians rule, but the Libyans are subject. Out of these people, which of the two classes do you imagine to pass their lives most pleasantly? Or, among the Greeks, of whom you yourself are, whether do the dominant, or the subject parties, appear to you to live more happily?

11. Nay, said Aristippus, I by no means consign myself to slavery: but there appears to me to be a certain path, midway between both, in which I will endeavour to proceed; a path conducting neither through supremacy or slavery, but through liberty,—the path which most surely conducts to happiness.

12. But if, replied Sokrates, as this path of yours leads neither through command or subjection, so it were considered not to lead through human society,³ you might then say something of weight. If, however, while you live amongst mankind, you do not think it meet to hold command yourself, or be commanded, or readily to render obedience to the magistrates over you, I think you will soon experience that the powerful well

¹ Ἄλλοις παρέχων. Many alterations of the text have been proposed, needlessly:—for those engaged in official duties are of necessity obliged to impose their respective duties on their subordinates, and to excite in them a spirit of activity and energy.

² Sokrates designedly mentions, out of several nations, those held in the greatest contempt among the Greeks.—JACOBS. The MAOTIANS dwelt near the lake Maotis, in European Sarmatia.

³ Δι' ἀνθρώπων, Scil. φέροι, which is to be supplied from the preceding φέρει.

know how to treat their inferiors as slaves,¹ by forcing them, both publicly and privately to wail.

13. And do you not know that others have sown and planted, but these cut down their corn and fell their trees, and harass² in every way their inferiors and those who do not wish to serve them; until they compel them to prefer slavery rather than war against the most powerful? And, even in private life, do you not know that the daring and vigorous, reducing to slavery the timid and weak, reap the fruits of the latter's labour?—But, said Aristippos, that I may not suffer this, I will not shut myself up within any one state, but will be everywhere a temporary guest.

14. Undoubtedly you mention a wonderful artifice!³ for, surely, since Sinis and Skiron, and Prokrustes⁴ died, no one injureth the stranger! But now, even they who live as free citizens in their native states, also enact laws to prevent injury; and besides their connections by blood they acquire other friends as allies, and throw bulwarks round their cities; and procure weapons by which they repel aggression; and moreover prepare other auxiliaries from foreign states; yet, after they have obtained all these advantages, are nevertheless wronged.

15. But though you have no protection of this kind, you will have to tarry long upon the roads, where many are constantly outraged. At whatsoever city also you may arrive, you will be inferior to all its citizens; and that, too, when you are such a character,⁵ as, more than

¹ *Πολιτοκοῦντες*. The verb properly means “to besiege,” “to blockade,” and is then applied to all other violent and oppressive conduct, as below, § 17.

² *Πάλασμα*, properly a trick or artifice peculiar to *wrestlers*, by which they endeavoured to trip up their antagonists. Here it denotes any cunning and artful device.

⁶ Celebrated robbers, destroyed by Theseus. There is a pleasant irony in this speech of Sokrates; he means to say, “although such cruel robbers as Skiron, &c. no longer infest the public roads, yet there are not wanting other men to injure you.”

⁷ *Τοιοῦτος, οἷος*, *i. e.* a vagrant, one roaming about without any settled abode, the citizen of no one state, and therefore unprotected by any.

any other, the injurious lay hands on. Yet, because you are a stranger do you think that you will not be wronged? or are you confident, because these cities proclaim safe-conduct to you, when arriving or departing? or is it rather, because you fancy yourself to be a slave¹ of such a character as would profit no one inclined to act the master? For who would wish to keep in his house a man by no means inclined to labour, and yet delighting in most sumptuous fare?

16. Let us consider this also, how masters manage slaves of such a kind: do they not cool down their lasciviousness by hunger? do they not prevent their committing robbery by debarring them from all places whence they could take anything? do they not by fetters prevent their running away? and by lashes drive out their laziness? Pray, what would you do when you perceived any of your slaves to be of such a temper?—I would break him down, said Aristippus, by every punishment, until I should compel him to act as becomes a slave.

17. But, then, O Sokrates, how do those trained up to the art of government, which you seem to consider to be happiness, differ from those suffering hardships of necessity? since they will have voluntarily to endure hunger, and thirst, and frost, and wakeful hours, and to labour in all other toils? For I do not see, what other difference it makes, when the same skin is lashed, whether it is lashed voluntarily or involuntarily;—or, in fine, when the same body is harassed by so many hardships, whether it be so with choice, or against choice—except this, that it is folly voluntarily to endure calamities.

18. What, Aristippus! said Sokrates, does not the voluntary suffering of such things appear to you to differ from the involuntary, so far as this, that he who suffers from choice may eat when he so will? and he who

¹ Δούλος. The mode of life of Aristippus was most costly and expensive, nor had he any inclination to work; hence he imagined that no one would be likely to reduce him to slavery, as his keep would cost far more than his earnings were worth. Sokrates soon shews the futility of this idea.

purposely endures thirst may drink, and in other matters similarly; while he who of necessity suffers such hardships cannot alleviate them when he is so inclined? Again, the man who willingly endureth difficulties is delighted by happy hopes of the result of all his toils, as the hunters of wild animals find pleasure in the difficulties of the chase from the hope of seizing the prey.

19. Yet such rewards of toil are worth but very little: but those who toil in order that they gain the worthy as friends, or master their enemies, or that becoming powerful both in body and mind, they may well regulate their own household, and do good to their friends and benefit their country—must you not believe that these feel real pleasure in labours for such objects; and live full of happiness, admiring themselves, panegyrised and emulated by others.

20. But indolence, and pleasures obtained at the moment² of desire, cannot either work out a good constitution for the body, (as the teachers of gymnastic exercises say), nor do they convey to the soul any knowledge worth consideration:³ but pursuits requiring constant perseverance, cause us eventually to reach all that is beautiful and good, as worthy men have said; for to this purpose speaks Hesiod⁴—

Vices, in troops, and everywhere, most easily are found,
Level and smooth the path to them, and near to us their home;
But before Virtue's threshold, hard labour God hath placed,
Long is the road, and steep the way that leadeth to her hill,
And rugged too at first: but when the highest point you gain,
Easy the course for ever then, though pathless once it seemed.

² Ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἡδοναί. Such is the interpretation of STRABO, adopted by Kuhnert, and supported by the whole connexion of the passage, "Voluptates ejusmodi, quas, ubi concupiveris, statim, utpote sine ullo labore parabiles, percipere liceat." The old interpretation was "pleasure of momentary duration," and so Schneider, "eas voluptates, quæ statim percipiuntur et quarum usus breve tempus durat."

³ Ἀξιόλογον is added, for αἱ παρὰ ταῦτα ἡδοναί cannot be said to convey *no knowledge* whatever to the mind. For who denies that music, paintings, and other pleasures of the same kind, give us some sort of knowledge?

⁴ Ἐργ. κ. ἡμ. 285 (287 GOETTL.)

Epicharmus,¹ also, bears testimony to the same effect —

The gods to us all blessings sell ; as pay they ask — our toil.

And in another passage, he says —

Vain man, wish not for pleasures soft, lest hard toil you may find.

21. And Prodikus,² the sophist, in his paper on Herakles — which also he declaims to many as a specimen of his skill³ — declares his sentiments in a similar manner regarding virtue ; speaking, as far as I can remember, to the following effect : —

For, he says, that Herakles when he sprung from childhood to puberty, — at which period, youths becoming their own masters, are wont to give indications whether they will enter on the course of actual life by the path of virtue, or, by that of vice, — having gone forth to a solitary place, sat down, perplexed as to which route he should pursue.

22. And that two females of majestic stature appeared to advance towards him, the one engaging in appearance and lady-like, adorned in all her parts by Nature solely, her body with virgin purity, her eyes with modesty, her mien with sobriety, and she was clad in a robe of white. The other richly fed to plumpness and softness,

¹ A native of Cos, an island in the Ægean sea. He flourished about 500 B.C., and consequently was cotemporary with Æschylus. He was considered by the Dorians to be the inventor of comedy. But if the date of the Arundel marbles be correct, SUSARION flourished about 562. The comedians Epicharmus, Susarion, and Dinolochus, the chiefs of the Sicilian school, dealt rather in the *ludicrous* than the *sarcastic*. The *Athenian* comic writers, Cheonides, Magnes, &c. adopted the old Iambic style, and personal satire. Of these Athenians, CRATES is mentioned as the first who introduced the Margitic style and subject.

The verses here quoted are tetrameter Trochaics.

² The most celebrated of all the sophists. Some have represented him to have been the teacher of Sokrates, but this is not clear. See C. Hermann : de Socr. Mag. *Marb.* 1817, p. 49.

³ Ἐπιδείκνυται. Declamations held by the sophists, to show the power of their language, skill in invention, and mode of reasoning, were called ἐπιδείξεις. Ἐπιδείκνυμι means *docco*, *demonstro*, and so the exhibition of a drama was analogously expressed by δειῶσκειν = *docere fabulam*.

artificially adorned in complexion, so that she appeared fairer, and to have a more beautiful blush than Nature gave. She had her eyes opened widely,⁴ and wore a robe whose texture allowed the youthful beauty of her limbs to be apparent: frequently she looked down upon her own figure, and stared boldly up if any person gazed upon her; and frequently she looked back to admire the shadow of her person.

23. But when they came nearer to Herakles, she, whom I first described, advanced with the same quiet gait, but the other, eager to get before her, ran up to Herakles, and cried, O Herakles, I see you are perplexed in doubt as to what path you shall take to enter upon life; if, then, you make me your friend,⁵ I will guide you by the most pleasant and easy path,—you shall taste of every pleasure, and pass your life devoid of every trouble.

24. For, first, you shall not agitate yourself with thought of wars or state affairs, but wend through life, considering only what most grateful viands or draughts you can discover: by seeing or hearing what you may be delighted; by the touch or fragrance of what productions you may be pleased; and by associating with what loved objects you can have most enjoyment; how you can slumber most softly; and how you may possess all these enjoyments with the least degree of trouble.

25. And if ever a slight suspicion should arise, respecting want of means whence all these blessings may be supplied, fear not that I will force you to procure them for yourself by labour and suffering in body and mind. Nay, rather, you shall enjoy the fruits of all the toils of others, abstaining from nothing whence it may be possible to take aught; for I give to my disciples full authority to gain profit from every source they can.

26. And Herakles, hearing this, said, O lady, what is

⁴ Ἀναπεπταμένα, the bold immodest stare, βλέμμα ἱταμόν, opposed to the modest and retiring look.

⁵ Παισιόμενος, on participles used for finite verbs, see Herm. Vig. § 227.

thy name?—They who love me, replied she, call me HAPPINESS; my enemies nickname¹ me VOLUPTUOUSNESS.

27. And now the other female, approaching calmly, said: I, too, am come to thee, O Herakles, because I knew thy parents, and have perceived your disposition during the training of your youth; whence I entertain a hope, if you turn on the path which leads to me, that surely you will become a noble doer of all acts which are honourable and dignified; and that I will become more honoured and more ennobled from the blessings you shall obtain through me.² I will not deceive you by any preludes regarding pleasure, but with truth will relate the facts, as the gods ordained them.

28. For nothing of all that is really good or beautiful do the gods bestow on man, without his own toil and care: but whether you desire the gods to be merciful to you, you must worship those divinities; or if you wish to be beloved by friends, you must perform some service for those friends. If you are anxious to be honoured by any state, that state you must advantage; and if you require to be admired by Greece in its whole extent, Greece in her whole extent you must try to benefit. If you wish that the land should yield you fruits in abundance, you must till the land. If you think you ought to enrich yourself by herds of cattle, you must diligently attend to those herds. If you are eager to increase your means by war, and desire the power of liberating your friends and mastering your enemies, not only should you learn from the experienced all the arts of war, but also should practise how you ought to use them. But if you desire to be powerful in bodily frame, you must habituate the body³ to render

¹ Ὑποκοριζόμενοι “invidioso et odioso nomine aliquem appellare.”—LEFVELL. “Rem bonam nomine odioso exprimere.”—KÜHN. We have followed Liddell, s. v.

² Ἐπ’ ἀγαθοῖς διαπρεπεστέραν, “propter bona, quæ tibi a me parabuntur, illustriorum.”—KÜHN.

³ Τῷ σώματι, κ. Comp. Cic. de off. 1, 23. “Exercendum corpus et ita afficiendum est, ut obedire consilio et ratione possit.” And so Sall. Cat. ii. 1. “Servitio corporis, amimi imperio, magis utimur.”

obedience to your mind, and must exercise it in labour and in toil.

29. Here VICE, interrupting, said, Do you perceive, Herakles, by how painful and tedious a road this woman leads you to mere cheerfulness? while I, by an easy and short path, will conduct you to perfect happiness.

30. And VIRTUE replied, O wretch, what good dost thou possess? What pleasures dost thou experience, since you are disinclined to do anything in order to obtain them? You, who wait not for the natural desire of pleasures, but gorge yourself with all things before you feel the appetite for them; eating before you are hungry, drinking before you feel thirst; nay, that you may eat with pleasure, you procure artists in gastronomy;—that you may drink with pleasure, you purchase most costly wines, and run round the world to search for snow in summer.¹ That you may sleep pleasantly, you procure not only beds of down, but costly couches, and rockers⁵ beneath them: for you desire sleep not as a rest from toil, but because you have nothing to occupy you. You excite by incentives the amorous passion before Nature kindles a desire, practising every species of sensuality, and abusing alike both males and females. For thus it is you train your friends—by night you outrage them in the grossest manner, and waste in heavy sleep the most precious hours of their day.

31. Though immortal, thou art flung forth from the gods. By all the worthy among mankind you are despised. The sweetest of all sounds you have never heard⁶—the praises of yourself. The loveliest of all

¹ *Χώρα*. Snow was used by the ancients to cool their wines. They frequently preserved it in subterranean caverns. See Plin. ix. 4. Athen. iii. p. 124.

⁵ *Υπόθαλαρα*, this is undoubtedly the meaning of the word, and the explanation is due to Schneider, who compares three passages of the physician Antyllus (in Frag. Medic. Oribas. *Mett.* p. 114, 170, 172), “e quibus apparet *ὑπόθαλαρα fulera diagonalia* pedibus lecti subjecta esse, ut *σισμός*, lecti agitatio, efficeretur.” This meaning is omitted in Liddell and Scott.

⁶ *Ἀκοήσματος*. Comp. Cic. pro Arch. ix. 32. “Themistoclem dixisse aiunt, quum ex eo quereretur quod *acroama* aut ejus vocem libentissime audiret; ejus a quo sua virtus optime predicaretur.”

sights you have never seen—for never hast thou beheld one noble work accomplished by thy hand. Who would credit you when you speak? Who would aid you when in want of aught? What man of honest mind would be so reckless as to join your train of revellers? for the young among them are impotent in body: when older they are deranged in mind. Without occupation throughout the years of youth, and fed richly with every superfluity: with heavy toil, in all the squalidness of penury, they pass through the years of age; ashamed of their past actions, broken down with what they must do now. Having run through all life's pleasures in their youth, they have stored up all its sorrows for old age.

32. But I associate with the gods, and I associate with virtuous men; no glorious work, whether divine or human is wrought without me. I am honoured above all, both by gods and men, those whom it befits to honour me. A loved co-operator with the artisan; to the master the faithful guardian of his household; the benevolent assistant of the servant; the benign promoter in all the arts of peace; the firm auxiliary in all the needs of war; the best associate in friendship.

33. Yet my friends have a sweet enjoyment of food and drink, simple as they are; for they refrain until they feel a natural desire for them. They, too, have sweeter sleep, than those who share no toil; nor are they annoyed if they lose a portion of their slumber; nor to gain repose do they forego the execution of their duties. The young delight in praises from the elders; the elders pride themselves in reverence from the young. Pleasantly do they remember the noble actions of olden time, and delighted are they while happily accomplishing the business of the present. Through me they are loved of gods, dear to all good men, and honoured by their country. And when the destined end may come, they lie not dishonoured in oblivion, but chanted by songs of praise, they bloom¹ in memory throughout all time. O Herakles, thou son of noble parents, if thou

1 *Θάλλουσι*. Comp. Cicer. Tusc. 1, 49. "Harmodius in ore et Aristogito, Lacedæmonius Leonidas, Thebanus Epaminondas, VIGENT."

dost accomplish such acts, thou can'st possess the most blessed happiness.

34. Thus, in the main, Prodikus related the instruction of Herakles by Virtue. He adorned, however, his sentiments by much more elevated language than I relate them now in. It were well worth your while, Aristippus, bearing these things in mind, to try and bethink you also of matters which concern the future period of your life.

CHAPTER II.

INTRODUCTION.—THIS chapter contains a conversation between Sokrates and his own son, Lamprokles, who had quarrelled with his mother; and treats of the duty of children towards their parents. The love of parents, especially of mothers towards their offspring is beautifully described. The sentiments occur in the following order:—

- (a') Those men are considered to be ungrateful who do not repay a kindness when they have the power.
- (b') Ungrateful men are properly classed among the unjust. (§ 1, 2.)
- (c') The greater the benefit received, the more unjust is the recipient to be considered if he display no gratitude. But we should consider the benefits conferred by parents, especially the mother, on their children, to be the very greatest. (§ 3—6.) Hence it follows, that even if a mother be harsh and peevish, yet should a son reverence her with filial affection, seeing that any severity in her treatment of him arises not from hostility or ill will, but from the kindest motives (§ 7—12.) He then considers how awful a crime neglect of filial duty is, seeing it was punished by the laws of the state, and visited with the universal contempt of men (§ 13—14.)

1. HAVING learned that Lamprokles, the eldest of his sons,¹ was incensed against his mother, Sokrates spoke as follows:—

Tell me, my child, are you aware that certain individuals are called ungrateful?—Truly I am, said the youth.—And have you learned, in consequence of what line of conduct men give them this appellation?—I have, said he; for those who have received a kindness and do not repay it, when they have the ability to do so, men call by the name “ungrateful.” Do you not think then, that the ungrateful should be classed with the unjust?—Certainly, he replied.

2. And have you ever considered this point, whether, perchance, as it appears unjust, to reduce one's friends to slavery, but just, to enslave our enemies, so it be unjust to act with ingratitude towards our friends, but

¹ The sons of Sokrates were Lamprokles, Sophroniskus, Menexenus. Their mother was Xanthippe.

just to do so towards our enemies?—I have well considered; replied he, and in my mind, whoever, having obtained a benefit at any other's hand, whether he be friend or foe, does not try to repay it with gratitude, he is an unjust man.

3. Accordingly, if this be so, does not ingratitude appear to be pure² injustice? The youth assented. In proportion, therefore, as one having received more important favours does not requite them, should he not be considered the more unjust? He assented to this also. Whom then, and at whose hands, can we find to have been benefited to a greater degree than children by their parents? whom their parents have called into existence from non-existence; and have caused them, to see so many beautiful things, and to share in so many extraordinary blessings, as the gods afford to men; blessings which undoubtedly appear to us so valuable beyond all else, that we all shrink from leaving them more than everything else beside; and states have appointed death as the penalty for the most heinous crimes, considering that they could not check injustice by the terror of any greater evil.

4. And surely you cannot imagine that men beget children merely to gratify the sensual passions; since all our streets and all our houses are full of means to appease desire; nay, it is evident, that only after close examination as to the sort of females from whom the most robust children¹ may be produced to us, we unite with them, and engender offspring.

5. And the husband supports a partner to bring forth offspring to himself, and provides that there shall be means for his future children, whatsoever he thinks will benefit them for life, and in as great abundance as he can. And the wife, receiving it within herself, bears this burden, oppressed with sickness, and perilling her life; participating to the infant the nutriment by which she is herself supported. And with many throes of agony carrying it her full time, and giving it birth, she suckles and

² Ἐτελειότης, "pure," "unmixed," properly "judged or examined by the sunlight."—STEPH.

¹ Βίλτιστα, "*robustissima*."—KENN.

cherishes it, not as yet receiving a single blessing, nor does the infant know¹ by whose hand it is thus fondly tended: nor is it able to signify its little wants, but she with a mother's true sagacity, endeavours to satisfy it with all that is both wholesome and grateful to its taste. Yes, for a weary time she tends it, patiently submitting to toil, by night and day, though she knoweth not what return she may receive for all this tenderness.

6. Nor are they contented with bestowing mere bodily support; but also when their children appear capable of acquiring some degree of instruction, the parents teach them all the good principles for conduct in life they are themselves acquainted with; and should they consider another more capable of imparting instruction on other points, at great expense they send their sons to him; and are filled with anxious care, labouring in all ways, that their children may be as excellent as possible.

7. To this the youth replied:—But assuredly, even if she had performed all this, and manifold more, no one could possibly bear her harshness.—And Sokrates replied, Whether do you think the wild temper of a savage animal, or of a mother, more difficult to be endured.—I think, said he, the wild temper of a mother, at least such as mine is. Has she then, ever inflicted an evil upon you, by biting, or kicking you, by which many have frequently suffered from beasts?

8. But, by Jove, said he, she uses language of such violence, that no one would wish to hear it for the value of all his means of livelihood.—How much trouble, difficult to be endured, do you think you have caused her, by your voice and acts, by day and night, being peevish from your childhood? How much grief have you given

¹ Οὔτε γιγνώσκον τὸ βρέφος, &c. Wannowski considers these words to be nominatives absolute: others think they depend on τρέφει. This latter is exceedingly ungraceful, since the clause οὔτε προπαινοῦνται οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν intervenes. Kühner thinks it to be a sort of oratorical anacolouthon, and that Xenophon used the nominative, instead of the genitive absolute "membrorum concinnitatis servandæ causa." In any construction the meaning of the passage is clear.

her by your illness?—Never, said he, have I spoken a word, or performed an act towards her at which she could blush.

9. What then? said Sokrates, do you think it is a harder thing for you to bear her hasty expressions, than for actors, when they utter the most violent reproaches upon each other in their tragedies?—But I think, because they do not imagine that the speaker who reviles, reviles to do them real injury, or that he who threatens, threatens to do any serious harm, they bear all lightly. — And when you know that all your mother utters, she utters with no evil thought, nay, rather wishing you to have blessings more numerous than any other has, are you incensed? Or do you suppose your mother to be malevolent to you?—Heaven forbid! said Lamprokles, I do not indeed imagine that.

10. Then, said Sokrates, this mother who is so benevolent to you: who in your sickness takes anxious care, to the utmost of her power, that you may recover health, and may not want any of the necessaries of life: a mother who entreats the gods for so many blessings for you, and payeth the oblations she hath vowed,² do you say that she is violent? For my part, I think if you cannot bear so excellent a mother, you cannot bear anything that is good.

11. But tell me, said he, whether you think it your duty to respect any individual; or have you determined to try to please no person whatever; or to follow, or obey³ neither general or magistrate?—By Jove, it is my duty to respect men, said he.

12. Accordingly, said Sokrates, do you wish to please your neighbour, in order that he may kindle a fire for you when it may be required; or assist you in the acquisition of some good; and should you happen to stumble might aid you speedily, with neighbourly help?—I do,

² Εὐχὰς ἀποδιδόναι = "*vota reddere, est persolvere, quæ diis aliquis promiserit.*"—Kühn.

³ "Ἐπεισθαι . . . πείθεσθαι. The former word has reference rather to the body, and is connected in meaning with στρατηγῶ. The latter word denotes mental obedience, and refers to ἄλλοι ἄρχοντι.

said he.—What then? should you meet with a fellow-traveller, by land or sea, does it make no difference whether he be an enemy or a friend? or do you think it your interest to gain good will from them?—I do, said he.

13. Are you then determined to endeavour to gain their favour, while you do not think it your duty to regard your mother, who loves you most of all? Do you not know that the state takes no cognizance of, or allows a suit, regarding other species of ingratitude, and disregards those who having received a favour do not requite it; but if any one should not reverence his parents,¹ on him they impose a fine: and punishing him with degradation, do not permit him to hold a magistracy, considering that the sacrifices for the city's welfare would not be duly offered, if he were to officiate, and that he would perform nought else with honour or with justice? And farther, by Jove, if one should neglect to pay due honour to the sepulchres² of his dead ancestors, the state examines into this, in the scrutiny³ of candidates for office.

14. If you are wise, my son, you will entreat the gods to pardon you, if you have neglected your mother: lest they, considering you to be an ingrate, should be disinclined to serve you. Have respect also for the opinion of mankind, lest perceiving you to be neglectful of your parents, all may condemn you, and then you should appear bereft of friends: for if men suspect that you are devoid of gratitude to your parents, no one will believe, that should he do you a kindness, he ever would meet with gratitude in return.

¹ Γονεὺς μὴ θεράπειν. An action was allowable for any neglect or insult towards a parent, γραφή κακώσεως γονέων.

This custom is illustrated by the following epigram of Callimachus:—

Στήλην μητρὸν ἔχει, μὲν λίσσον, ἔσπεφ' αὖ κοῦρος,
ὧς βίον ἡλλάχθαι καὶ τρόπον οἰόμενος.
Ἢ δὲ τάφῳ κλινθεῖσα κατέκτανε παῖδα πεσοῦσα.
Φεύγειτε μητρὸν καὶ τάφον οἱ πρόγονοι.

³ Δοκιμασία, at Athens the examination held regarding the life and character of candidates for magisterial offices. If the examination took place in the Senate it was called ἀνάκρισις, if in the Agora, δοκιμασία.—POLL. viii. 9.

CHAPTER III.

INTRODUCTION.—DISSENSION having arisen between two brothers, Chærephon and Chærekrates, Sokrates enforces fraternal love by the following arguments:—

1. A brother ought to be esteemed beyond all wealth (§ 1.) The possession of wealth is doubtful and uncertain, unless you have friends and allies, by whose aid you can acquire and defend them (§ 2, 3.) He is undoubtedly to be adjudged our nearest friend, whom Nature herself has given; for, firstly, mutual love is innate in brothers; secondly, those who bear brethren are more respected by men, and less liable to injury (§ 4.)
2. This being so, even though a brother be hostile to us, we should forego all anger, and study to please him (§ 5--9.) You will surely appease him, if you be the first to seek a reconciliation by kind acts and words, and you should do this the more if you be the junior. The more ambitious and high-souled your brother is, the more will you gain on him by kindness.
3. As the limbs of the body are formed for mutual aid, so brothers, if united, are beneficial to each other; if severed, they are not (§ 18--19.)

Weiske well observes, that Sokrates shews no small degree of wisdom and knowledge in these remarks. It even happens, he says, that many who have endeavoured to reconcile foes, bring them together, warn, advise, adjure, and by the strongest arguments endeavour to reunite them, yet after all gain no other result save to render them more hostile to each other and themselves. Thus Iokasta errs in her attempts to reconcile Eteokles and Polynikes, in the *Phœnissæ* of Euripides. Sokrates saw that only *one* should be addressed for such an object, and that, the one not influenced by implacable animosity, who would wish and have ability to affect the other's mind. Chærephon appears to have been passionate and *φιλότιμος* (§ 16); with him, therefore, caution should be adopted, and his brother was to be induced to address him, and be the first to propose a reconciliation.

1. HAVING perceived that Chærephon and Chærekrates, two brothers, and well known to him, were at variance with each other, when he saw Chærekrates, he thus addressed him. Answer me this, said he, Chærekrates, surely you are not one of those men who con-

sider property¹ more valuable than brethren; and this, too, when possessions are devoid of reason, while a brother has reason: and the former requires aid to protect it,² the latter is able to afford you aid; and, moreover, the former being manifold, the latter but one!

2. It is indeed a strange thing if any one considers brethren to be an injury to himself, because he does not possess the property of these brothers; while he does not consider fellow-citizens to be an injury, because he does not possess the property of these citizens: and that in the latter case he can reason, that it is far better by living in society with many, to enjoy a competency with security, than by leading a solitary life, to possess the property of all his fellow-citizens, exposed to danger.

3. And those who are rich, purchase for themselves slaves, that they may have partners in labour; and procure friends as if they required auxiliaries; while they are neglectful of their brethren, as if friends could indeed be acquired from among the citizens, but from among brethren they could not.

4. And yet it conduces much to a friendly feeling, to have sprung from the same parents; and much to have been reared together; since even among wild animals a fond affection springs between those fostered together. Besides men respect more those who have brothers than those who have not, and are less inclined to commit aggression on them.

5. And Cherekrates replied, Indeed, Sokrates, if the difference between us were not very great, probably it would be my duty to bear with my brother, and not avoid him for trivial reasons: for, as you say, a brother is an advantage, provided he is the character he ought to be; however, when he is devoid of all a brother's characteristics,³ nay, is quite the opposite to them, why should any one attempt impossibilities?

¹ *Χρήματα* "omnia quibus utimur, i. e. omnino omnes possessiones, ergo et pecora."—LEX. SEGNIER.

² Sokrates means that wealth and other property requires care on the part of the possessors to guard and preserve it.

³ *Ἐνέχον*. The common version renders by "at si plane desit officio, which is opposed to the usage of the verb." HERBSTIUS

6. And Sokrates said, Whether, O Chærekrates, is Chærephon able to gain the favours of no one, as he does not your's, or are there some whom he can greatly please?—Yes, replied he, and for that very reason, Sokrates, it is but just that I should hate him, because he is able to please others; while to me, whenever he is near me, on all occasions, even by act as well as word, he is an injury rather than a benefit.

7. Pray, said Sokrates, just as a horse is an injury to a person, who not knowing how, yet tries to manage him, is it thus that a brother is an injury to him who tries to manage him, not knowing the proper way?

8. Why should I be ignorant, said Chærekrates, how to conduct myself towards my brother, since I know how to speak kindly to him who speaketh kindly, and to benefit him who benefits me? But a person who is constantly endeavouring to annoy me, both by act and word, I could not speak or act well to, nay, I will not even try.

9. You speak strangely, O Chærekrates, since if you had even a dog, trained to guard the flocks, which fawned upon the shepherds, but was irritated at your approach, you would forego all anger, and would endeavour to tame him by kind treatment: while a brother,—though you acknowledge he would be a great advantage if he were such as he ought to be; though you acknowledge¹ that you know how both to speak and act kindly,—you will not even attempt to render for yourself as excellent as possible.

10. Chærekrates replied, I apprehend, Sokrates, that I have not such extraordinary cunning, as to render Chærephon such as he ought to be towards me.—Yet truly, said Sokrates, there is no need of any abstruse or novel plan against him; on the contrary, I think that if he be gained over by those arts you already know, he will most highly prize you.

understands *ἄνθρωπος* after the verb. WEISKE, approved by Kühner, renders “when as yet he is infinitely at fault,” “when he is the direct opposite of a brother.”

¹ Ὁμολογῶν “prose autem te confessus et factis et verbis benignum esse, tamen operam non das ut, &c.”—KÜHN.

11. Will you not at once tell me,¹ said he, if you perceive that I possess some love charm, which I am ignorant of having?—Nay, tell me you, said Sokrates, if you wished to effect that one of your acquaintances, when he offered sacrifice, should invite you to the banquet, what would you do?—It is quite clear, said the other, that I would take the initiative myself, and invite him when I would sacrifice.

12. And if you wished to urge one of your friends to take care of your interests, whenever you should go abroad, what would you do? No doubt I would endeavour previously to take care of his interests, whenever he might be abroad.

13. And if you wished that any host should give you a hospitable reception, whenever you might arrive at his city, what would you do?—Certainly I would first endeavour to receive him hospitably whenever he came to Athens; and if I wished to incite him to accomplish for me the objects of my journey thither, it is clear that I should endeavour first to effect the same for him here.

14. Accordingly, though you long knew all love-charms among mankind, you have kept them in the dark. Or, tell me, said he, do you hesitate to make the first advance, lest you should seem degraded, if you should take the lead in trying to benefit a brother? And yet to me that man appears worthy of the highest praise, who is the first to commit havoc on the foe, or render service to a friend. If then, I had supposed Chærephon to be more easily led to this frame of mind than you, I would have endeavoured to induce him first to make efforts to conciliate your friendship; but as it is, you appear, by taking the lead, more likely to effect this.²

¹ Οὐκ ἂν φθάραις. “you cannot be too soon in telling me,” *quin statim loqueris*. See Math. Gr. G. ii. § 553, 2; Kühn. ii. § 664. Herman strangely considers φθάραις properly to mean *cessare, desinere*. Ad. Vig. p. 761.

² The connection of the whole passage is this, “Chærephon is the elder, and you Chærekrates the younger. But in all countries it is the established usage that the juniors should give reverence and pay respect to their seniors. From this it results that you

15. And Chærekrates said, you appear to me, O Sokrates, to speak what is quite out of place, and by no means suited to your character, since you require me, the junior, to take the lead in this matter; and yet the established custom among all men is quite the reverse, namely, that the elder should take the lead in all things, whether work or word.

16. How so? said Sokrates; is it not the custom everywhere that the junior should leave the path when an elder meets him? that he should rise from his chair, honour him with the softer seat, and yield to him in conversation? My good friend, be not averse, but try to soften down this man,² and very soon he will yield to you. Do you not see how fond of honour,³ and how liberal-minded he is? Worthless wretches you cannot more easily allure than by offering a bribe; but good and worthy men you can most securely gain by treating them in a friendly spirit.

17. And Chærekrates replied, But what if he shall become no better after I have made the trial?—What other peril will you hazard, said Sokrates, save only the proof that you are a worthy man, and full of brotherly affection, but that he is worthless and undeserving of any service? But I do not expect any such result. I am sure that when he perceives you challenging him to this fraternal contest, he will emulously strive to be superior to you in services both of deed and word.

18. For, at present, you are as unnaturally separated, as if the hands, which the gods made in pairs mutually to assist each other, should cease their office, and turn to mutual hindrance: or if both the feet, fashioned by divine council to co-operate with each other, should

should shew your respect for your elder brother, by anticipating him in kindly offices; *i. e.* it was the duty of Chærekrates, though junior, so to regulate his temper and conduct, as to be the first to court the favour of his brother by anticipating him in performing services, and, by so doing, conciliate him. *Taking the lead*, ἡγούμενος “*principium faciens*,” ἡγεμονικὸς ὢν, πρότερος.

² Τὸν ἄνδρα, much more emphatic than ἐκείνον. Perhaps he intended to vindicate the full-grown manhood of Chærephon, as opposed to the youth of Chærekrates,

³ Φιλότιμος, in a good sense, “*noble-minded*.”—ΚΕΧΗΝ.

neglect this, and fetter one another. Would it not be utter folly to use for purposes of embarrassment what has been formed for purposes of aid?

19. And it appears to me that God hath formed two brothers for mutual aid, of far greater value than the hands, or feet, or eyes, or other members which are formed in pairs in the human frame, can give: for the hands, if it should be necessary at the same time to do things at a greater distance than a fathom, are unable to effect them; the feet cannot at the same time reach two objects, even at a less distance; and the eyes, which seem to have the power of reaching to the greatest distance, cannot at the same instant see objects before and behind, even though much closer: but brothers, if they be friends, though widely severed, may accomplish all things, and that for mutual¹ aid.

¹ Sokrates means to say, that two brothers, even though separated by a wide interval of space, can unite their strength to accomplish any object, and that (καί) in such a way, that each can assist and promote the welfare of the other. The words ἅμα καὶ do not signify "equally as" (a meaning they bore above), but ἅμα is to be joined with πρᾶττον = *in re aliqua agenda operam cum aliquo conjungere*: and the particle καὶ means *et quidem*. See Kühn. Gr. Gr. vol. ii. § 721. 1.

CHAPTER IV.

INTRODUCTION.—THIS and the following chapters treat of friendship—in this, Sokrates considers the *value* of friends. He states that many men are more anxious for the acquisition of property than of friends (§ 1—4.) Yet no good can be found more precious, lasting, and profitable than a worthy friend. He regards our interests as his own, he shares prosperity or adversity with his associates, and is even more careful than themselves in forethought (§ 5—7.)

The sentiments of the Platonic Sokrates concerning friendship, are described by Plato in the piece called *Lysis*; the more full discussion, however, is contained in the *Symposium* and *Phædrus*.

1. I HEARD Sokrates also holding a discussion regarding friends; from which discussions I consider one would be considerably benefited, both as concerns the acquisition of friends, and the retention of them. For he said, that from numerous individuals he heard this very maxim, “that a friend is the best of all possessions, if he be honourable and good;” but yet that he saw the majority of mankind anxious for the acquisition of any thing rather than of friends.

2. For he stated that he saw men anxious to acquire houses² and lands, slaves, herds of cattle and furniture, and zealous to preserve them when acquired; but friends,³ which they acknowledged to be the most valuable acquisition of all, he saw the mass of mankind careless how they should obtain, or how existing friendships should be retained.

² Comp. Cic. in *Læli.* xv. 55; “Quid autem stultius, quam, cum plurimum copiis, facultatibus, opibus possint, cetera parare, quæ parantur pecuniâ, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa: amicos non parare, optimam et puerherrimam vitæ, ut ita dicam, suppellectilem?”

³ The emphatic position of φίλων, as remarked by a reviewer in *Lit. Jour. Hal.* p. 438, 1835, requires the sentiment to run on as if written οὐτὲ ὁπωσ, ὅν ἂν ἔχωσι. Σώζονται=preserve for themselves.

3. Nay "more, when both friends and slaves should be sick, he stated that he knew men even to call in physicians to visit their slaves, and carefully to provide all things necessary for their convalescence, while they utterly neglected their friends. And supposing both to die, they were grieved for their slaves, and considered they had suffered a loss, but supposed they had met no injury by the decease of friends. And that men permitted nothing of their other possessions to be disregarded or uncared for, while they neglected their friends when requiring help.

4. Moreover, he remarked, that he perceived men to be accurately acquainted with the number of all their other possessions,¹ even though numerous in amount; while they were not only ignorant of the number of their friends, though few they were, but even if they attempted to enumerate them in answer to inquiries, they retracted² again some whom they had at first set down: so little do they think upon their friends.

5. And yet in comparison with what other possession of all, would a friend not appear far more valuable? What description of steed, what sort of team, is so useful as a useful friend? What slave is so well disposed or faithful? what other acquisition is so universally advantageous?

6. For the truly good friend, ranges himself against every deficiency of his friend, to supply it. whether it refers to the establishment of his private means, or public interests; if it be necessary to do a service to any, he supplies the means; if apprehension alarm any, he gives his aid, sometimes by sharing in expenditure, partly by co-operation, now by persuasion, now by gentle violence: he feels the greatest joy in their success,

¹ Comp. Cic. in Lael. xvii. 62. "Sæpe (Scipio) querebatur, quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent, ut capras et oves quot quisque haberet, dicere posset; amicos quot haberet, non posset dicere."

² Ἀπαρθόσθαι, they enumerated persons at first, but corrected themselves, and rejected them on second thoughts. The word is metaphor derived from the game of drafts, when the mover alters the position of his man, while allowed by the laws of the game.

and when they trip, he is the first to raise them from prostration.

7. All that the hands minister to the body, all that the eyes foresee, and the ears hear³ beforehand, or that feet accomplish, in no one of these services does a friend fail. Nay oftentimes what one has not effected for himself, or has not seen, or heard, this a friend is wont to anticipate in fully performing for his friend. But, nevertheless, some endeavour to foster trees for the sake of their fruit, but are utterly careless and negligent of the most profitable possession, that called a friend.

³ Προακούειν, Herbstius renders by “*sonus e remoto loco percipere* ;” but Kühner correctly remarks, as προορᾶν is to “foresee”=*prospicere*, so προακούειν τι, is used of him who hears any thing before another.

CHAPTER V.

INTRODUCTION.—THE chief heads of the following chapter are, 1, that every one ought to examine, at what value he should be estimated by his friends—2, that he should endeavour to make himself as valuable as possible to them.

From the brevity with which Sokrates treats the subject, several passages present some difficulty and obscurity; Sokrates leaves more to be inferred from his words by the judgment of his hearer, than he has verbally expressed. He desired to reform some one of his disciples who neglected a poverty stricken friend, yet he pursues his object rather covertly than openly, and in the full connexion of the sentences much has to be supplied by thought.

He first states, that slaves are considered of the more or less value in proportion to the services to their owner. Then we must hence infer, that as the value of slaves is to be considered from their utility, not from their property, so friends should be estimated not from their wealth, but their love, affection and good will. Thence he goes on to state, that therefore, it is fitting that each should examine what is his own real value to his friends, and should study to increase this as much as possible; and by this conduct we will bind our friends to us so forcibly, that we need never apprehend that they will desert us.

There is a severe irony in the words of Sokrates against him, who thought that a friend should be esteemed not from the value of his friendship, but from his wealth, and therefore had deserted his friend when reduced to poverty.

1. I HEARD also another lecture of his, which appeared to me to excite the hearer to self-examination, as to his own probable worth in the estimation of his friends. For having seen one of his disciples neglectful of a friend when pinched with poverty, in presence of that person and many others, he thus interrogated Antisthenes.¹

2. Pray Antisthenes, said he, is there any standard value for friends, as there is for slaves? for of slaves,

¹ A celebrated pupil of Sokrates, and after his death the founder of the Cynic School of Philosophy.

one perchance is worth two minæ,² another half a minæ, another five minæ, another ten. Nay, lately Nikias, the son of Nikeratus is said to have given a talent for a cashier.³ Now then I investigate this question, whether there be any standard of value for friends as there is for slaves.

3 There is a standard assuredly, said Antisthenes; since, for my part, I would prefer that one man should be my friend, rather than have two minæ; another, however, I would not estimate at more than half a minæ; another I would prefer to ten minæ; but I would value the friendship of another to all my means, and all my pursuits.⁴

4. Therefore, said Sokrates, if these things be so, it would be most advisable that we should each examine ourselves, as to our value in the estimation of our friends; and also to endeavour that we should be as valuable to them as possible, that these friends may be less inclined to abandon us; for I have frequently heard one individual say, that his friend has abandoned him; and another, that a man whom he considered to have been his friend, preferred a minæ to his friendship.

5. I take into consideration all such points as these, whether, as one offers for sale, and parts with, a worthless slave for any sum it may bring,⁵ so one is easily induced to abandon a worthless friend, when he may gain more than the little value he esteems him at. But I do not often see either worthy slaves sold, or worthy friends forsaken.

² For the prices at which slaves were commonly sold, see Bösch. Eron. Athen. vol. i. 73.

³ *i. e.* An overseer of his cash, *ταργύρτα*; others read *τάργυρτα* = *silver mines*. The Athenian silver mines were at Laurium, they were farmed out to private individuals, and produced a considerable income to the state. See below iii. 6, 12.

⁴ *ἥτις*. Many books read *πάντων*, the notion of which is already included in *χρημάτων*, besides *πάντων* could not be used in reference to Antisthenes, who was known to be exceedingly poor. Kühner remarks “verba *πρὸ πάντων χρημάτων καὶ πάντων* quasi proverbialem quandam vim mihi videntur habere.”

Τὸν ἑρόντοτος, prætium quod res censilis reperit; to sell it for any price it may bring.

CHAPTER VI.

INTRODUCTION.—THE first inquiry is, what should be the character of those we select for our friends—they ought to be temperate, faithful, and ready to perform duties for their friends (§ 1—5.)

2. He discusses how we can investigate the character of men, before we form friendship with them; and the best way is to see how they conducted themselves to previous friends (§ 6—7.)

[This part of the discussion is very short, and by no means satisfactory, for if we are unacquainted with those previous friends, and if we have not had opportunity to investigate their character also, the counsel given by Sokrates will be of no avail.]

3. He treats of the method to acquire friends, from among those whom we approve of—first, the gods must be consulted, (§ 8); 2nd, by acts and words we should shew our affection for them (9—13)—friendship cannot exist unless between the wise and good (§ 14—16)—but though even amongst the good and worthy disputes arise, because each wishes to obtain the same good, yet still friendship insinuates herself, and unites the good and worthy, (§ 19—28)

These matters being discussed, he states that a friend should be selected not for beauty of person, but for excellence of mind, (§ 29—32) friendship must proceed from admiration of virtue (§ 33), this admiration inspires benevolence (§ 34) and causes us to endeavour to surpass our friends in every class of duty, (§ 35.) Truth is the foundation of friendship (§ 36—38.) Wherefore the shortest and safest way to obtain friendship is this, that you should endeavour to be really the character you wish to be esteemed by your friends (§ 39.)

1. He appeared to me to give wise instruction relative to the examination of the characters it would be best to gain as friends, by speaking to the following effect. Tell me, said he, Kritobulus, if we needed a worthy friend how would we take in hand to examine his morals? would we not first inquire whether he could restrain his appetite and intemperance, lasciviousness, love of sleep, and idleness? for can a person held in subjection by such passions, do his proper duty, either to himself, or to his friend?—Surely he cannot, said he.—Accordingly, do you not think we should avoid such characters?—Certainly, replied the other.

2. What next? said he. Since he who is extravagant cannot be independent, but always needs his neighbour's aid; and when he receives help is not able to repay, and not receiving, hates the individual who refuses to grant him a favour, does not such a person appear to you, to be a dangerous friend?—Undoubtedly, said he.—We must therefore avoid that man?—We must assuredly shun him, said he.

3. What then of him who has ability to make money, and is anxious to amass large sums, and on this account drives hard bargains,¹ and is delighted to receive, but is disinclined to make a return?—I think that such a person is even more wicked than the former.

4. What then of him who through a passion for making money allows no time for any other consideration, than as to whence he may hope to obtain it?² We must keep aloof from this man also, as I think; for he would be useless to one desirous to be intimate with him.

And what then of him who is quarrelsome, and likely to raise up enemies to his friends?—We must avoid this person, too, by Jove.—But if one be tainted with none of these evil qualities, yet quietly allows himself to be under a compliment, never thinking to repay one?—Such a person would be useless as a friend. Then what sort of a person should we endeavour to make our friend?

5. A person of directly opposite traits, I think, who is able to master all pleasures received by means of the body, who is just,³ and easy to be dealt with, and emulous not to be outdone in benefiting those who benefit him, so that consequently he is an advantage to his intimates.

6. How then shall we make proof of this, O Sokrates,

¹ Δυσξέρυβλος from συμβολή a contract, "qui in pactis faciendis aliisque negotiis contrahendis aut tractandis difficilem se præbet."—STALLBAUM.

² Κερδανεῖ, "unde ipse lucrum capturum se sperat," sic enim sæpe futurum explicandum est.—KÜHN.

³ Εὖορκος, h. e. *justus*. Ruhnken ingeniously conjectures εὖοργος, "easy to be appeased;" but εὖορκος is used in opposition to the character of the avaricious man, § 4, and who is called ἄπιστος, § 19.

before we are intimate?—We approve of statuaries, replied he, not by forming opinions from their own assertions; but whomsoever we know to have formed statues admirably before, we confide that he will make other statues well.

7. Do you mean then, said he, that the person who has benefited his previous friends, would clearly be inclined to serve his future friends?—Yes, replied Sokrates, for the groom whom I see previously to have managed horses skilfully, I deem skilful in managing other horses also.

8. Let it be so, said he, but how is it right to acquire the intimacy of the man who appears to us worthy of friendship?—Firstly, says he, we ought to consult the gods, whether they would advise us to seek his friendship.—What then? said he, regarding one whom we think it right to gain, and the gods do not oppose us, can you inform me how he is to be pursued?

9. Yes, by Jove, but it is not by tracking his trail,¹ as hares; or by traps, as birds; or by violence, as foes.² For to seize a friend against his inclination is troublesome, and to bind and retain him like a slave is very difficult: for treated in this manner men become enemies rather than friends.—Yes, but how do they truly become friends? asked he.

10. They say there are certain charms,³ which those who know, chaunt to whomsoever they may desire, and at once obtain their friendship; there are also love-spells, and they say, that they who know these, administer them to those whom they are desirous of, and are consequently loved by them.—Whence could we learn these? said he.

¹ Κατὰ πόδας, so below iii. ii. 8 -- "*insistendo vestigiis ejus.*" Kühner, who cites Liv. xxvii. 2. Marcellus . . . "*vestigii institit sequi.*"—Herbstius renders by *velocitate pedum, cursu.*

² Ἐχθροί, here with the same meaning as πολέμοι. The distinction between these words is thus given by Ammonius: ἔχθρὸς = ὁ πρότερον φίλος. πολέμιος = ὁ μετ' ὅπλων χειρῶν πύλας. Weiske thinks ἔχθρὸς to mean here, "qui per vim in jus rapiatur."

³ Ἐπρωταί, as below φίλτρα. Plato explains the irony—ἐπωδαῖς τισι τὰς δ' ἐπρωτὰς ταύτας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τὰς καλοῦς. Charm. p. 157. So Hor. Ep. 1. i. 34, "Sunt verba et voces quibus hunc *lenire* dolorem Possis."

11. You have heard from Homer, replied he, the verses chaunted by the Sirens to charm Ulysses, the commencement of which runs thus :

“ Pray, hither come, Ulysses famed, Achaia's greatest glory.”

But then, Sokrates, said he, did not the Sirens, by chaunting the identical same charm to all other men, retain them so effectually, that once they were charmed they never departed from them?—Not at all, replied Sokrates; they chaunted thus, only to those who were ambitious of virtue.

12. You seem to mean nearly this ;⁴ replied he, that we should use as charms to each, such praises, as that when he hears them, he will not think himself mocked by you; for in the latter case, he would only become the more hostile, and would repel men from him. Thus, for instance, if one were to praise as beautiful and robust, and strong, one who was conscious that he was diminutive or hideous, and weak.

13. Do you know any other charms, said he?—No: but I heard that Perikles was acquainted with many, by chaunting which in the city's ear, he caused it to love him.—How did Themistocles then cause the city to love him?—By Jove, not by charms, but by attaching to it some advantage.

14. You seem to me to mean, Sokrates, that if we are likely to procure any excellent friend, we ourselves should be excellent both in speaking⁵ and action,—And do you think it possible, said Sokrates, that a wicked man could obtain worthy persons as friends?

15. Yes, for I have seen, said Kritobulus, worthless

⁴ The general meaning of § 11—14 is this, “ if you desire any one to be your friend, you must first signify your affection for him by laudatory words, and afterwards prove it by your deeds.”

⁵ Λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν, Herbstius considers λέγειν to refer to the *oratorical powers* of Pericles; πράττειν to the illustrious *deeds* of Themistocles. But both statesmen were remarkable for these qualities united. Sokrates had already compared the oratory of Pericles with the music of the Sirens, to shew the power of language; he now introduces, in the exploits of Themistocles (πράττειν), and in his admirable *councils* for the state (λέγειν), the effect of *both* in gaining affection.

rhetoricians become close friends to worthy orators ; and men unfit for strategy, companions of men admirably skilled in military tactics.

16. But regarding the immediate topic of discussion,¹ are you then also acquainted with any persons who though useless themselves can obtain useful persons as friends? No, by Jove, I do not, but since it is impossible for a worthless person to obtain worthy friends, this is a concern to me, whether it be possible, that a man who is excellent and worthy, could easily become the friend of the worthy and excellent.

17. What disturbs you, Kritobulus, is this : because you frequently see men most honourable in their actions, and who refrain from all disgraceful deeds, instead of being friends, to be most hostilely disposed towards each other, and to use each other more violently than they do the utterly worthless.

18. And not only, said Kritobulus, do private individuals act so : but even cities which have the highest concern for all that is excellent, and least tolerate any depravity, frequently are hostilely² disposed towards one another.

19. Considering all this, I am in despair as to the acquisition of friends, for I neither see how the evil are likely to become friends to each other : for how can the ungrateful, or careless, or avaricious, or faithless, or intemperate, become friend? The evil-minded then appear to me absolutely disposed by nature to be mutual enemies rather than mutual friends.

20. Yet, moreover, as you say, the evil never can harmonize for friendship with the worthy ; for how can they who act basely become friends of those who hate all baseness? And finally, if they who practise virtue are at variance with each other for pre-eminence in the state, and from mutual envy hate one another ; who can

¹ Περὶ οὗ διαλεγόμεθα, "de qua quærimur," Sokrates wishes to turn attention to the original subject of investigation.

² Πολεμικῶς, here used for πολεμίως; for πολεμικῶς is generally an attribute of praise, "warlike," *bellicose*, *fortiter*; but πολεμίως is an attribute of censure, "violently," "hostilely," *hostiliter*. See § 21, where πολεμικόν is = *dissidiorum efficiens*.

be friends, and among what class of men can kind feeling and faithfulness be found.

21. But these matters are intricately disposed ; replied Sokrates. For mankind have in their natural constitution, not only principles of love ; (for they need each other, and feel compassion, and by co-operation benefit ; and understanding this, feel mutual gratitude) : but also have principles of hostility. For as all believe the same objects to be honourable and delightful, they contend with each other to obtain these, and so becoming at variance, contend with each other : for strife and resentment are prone to war, and the passion for self-interest begets ill-will, and envy deserves hatred.³

22. Yet notwithstanding this ; friendship, insinuating through all these obstacles, unites together the worthy and the good : for through virtuous principles they prefer a moderate competency without peril to supreme power with enmity : and they are disposed, by enduring hunger and thirst patiently, to share in food and drink without injury to others ; and though delighted by love for youthful bloom and beauty, they can master passion, so as not to offend those who should not be offended.

23. And, by refraining from self-aggrandizement, they not only participate⁴ in pecuniary matters, as far as justice allows ; but also with money give mutual aid. And they can arrange their disputes, not only without offence, but even beneficially to each other. They suffer not their hostility to advance to such violence as would cause repentance. And wholly remove the vice of envy, partly by sharing their own property, as common to their friends ; and partly by considering the property of their friends as if their own.

³ Μισητὸν, usually rendered by interpreters, “producing,” “causing hatred.” Kühner rejects this active sense, and explains by *odio dignum, odiosum*.

⁴ Νοτίμω, explained by Kühner as = *ἐκαίως*, see below iv. 4, 1. Herbstius understands the adjective to be used for an adverb, and then that *νόμιμα χρήματα* means, “money properly, justly acquired ;” properly obtained without any act of injustice. Bornemann thinks Sokrates means to express the lending of money at *legal interest, legitimis usuris*.

24. How then is it not natural, that the honourable and excellent should share in political honours, not only without injury, but even with advantage to each other? For those desirous of honour and power in states, merely that they may have means to peculate, and outrage men, and indulge in luxury, should be considered unjust, and guilty, and incapable of friendly union with another.

25. But if any one endeavours to gain honour in the state, from a wish that he may not suffer wrong, and may be able to assist his friends, so far as justice permits; and in his magistracy endeavours to benefit his state, why should not such a man form the closest union with another of similar disposition? Why should he have less ability to serve his friends if he be united with the worthy and the good? or why be less able to serve the state if he have the worthy and good to assist his labours?

26. But even as regards athletic games, it is quite clear that if it were allowable for the strongest to unite together and advance against the weaker, that the former would conquer in all the contests, and they would receive all the prizes. Accordingly, then, it is not allowed to do this. But seeing that in those states in which the worthy and the good hold sway, no one prevents a man from benefiting the state, in concert with whomsoever he may please, how can it be otherwise than profitable for a man to acquire the worthy and good as his associates and thus conduct affairs, experiencing these as sharers and co-operators in his proceedings, instead of antagonists?

27. And assuredly this is clear, that if any one war upon another he will require auxiliaries; and these in greater numbers if he oppose the honourable and good. And yet, those who are inclined to be auxiliaries, must be well treated, that they may be zealous in their exertions; and it is far better to treat well a few of the more deserving class, than a large number of the worse; for the evil require far more services than the good.

28. Yet with good courage, O Kritobulus, try to be excellent yourself, and while you endeavour to be

such,¹ pursue the friendship of the good and excellent. Perhaps too in this chase of the good and excellent, I may be able to assist you from my being so given to love;² for with regard to persons I desire, I am powerfully and wholly impelled to love them that I may be loved in turn; to desire them that I may be desired; and eager for their intercourse, that I may be sought for by them, for the sake of intercourse with me.³

29. And I see, you also will have need of these characteristics, when you wish to acquire friendship with any persons; do not then conceal from me, those, to whom you wish to become a friend; for through my careful diligence to please him who is pleasing to me, I do not think I am inexperienced in this pursuit of friends.

30. Then Kritobulus said, truly, Sokrates, I have long desired to learn this science; especially if the same knowledge will avail me to captivate the minds of the good, and the persons of the beautiful. And Sokrates replied—Nay, Kritobulus, my science embraces no art to cause the beautiful to endure him who lays his hands upon them: and I am persuaded that men fled from Scylla, because she endeavoured to throw her arms around them: while they say, that all awaited on the Sirens,⁴ because they laid hands on none, but sang their charms to them at a distance; and as men heard they were enchanted.

31. Then Kritobulus said, if you have any efficacious means to acquire friends, inform me of it, as one fully determined never to use my hands.—Well, will you never apply your lips to theirs? said Sokrates.—Be of good courage, Sokrates, said Kritobulus, for I will never apply my lips to the lips of any but the beautiful.—O Kritobulus, said he, this sentiment is diametrically

¹ Τοιοῦτος γυγνομίνοϋς=*dum talis fieri studeo*.—BORN.

² Ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι = *quia amoris (amicitiæ) operum do*.—KÜHN. He means the love of real loveliness, *i. e.* truth, virtue, and honour, with which he endeavoured also to inspire his pupils.

³ Ἐπνουσίας, "*vicissim expeti consuetudinis causa*," and thus Kühner explains the genitive.

⁴ Σειρήνας ἀπομένειν, "*Sirenes sustinere, non fugere*."—KÜHN.

opposed to your interest; for the beautiful¹ do not suffer such conduct; though the deformed gratefully admit such liberties, thinking they are considered beautiful in mind.

32. Then, replied Kritobulus; as I am determined to caress the beautiful, but most tenderly to caress the good, with confidence teach me the art of snaring friends. Then, said Sokrates, —when you desire to be the friend of any one, will you permit² me to accuse you to him, to the effect that you love and desire his friendship?—By all means accuse me, said Kritobulus, for I never knew one to detest those who praised him.³

33. But if I should lay this additional information against you, said he; that in consequence of your admiration of him, you are most kindly disposed towards him, will you not think you are calumniated by me?—Nay, said he; for in my own breast, kind feelings spring towards those I think to have kind feelings towards me.

34. Such things then, said Sokrates, it is allowed

¹ Οἱ καλοὶ, “ Sokrates, with his usual irony, does not here intend by καλοὶ the *beautiful in person*, but the *beautiful in mind*—the honourable, fair, amiable, —and by οἱ αἰσχροὶ we must understand the *degraded* and *worthless*, who think they are called καλοὶ on account of their mental graces.” Thus BORN.—MAETZNER explains the whole passages as follows, “ When Kritobulus expresses himself thus οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ στόμα προσοίσω οὐδενί, ἐὰν μὴ καλὸς ᾖ, he did not speak with sufficient clearness and precision, since καλὸς may denote loveliness not only of person, but of mind. Sokrates taking advantage of this ambiguity, in his usual manner, puns upon the word, and uses καλὸς to express *mental beauty*, yet opposes to it the word αἰσχροὺς in its own proper signification of bodily deformity. So then Kritobulus spoke in direct opposition to his interest, for the καλοὶ (i. e. the beautiful in mind) will not admit such caresses, and though the ugly would allow such liberties, their deformity would repel such advances. When Kritobulus understands the irony of Sokrates, he endeavours to avoid the ambiguity by using the word καλὸς of personal beauty, while he adopts ἀγαθὸς to denote mental beauty.

² Sokrates means, “ will you so think, speak, and act, that I may say all this with truth, concerning you ?”

³ Weiske calls attention to the gradation in these means of obtaining friendship.—1. *Admiratio* (ἀγασαι αὐτοῦ). 2. *Benevolentia* (ἐὐνοίῳ εἶχαι πρὸς αὐτόν). 3. *Studium promerendi*. (ἐπιμλῆς τῶν φίλων).

me to say regarding you to those whom you wish to make your friends: but if you give me the additional privilege of saying regarding you, that you are careful of your friends; and rejoice in worthy friends above all; and pride yourself on the noble conduct of your friends, no less than on your own; and rejoice at your friend's success, no less than at your own; and are never weary trying how your friends may meet with this success; and that you consider it the chief virtue of manly character to outdo your friends in services, and outdo your enemies in injury; I think I shall be a very useful companion to you, in this your pursuit of worthy friends.

35. Do you then say this to me, said Kritobulus, as if it were not in your power, to state concerning me whatever you pleased?—Surely I cannot do so, as I once heard⁴ Aspasia declare; for she stated that upright matchmakers, by telling with truth good points of character, were powerful to induce affection between the parties; while those who uttered false praises were of no service; nay that the deceived individuals hated each other as well as the matchmaker. Now since I am persuaded that her view is correct, I do not think I am allowed in my praises, to state any thing of you, which I could not state with truth.

36. Then, said Kritobulus, you appear to me a friend of such a kind, as would assist me, if in my own person I had qualities adapted to obtain friends; but if I had not, you would not be inclined to feign any thing for my benefit.—Whether then, Kritobulus, said Sokrates, do you think I would benefit you more by praising you falsely, or by persuading you to endeavour really to become an admirable character?

37. And if this be not clear to you, consider it from these illustrations: for if through a desire to render you a friend to the master of a ship, I were falsely to praise you, by asserting you to be a skilful pilot; and he

⁴ It has been a tradition, that Sokrates was instructed in some points of Philosophy by this celebrated lady. Weiske endeavours to prove, that Sokrates praises this lady as his teacher, solely on the principles of irony, and never intended to mean that he really heard the lessons of Aspasia.

through confidence in me, were to entrust his ship to you to steer, though wholly ignorant of the way; have you any expectation that you would not destroy both yourself and the ship? Or if by false representations, I should persuade the city in its public capacity, to entrust herself to you as an able warrior, upright judge, and admirable economist; what do you think both yourself and the city would be likely to suffer at your hands? or if by falsehood, I were to prevail upon any private individuals to entrust their property to you, as a skilful steward, and overseer; would you not, when put to the trial, not only be an injurious person, but also appear ridiculous?

38. But the shortest, safest, and most glorious way, O Kritobulus, is this; to endeavour to be really good in that in which you wish to be thought so. And all things which are considered virtues among men, on consideration you will find, can be increased by study and by practice. I, for my part, think we ought in accordance with these principles¹ to hunt for friends, but if you happen to know any other way inform me.—Then Kritobulus said, nay, I would be ashamed, Sokrates, to speak in opposition to these sentiments, for if I did so, I should speak what was neither honourable or true.

¹ Ταύτη "Credo oportere nos *tali ratione*, qualem exposui, venari, i. e. nobis conciliare amicos. Vid. i. 7, 3, ταύτη λυπηρόν."
—ΚΥΗΝ.

CHAPTER VII.

INTRODUCTION.—The precepts of Sokrates concerning virtue being enumerated, Xenophon now relates, how he endeavoured to alleviate the want and poverty of his friends, as well by instruction (chap. vii.—ix.) as by encouraging his pupils mutually to aid each other (chap. x.)

In this chapter Sokrates teaches us, that if any educated person be oppressed by poverty, it is not only not degrading, but even honourable, actively to practise any art he may have learned, in order to support existence; although these arts may vulgarly be thought unworthy of a freeman.

1. AND as to the difficulties of his friends; those which arose from ignorance he endeavoured to remove by instruction; those which arose from poverty, by teaching his followers to give mutual aid according to their ability. But as an instance of these matters, I will state what I was an ear-witness of. For perceiving Aristarchus² to have a very gloomy countenance; you seem, said he, O Aristarchus, to take something greatly to heart; now it is right to communicate the cause of your heaviness to your friends, for perhaps even we can alleviate it in some respects.

2. And Aristarchus replied; of a surety, O Sokrates, I am in considerable difficulty. For since the insurrection in the city,³ many having fled to the Piræus, all my surviving sisters and cousins, and nieces, have flocked to me; so that I have in my own house⁴ fourteen freeborn persons, independently of others.⁵ While we receive nothing from the country, since the enemy hold it; nor from the rents of our houses, since but few now

² Who this individual was, is not known.

³ After Lysander had taken Athens, and established the thirty Tyrants, a few, desirous of their former freedom, under the guidance of Thrasybulus, occupied the Piræus, and proceeded to war against the defenders of the oligarchy.—SCHN.

⁴ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ. See above on I, I, 9.

⁵ Such is the force of the article. “Quatuor decem et ii quidem libri homines, ut de servis nihil dicam.”—ERNEST.

remain in the city.¹ No one purchases our furniture; nor is it possible to borrow money from any quarter; nay, I think that by searching on the high road, one would more easily find money, than obtain it by borrowing. It is difficult indeed to see my relatives perishing; and yet it is impossible to support so many under such circumstances.

3. Sokrates, when he heard this said; what possibly can be the cause, why Keramon, though supporting so many, is not only able to afford all necessities to himself and them, but also to make so much as actually to roll in wealth; while you fear to support many, lest you should all perish from want of means?—Because, by Jove, replied he, he keeps slaves, I free persons.

4. And which of the two do you think, said he, are better; the free persons with you, or the slaves with Keramon?—Undoubtedly, I think, the free persons with me.—Is it not shameful then, said Sokrates, that he should become wealthy by the means of more worthless persons; while you should be in difficulties from having those of a superior class?—The fact is so,² said he; for he maintains artizans, I, those who are liberally educated.

5. Whether then, said Sokrates, are they who know how to prepare any thing useful, artizans?—Most certainly, replied he.—Is not meal useful?—Excessively so.—What of bread?—No less useful.—What then, said he, of male and female apparel,³ and inner vests, and

¹ Ὀλιγανθρωπία, for many of the citizens were put to death by the Tyrants, others fled for refuge to the Piræus, not a few retired to Megara and Thebes.—SCHW. Comp. Sall. Cat. 41, 28—31.

² Νῆ Δί', ἔφη. The connection is, "undoubtedly it is disgraceful that I should be in poverty, for I have to support free citizens, well brought up and tenderly reared, who ought to live in a manner superior to common slaves."

³ Several species of garments are here mentioned, ἱμάτιον, an *upper garment*, outer robe, or gown, answering nearly to the *toga* of the Romans, and frequently called *pallium*; this was usually worn at home.—2 χιτών, "*an inner vest*," called *tunica* by the Romans, (Ammonius makes χιτωνίσκος = *tunicula* to be a man's vest, χιτώνιον a woman's, but Pollux. vii. 55, makes the χιτωνίσκος peculiar to virgins.)—3. χλαμύς, a *thick warm cloak*; of an oval form.—4. ἔσωμός, a short mantle generally used by slaves and persons of the lower class. The Etym. Mag. states that those with one sleeve were peculiar to slaves, those with two, to freemen.

cloaks, and mantles?—All these, said he, are very useful. —Then do these abiding with you, know how to make none of these things?—Nay, they know how to make all, as I think.

6. And then are you not aware, that from only the profit of one of all these trades, namely preparing barley, Nausikudes not only supports himself and slaves, but a large number of swine and oxen besides; and makes so much that he frequently lends money to the state.⁴ While from making bread, Kerebus⁵ supports his whole household and lives splendidly; and Demeas, of Collyttus,⁶ by making cloaks; and most of the Megareans by making mantles, are well maintained?—Yes, by Jove, said he, for these purchase Barbarians, and maintain them on condition that they will work as their owners think fit; but I entertain free persons and relatives.

7. Then, said Sokrates, because they are free, and your relatives, do you think it right they should do nothing but eat and drink and sleep? Of free persons then, which do you think live most happy and pleasantly; they who pass their lives in that idle way, or those, who practise those arts which they know, and are useful to life? Or do you imagine that idleness and carelessness are beneficial to man—either as regards learning what it becomes them to know, and remembering what they have learned; or for health and strength of body, and acquisition and preservation of what is useful for life's support; while industry and diligence are in no respects useful?

8. And as to the arts you say they know; whether did they learn them as appendages by no means useful for life, and with the intention of never practising any of them; or, on the reverse, with the intention of engaging in them with industry and reaping profit from them? Whether are men more temperate when idle, or when employed in useful occupation? And whether are they

⁴ Λειτουργεῖν. See Boeck. Econ. Ath. vol. 1, 481.

⁵ Thus the name is restored by Borneman, as a coined name from κυρήβια = πίτυρα καὶ τὰ τῶν κριθῶν ἀποβρέγματα. Something like Bentley's emendation *Nummidius* for *Unumidius*, from *Nummus*.

⁶ One of the εἴημοι of Attica, and belonging to the tribe of Ægeis.

more just, when they support themselves by toil, or when in idleness they merely deliberate how to gain the necessaries of life?

9. Further; under present circumstances, you neither love them, nor do they love you, as I think. You consider them to be an injury to yourself: they see you to be annoyed with them. And from these feelings there is danger that hostility may increase, and previous friendly feelings be diminished. But should you direct them, so that they may be employed, both you will love them, when you see they are serviceable to you; and they will be dearly attached to you, when they have fully perceived that you rejoice in them; and both with greater pleasure remembering previous services, you will increase the friendship resulting thence; and from all these motives, you will be more lovingly and happily disposed towards each other.

10. If they were about to perpetrate any shameful act, death should be preferred to that; but as it is, all those arts, which are considered most honourable and becoming in women they know, as it appears; and all practise what they really know, with ease and speed, in the best manner, and with the greatest pleasure. Hesitate not then, said he, to advise them to this line of conduct, which will prove beneficial to you as well as to them; and, as is but natural, they will readily obey your suggestion.

11. But, by the gods, said Aristarchus, you appear to me to give such admirable advice, that although I previously was averse to borrow money, knowing that when I had spent whatever I might receive, I would have no means of paying it: now, I think I can brook to do this, in order to gain means¹ for commencing the work.

12. From this sum, then, materials were provided, and wool was bought; and continuing² their work they break-

¹ Ἀφορμή is that point from whence one sets out to do any thing, hence applied to the means, by which he can carry it into effect: hence ἐργῶν ἀφορμή here means "money sufficient to commence the work."

² Ἐργαζόμεναι "quæ in opere adhuc occupatæ sumunt cibum, post quem non sunt manus lavandæ: ἐργασάμεναι, quæ, operibus confectis, dilatis certe in aliud tempus, cœnant."—ERNESTI.

fasted ; and supped when their tasks were fulfilled. They were joyous instead of gloomy in countenance ; and as before their looks expressed mutual suspicion, now they rejoiced at each other's sight. They loved Aristarchus as their guardian ; he tenderly loved them as benefactors to himself. But at last he came to Sokrates, full of joy, and told him the result ; and that they charged him with being the only person who eat the bread of idleness in the house.

13. And Sokrates said, did you not tell them, then, the story of the dog ? For they say, when once upon a time, animals had power of speech, that the sheep said to her owner ; “ you do a strange thing, since you give nothing to us, who supply you with wool and lambs, and cheese, except what we pick ourselves from the fields ; while to the dog, which affords you none of these advantages, you give a share of the food you may have yourself.”

14. But the dog hearing this said—And rightly, by Jove ; for I am he who preserves even yourselves,³ so that by my aid you are neither lifted by men, nor worried by wolves : since, if I did not guard you, you would not be able even to feed, through terror lest ye should be destroyed. And so, it is fabled, the sheep assented that the dog should have superior honour. Do you then say to them, that as a dog, you are their guardian and protector, and that by your aid they live performing their various tasks in safety and with pleasure, injured by none.

³ *Kai h̄mās aûrās, i. e.* as well as your wool, lambs, cheese, &c.

CHAPTER VIII.

INTRODUCTION.—Sokrates encourages Eutherus, who hired himself out for manual labour, to select some more suitable mode of life, as his present employment was not adapted for old age. He urges him to seek for the office of steward to some rich man requiring help. The objection of Eutherus, that he disliked to be obliged to render account to his master, Sokrates opposes, by shewing him that there is no office in life free from liability to censure.

1. BUT having seen, after a considerable interval, another friend of long standing, he cried ; whence do you come Eutherus ?—After my departure just before the close¹ of the war, I now abide in this city : for since we were deprived of all possessions outside the frontiers of Attica ;² and in Attica my father left me nothing ; I am now compelled, sojourning here, to acquire the necessaries of life, by bodily labour. For I think even this better than to ask aid from any friend, especially since I have nothing, on the security of which I could borrow.

2. And how long do you think your body will be able to earn what you daily require ?—No long time, by Jove. —Well then, said he, when you become older, it is clear you will be in want of means, and no one will be inclined to give you hire for your bodily toil.—You speak but the truth, said he.

3. Accordingly it is better at once to apply yourself to some occupation, which will assist you when you become old ; and to attach yourself to some one possessed of a larger fortune, who requires a person to join in its superintendence ; and so, by serving him in the superintendence of his farms, and gathering in of his harvests, and preservation of his property, to be benefited yourself in turn.

¹ Eutherus alludes to the peace of Theramenes, by which the Athenians lost all the property they had acquired outside their own frontier.

² Ὑπερόρια, property outside Attica : τὰ ἑγγαία property within its limits.

4. I am very much disinclined to submit to slavery, Sokrates.—Yet the presidents in different states, and the managers of public monies, are not more slaves because of their office ; nay, are considered to have more freedom.

5. In a word, I cannot endure³ to be liable to censure, from any one.—Yet assuredly, Eutherus, said he, it is by no means easy to find any occupation in which one would not be exposed to censure ; for it is difficult so to act, as to commit no error ; and even when one has performed his office without error it is difficult to meet with an unprejudiced judge : since even in the occupation you are now engaged in, I wonder if it be easy for you to pass through it without blame.

6. We ought to endeavour then to avoid censorious persons, and to seek for the benevolent ; and as to duties, whatsoever you are able to do, to take them upon you,⁴ but whatsoever you are not able, to avoid wholly ; and whatsoever you may attempt, to perform that in the best and most zealous manner : for by such conduct, I think you will be less liable to censure ; you will most easily find assistance in your poverty ; and live in the manner most easy, most free from danger, and most independent till old age.

3 Οὐδὲ πᾶν προσίεμαι = non probo, non placet mihi, aversor. —KÜHN.

4 Ὑπομένειν, “suscipere et tibi imponi pati.”—SCHEUS. It is opposed to φυλάττεσθαι = sibi cavere ab aliquo re.

CHAPTER IX.

INTRODUCTION.—Krito, a wealthy person, complains that he is assailed by sycophants. Sokrates recommends him to take as his friend Archedamus, a poor, but acute man, who may retaliate by accusations against them; by the adoption of this counsel, the poverty of Archedamus, and the dangers of Krito, are removed. The friends of Krito also, court Archedamus, and are rendered secure from false accusers by his exertions.

1. I REMEMBER also his having heard Krito say, how very difficult it was, for any man who wished only to mind his own business, to live at Athens.¹ For at present, said he, certain persons are bringing actions against me, not because they are wronged by me; but because they think I would rather give them a sum of money than be involved in the trouble of a lawsuit.²

2. And Sokrates said, tell me, said he, Krito; do you not keep dogs that they may repel the wolves from your flocks?—Certainly I do, said he, for it is much more profitable to keep them, than not.—Why would you not then support a man, who would have both the will and the power to repel from you those who attempt to wrong you?—I would with pleasure, said he, if I were not apprehensive that he might turn upon myself.

3. What then, said he, do you not see, that it would be far more pleasant for such a man to meet with services by gratifying you, rather than by being hostile? Be well assured, that there are numbers of such men here, who would be very anxious to gain your friendship.

¹ All the orators and comedians prove the truth of Krito's complaints. "Life indeed was harassing and full of trouble at Athens, on account of the swarm of sycophants, whom the people permitted constantly to accuse and harass the better class, erroneously thinking it tended to preserve the purity of their democracy. A peculiar word *σιίου* was used to denote the assaults of these calumniators upon the rich."—SCHN.

² *Πράγματα*, the constant annoyance caused by the suits instituted by these calumniators.

4. After these words,³ he found one Archédamus, of great ability both in speech and action, but poor: for he was not a person to make money by every means, but, being a lover of honesty himself, and of keen ready wit, just the man to make money of the Sophists. For him, then, Krito used to select, and give him a portion, whenever he gathered in his corn, or olives, or wine, or wool, or other productions of his farm, useful for daily life: and whenever he sacrificed, he used to invite him,⁴ and paid him attention in all similar acts of courtesy.

5. When Archedamus perceived that he would always have a refuge in the house of Krito, he paid much court to him: and straightway found out numerous illegal acts committed by Krito's accusers, and others who were their enemies: and at once he served one of them with a writ to appear to answer a public suit, in which it would be decided, what bodily or pecuniary mulct he should atone by.⁵

6. But since this person was conscious he had committed many wicked actions, he strained every nerve to get rid of Archedamus; but Archedamus was not to be shaken off, until the other ceased to annoy Krito, and give himself a sum besides.

7. But when Archedamus had effected this, and many similar proceedings, then,—as when a shepherd has a good dog, other shepherds wish to place their flocks near him, in order that they may have the benefit of his dog,—so also many of Krito's friends entreated him to lend them Archedamus as their protector.

³ Ἐκ τούτων "ex his sermonibus, post hos sermones."—KÜHN.

⁴ When sacrifices were offered, it was usual, at the conclusion of the ceremony, to invite friends and acquaintances to an entertainment.

⁵ Ἀπὸν ἔχει κριθῆναι, ὃ τι δεῖ παθεῖν ἢ ἀπορίσαι, "what it was fitting the accused should suffer or pay." Παθεῖν in reference to bodily punishment, ἀπορίσαι, to a pecuniary fine. This was a usual formula in Athenian trials, in which either the accuser, or Judges, added to the indictment, a clause, in which the amount and nature of the punishment was stated. Viger thus interprets "judicium subire hac formula, quid aut pœna lucendum sit, aut pecuniaria muleta subeundum."

8. And Archedamus gladly gratified Krito: and not only was Krito left in tranquillity, but all his friends. And if any of those whose antagonist he was, taunted him with having received benefits from Krito, and therefore protecting him; Archedamus asked which of the two is more disgraceful? to be benefited by honest men; and then by serving them in turn, to make such men your friends, and be at variance with the wicked; or to try to wrong the upright and good, and so make them your enemies, and by co-operating with the evil, to try to gain their friendship, and use them to the detriment of the good? And ever after this, Archedamus was one of the friends of Krito, and was honoured by all Krito's friends.

CHAPTER X. .

INTRODUCTION,—Sokrates exhorts Diodorus, a rich man, to aid his friend Hermogenes who was oppressed by poverty, but a person of honour and probity. —He teaches, that as we endeavour to recover a fugitive slave by rewards, and cure him in his illness, so we ought the more to prevent a friend from perishing through want, seeing that he is so much more valuable than a slave. An honourable friend should leave nothing untried to repay a kindness.

1. I KNOW also of his having held a conversation with his follower Diodorus, to this effect. Tell me, said he, Diodorus, if one of your slaves were to run away, would you take measures to recover him?

2. Yes, and by Jove I would excite others to catch him too, by offering rewards.—What then, said he, if one of your slaves were ill, would you take care of him, and call in physicians, that he might not die?—Assuredly, said he.—But if any one of your intimate friends, being far more useful than a slave, were in danger of perishing through want of means, do you not think you ought to cherish him, so that he might be saved?

3. And yet you know that Hermogenes¹ is not insensible; and would feel deep shame, if once he was aided he did not requite to you the favour. And yet such an agent as he, voluntary and well-disposed and faithful, one not only able to effect what he is directed to do, but able to be useful of himself, and to plan and devise beforehand, I would consider equivalent in value to many slaves.

4. Good economists tell you then to buy, when you can purchase for a small sum, what is worth much more: but in consequence of the present troubled times,² good friends can be procured for a trifle.

¹ Hermogenes was the son of Hipponicus and a very worthy individual. In consequence of his brother Callias having obtained all his father's property, he was stricken down by poverty.

² *Διὰ τὰ πράγματα*, “*hoc reipublicæ statu: ut nunc res sunt.*”

5. Diodorus replied, indeed you say well, Sokrates, and tell Hermogenes to come to me.—No, by Jove, I will not, said he: for I do not consider it so honourable for you to invite him to come, as for you to visit him yourself: nor do I think his reception into your friendship, a greater boon to him than to you.

6. And so Diodorus visited Hermogenes, and at no great cost acquired a friend, who considered it his chief occupation to watch how by speech or word he could benefit or please Diodorus.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.—Xenophon now relates how Sokrates instructed those who were desirous of public situations in the state, particularly to learn and practise their several duties.

First he discusses the duties of a General.

The man desirous of becoming a General must learn the duties of one invested with command: and this is the more necessary, since in war, the whole welfare and condition of his country, is placed at the disposal of a General; and his errors may prove the cause of the greatest calamities to it, as well as to himself.

The science of Tactics, the marshalling and deploying a military force, is of considerable use: but the General must not be contented with this knowledge, there being many other and higher duties of command, which a General should know.

1. AND that Sokrates greatly benefited those desirous of public honours,¹ by rendering them diligent in the offices they might desire, I will now shew by a narrative: for hearing that Dionysodorus² had come to Athens, professing to teach the art of generalship, he addressed one of his companions, whom he perceived to be anxious to gain that employment in the state.

2. Truly it were disgraceful, my young friend, that he who desired the office of General in the state, should neglect all instruction, when it is possible to learn that art; and far more justly should he be punished by the state than one who should contract to make statues, though he never has learned the art of statuary.

3. For since in the dangers of war, the entire city is entrusted to her General, it is natural that great advan-

¹ Τῶν καλῶν; τὰ καλὰ hic sunt munera publica, honores.—KÜHN.

² Dionysodorus, was a native of Chios, and brother of Guthydemus. He first assumed the office of a professed teacher of military tactics at Athens, and afterwards turned Sophist.

tages should result, if he be successful, and great evils, if unfortunate. Why then should he not justly be punished, who neglects indeed to learn the art, while he is eager to be elected? By uttering such arguments he persuaded the youth to go and learn.

4. But when he returned, having received instruction, as he sported¹ with him, he said; my friends! as Homer² describes Agamemnon to be august, does not our friend here appear more august since he has learned the art of war? for, as he who hath learned to play the harp, is a harpist, even though he may not actually play the instrument; and he who hath learned the healing art, is a physician, although he may not really practise; so he from henceforth will continue to be a General, even though no one should elect him. But he who is not properly instructed, is neither General or Physician, though he should be appointed as such by all men.

5. But, in order that we may be more fully acquainted with the military art, in case any of us should be leader of brigade or of a troop under your command,³ tell us, with what did he commence to teach you strategy?—He replied, he commenced with the same principles he concluded with, for he taught me “Tactics,” and nothing else.

6. Yet assuredly, said Sokrates, this is the most trivial branch of strategy. For the General should be a provider of all things useful for the war, and be able to procure necessities for his soldiers; he should be quick in contrivances⁴ and hard-working, careful, capable of endurance, and shrewd, gentle and yet severe; frank and yet crafty; a watcher yet a thief; lavish in his gifts, yet a plunderer of others; liberal, yet avaricious; cautious⁵

¹ Προσέπαιζειν, the imperfect denotes the frequent repetition of his joke.

² Iliad iii. 170. Καλὸν δ' οὕτω ἐγὼν οὐπω ἶδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
Οὐδ' οὕτω γεμαρὸν, βασιλῆϊ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ ἔοικεν.

³ Λοχαγῇ σοι, “verti potest, tibi, vel imperio tuo subiectus.—Κῆρυξ.

⁴ Μηχανικός, i. e. “Solertem in consiliis excogitandis.”

⁵ Ἀσφαλῆ, i. e. cautum. See below; Book iv. 6, 15.

yet enterprising; he who is likely to fill the office of General ably, should have these, and many other characteristics both of nature and training.

7. But it is advantageous also to know the tactics; for any army properly marshalled, differs much from one in disorder; as stones and bricks, beams and tiles flung together in disorder, are in no respect useful: but when at the foundation and roof, materials not liable to rot or decay are placed, namely stones and tiles, while between these the bricks and wood are placed together, as in house-building, then the mass becomes a house, a possession worth a large sum.

8. Truly, said the young man, you have spoken an exact parallel; for in war we must form both the front and rear,⁶ of the bravest: in the midst we place the worst, that they may be led on by the van, and pushed forward by the rear.

9. That would be useful,⁷ said he, if he has taught you thoroughly to distinguish the brave, and the cowardly; but if he has not, what use is there in what you have learned? for, suppose he ordered you to range the purest silver in the foremost and hindermost row, but the worst in the space between, without instructing you how to distinguish between the standard and the adulterated, of what use would his precepts be?—But, by Jove, he did not teach me this. So that we must, of ourselves, separate the brave and the cowardly.⁸

10. Come then, why should we not at once consider, by what means we may be free from mistake in these points?—I am desirous we should, replied the youth.—Well then, said he, supposing it were our duty to seize on silver, if we place the most avaricious first, would we not arrange them correctly?—I think so.—What then, if the soldiers were to brave a perilous enterprise, should

⁶ Ἀρίστους εἰ τάττειν, in this sentence, τοὺς πρώτους is the subject, ἀρίστους the predicate. See iii. 14. 6.

⁷ Ἐκτετακέν, as often, there is an ellipse of καλῶς ἔχει. See Matt. Gr. Gr. § 617. a.

⁸ Ὡστε—ἄν—εἰς, “ut, si bonus et malos discernere velimus, nos ipsos id facere oporteat.”—Κύμν.

we not rank the most ambitious first? for these are they, who for the sake of praise are eager to brave danger. They are, therefore, by no means obscure, but since they are every where conspicuous, they may be easily selected.

11. And pray, said he, whether did he merely teach you to arrange your troops; or did he also teach you with what object, and in what manner¹ you must use each of your divisions?—Not at all, said he.—Yet, surely, there are many objects, said he, against which it will not be fitting to draw up, or lead up your troops in the same way.—By Jove, said he, he never explained these points.—Well then, by Jove, said Sokrates, go again to him, and question him; for if he have science, and is not wholly shameless, he will blush to dismiss you uninstructed, after taking your money.

¹ "Ὅποι, quo, significat *consilium*, ad quod singulis ordinibus utendum sit : ὁποῶς, *rationem*, qua singulis ordinibus utendum sit ad consilium exsequendum.

CHAPTER II.

INTRODUCTION.—A good general should take measures for the safety of his soldiers, by providing them with all necessaries in abundance. Nor should he be listless in his endeavours to render his soldiers ready, but of a bold and warlike spirit against the enemy. He should not endeavour to procure success merely for himself alone, but also for the whole force.

1. ON one occasion having met a person appointed as general, he asked him ; wherefore, do you think Homer has styled Agamemnon, “ shepherd of the people ? ” Is it not for this reason, that as shepherds ought to be careful so that their sheep may be safe, and have pasture in sufficiency ; and that that result may accrue to obtain which they are kept ; so a general should take care, how his soldiers should be safe, and have necessary supplies, and that that result may accrue, to obtain which they serve ? They serve, no doubt, that by conquering the enemy, they themselves may live in greater happiness.

2. Or why pray, has he lauded Agamemnon, saying,

Both was he, a monarch noble, and puissant warrior.²

May he not have called him a **PUISSANT WARRIOR**, not only because in his own person he fought nobly against the foe, but also because he infused the same courage into his whole army ? And a **NOBLE MONARCH**, not only because he guided his own life well, but also because he was the cause of felicity to those over whom he ruled ?

3. For^a a Monarch is elected, not that he may take diligent concern for himself, but that those who elect him, may prosper by his means. And all take the field, that their lives may be as happy as possible : and they elect generals for this sole object, that they may lead them to this result.

² This verse is mentioned as having been frequently repeated and applauded by Alexander the Great.

4. *The leader of an army, therefore, should provide this happiness for those who have chosen him their general. Nor is it easy to find any thing more honourable than this result, or more disgraceful than its opposite. And considering in this point of view what should be the virtue of a good leader, he used to reject all other characteristics, but left this, that he should render happy the soldiers whom he led.*

CHAPTER III.

INTRODUCTION.—The Prefect of Cavalry has two special duties, *e. g.* to render better both horses and men. He should not leave the care of the horses to the troops, (§ 1—4.) He will render the riders better if he train them quickly to mount and dismount their steeds, to ride on rugged and broken ground, and hurl their weapons from horseback. He should also render them attentive and watchful to the word of command. To obtain this result, he must himself excel in all these various duties, (§ 9). And next he will teach his troops that obedience is honourable and advantageous, (§ 10). He should also have oratorical power, in order to fire his soldiers with the spirit of ambition, and be able to influence them to all that is noble and salutary.

1. I REMEMBER his having spoken to the following effect, with a person elected to the office of Hipparch¹ Can you tell me, my young friend, for what motive you desired to be a Hipparch? doubtless it is not that you may ride as first of the horsemen, for the horse-archers are appointed to that place, since they ride even before the Hipparchs!—You say the truth, said he.—Assuredly it is not that you may become notorious, for even madmen² are noted by all!—You state the truth in this also, said he.

2. Or is it that you may hand over the cavalry forces to the city, rendered far superior to their present state, by your exertions? And, if ever a necessity for cavalry should occur, is it, that as their leader you may effect some advantage for the state?—Undoubtedly, said

¹ At Athens there were two ἵππαρχοι, = "prefects of horse," who had some authority over the cavalry force of the state, but yet were themselves under the authority of the ten στρατηγοί, or "leaders of the infantry." Xenophon has described the duties of the Hipparch in a separate tract, ἵππαρχικός.

² Οἱ μαυρόμενοι "Furiosi quidem facile in vulgus innotescunt et a pueris etiam rideantur."—WEISKE.

he.—And it is glorious, by Jove, said Sokrates, if you be able to effect this. But the command, to which you are elected, unless I am mistaken, extends to the horses as well as riders?—It does, said he.

3. Come then, tell me this first ; by what measures do you think you will render the horses better?—He replied ; I do not think this office to be any part of my duties ; but each, separately, must take care of his own steed.

4. If then, said Sokrates, some should parade¹ their steeds, weak in foot, or limb, or feeble ; others so ill-conditioned that they could not follow the march ; and some, so unmanageable, that they would not remain where you should station them ; others so given to kicking, that it would not be possible to arrange them at all, what would be the use of such cavalry to you ? or how, as their leader, would you be able to effect any exploit for the state?—You speak admirably, he replied, and I will endeavour to take care of the steeds, as far as is possible.

5. What then, said he, will you not try to render the horsemen themselves better than they are?—Certainly, said he.—Will you not first then, render them more active in mounting their steeds?—That is but right, replied he, for then in case any of them should be unhorsed, he would thus more quickly save himself.

6. What then ? if you must peril an engagement, will you order the enemy to lead their forces down to the level sand,² where you usually exercise your horses, or will you rather endeavour to train your men on such ground,

¹ *ἡαρίχωνται σοι*, the subject is, “the soldiers.” ‘To each his own horse was given, and each led his own steed out for review ; hence the use of the middle voice. SCHNEIDER thinks *σοί* to be redundant, and that *παρίχισθαι ἵππον* is used of those who *ἐκ καταλόγου ἵπποτροφοῦσι*, i. e. are obliged to support horses for the state at their own expense ; a duty usually imposed on the richer class of citizens. But it is hardly probable that the Hipparchus would take steeds in such bad condition, from these persons.

² *Ἄμυν*. The cavalry generally performed their exercises on level ground covered with sand, such places were called *ἀμμόδρομοι*.

as it is probable the enemy may appear in.³—The latter course is preferable, said he.

7. Come then! will you entertain any concern that your troops may spear⁴ from their steeds the greatest number of the foes possible?—This too would be more advantageous, said he.—Have you ever thought of whetting the courage of your cavalry, and exciting them against the foe, since you do care to render them more valiant?—If I have not hitherto, said he, I will now endeavour.

8. Have you ever taken thought, as to the means by which your cavalry should be induced to obey you? for without obedience, there will be no use in horses, or in horsemen though valiant and spirited.—You say the truth, said he: but Sokrates, by what method could one most effectually persuade them to this?

9. Doubtless you are aware of this, that men in all circumstances, wish to obey above all others those whom they consider to be most skilful. For in sickness they yield implicit obedience to him, whom they consider to be the best physician: and passengers on ship-board obey the most experienced pilot: and in agriculture, men obey the most skilful agriculturist.—I am acquainted with this, said he.—It is probable then, said he, that in horsemanship also, others will yield obedience especially to him, who appears best to know what line of action to pursue.

10. If then, O Sokrates, said he, I should clearly appear to be the best among them, would this be sufficient to render them obedient to me?—Yes, replied he, if besides you will teach them, that it will be far more honourable and beneficial to themselves, to obey you. — But how, said he, shall I teach this.—Far easier, by Jove, said he, than if it were incumbent on you to prove, that evil is better and more profitable than good.

³ *Γίγνεται*. “*γίγνεσθαι* nunquam simpliciter *versari* significare potest: at potest significare *apparere, in conspectum venire*.”—KCHN.

⁴ *Βάλλειν*, here the same as *ἀκοντίζειν*, “*ut quam plurimi ab equis jacentur*.”

11. Do you mean, said he, that a Hipparch, besides his other duties, should endeavour to acquire ability in eloquence?—And did you suppose, that one should needs command cavalry by silence? And did you not rather consider, that as well all the noble principles we have learned, according to the institutions of the state,¹ and by which we enjoy civilized life,² we have learned through eloquence: as also that if one learns any other honourable science, it is by means of language he acquires that knowledge. The best instructors too, use eloquence most: and those who best know the most important doctrines, most eloquently discuss upon them?

12. Pray have you never considered, that when a chorus is formed from this city,³ for instance that sent to Delos, no chorus from any other state whatever can rival it, and that in no other city can men be collected of such noble forms as here?⁴

13. And yet it is not so much by sweetness of voice,⁵ or magnificence and strength of frame, that the Athenians surpass all other men, as by ambition, the greatest excitement to all that is beautiful and honourable.—This is true, said he.

14. Do you not think then, said he, that if one

¹ *Nóμος*, in this clause Sokrates speaks of the training of youth, &c. as appointed and regulated by the institutions of the state. In the next member (*εἴ τι ἄλλο καλόν*, &c.) he speaks of those arts which one learns by his own inclination, although usually not classed with the regular instruction of a freeman in a free state.

² *Ζῆν*, i. e. a life well regulated by order, and under the laws and customs established by the state; as opposed to a rustic and uncivilized existence.

³ *Χορός* *εἷς*, the idea is, "Although the Athenians excel other people in very many respects, yet in none do they excel so much as in their love of praise. Wherefore, if you desire to render your cavalry troops superior to others, you must honour them with praise and approbation, if they perform their duty well."—LANG.

⁴ *Εὐανδρία*, i. e. abundance of well-looking men. Sokrates alludes to the custom of selecting the most handsome and comely, both young and old, to serve as *Thallopbori* in the Panathænæic feasts of *Mincra*.

⁵ *Εὐφωρία*, i. e. sweetness of voice in singing. The following words *μεγίσθῃ τε καὶ ῥώμῃ* refer to *εὐανδρία*.

should take diligent care of the cavalry here, that in equestrian skill also the Athenians should far surpass all other men—both by equipments of arms and steeds, by discipline, and by readily facing danger against the foe, if they thought that by acting so they would acquire praise and honour?

15. Do not delay then, said he, but endeavour to excite your soldiers to this conduct, from which you will be benefited, and the other citizens through you.—I will try at least, by Jove, said he.

CHAPTER IV.

INTRODUCTION.—Upon Nikomachides complaining that the Athenians had not selected him as general, though skilled in warlike enterprizes, but had rather chosen Antisthenes whose only knowledge lay in the collection of money, Sokrates endeavours to shew him, that if one knows what should be done to fulfil well any office, and how all necessary things for it may be acquired, he will be an excellent Prefect, whether of a chorus, or family, or state or army. Hence, since Antisthenes has proved himself to be an excellent economist in his family affairs, to be ambitious and fond of praise, and already to have well fulfilled the office of Choragus, Sokrates asserts that he will be likely to prove a good general also.

1. BUT seeing Nikomachides returning from the election of magistrates, he thus interrogated him : O Nikomachides, who are appointed generals? And he said, O Sokrates, are not the Athenians just the same as ever,¹ so that they have not elected me, who am worn out in serving according to the list of levies,² both as leader of a troop and brigade, and by having received so many wounds from the foe : (at the same time, he took off his robe, and shewed the scars of his wounds) while they have chosen Antisthenes, who never yet served on foot, nor in the cavalry did any thing remarkable, and who only knows how to collect money?

2. Well, is not this an advantage, said Sokrates, since he will be able to provide necessaries for the soldiery?—So would the merchants then, said he, for they are able to collect money, but they would not, on that account be capable of leading an army in the field.

3. An? Sokrates replied: but Antisthenes is ambi-

¹ Τοιοῦτοί εἰσι, "nonne tales sese exhibuerunt, quales in omnibus rebus sese exhibent?"

² ἐκ καταλόγου στρατιώτης, *delectu militans*, Herbstius and Sauppe, erroneously think the preposition denotes *the time* of the enrolment of Nikomachides in the list.

tious of victory, which is a proper characteristic for a general: do you know that as often as he was choragus, he conquered all the other choruses? Yes, by Jove, said Nikomachides, but there is no analogy* between leading a chorus, and an army.

4. And yet, said Sokrates, Antisthenes, though being neither experienced in music or instruction of the chorus,³ yet was able to find out the best artists in both.⁴—And in the army then, replied Nikomachides, he will procure substitutes to marshal his troops for him, and other substitutes to fight.

5. If then, in transactions of war, he may find out and secure the most skilful, as he did regarding choruses, very probably he will gain the palm in this also; and it is likely he will spend, in order to obtain a victory in war to honour the whole state, more freely than for a victory with a chorus to honour a single tribe.⁵

6. Do you mean, Sokrates, said he, that it is the part of the same individual, to lead a chorus, and an army, skilfully.—I say, replied he, that no matter over what a man may preside, if he know what his office requires, and be able to provide that, he will be an admirable president, whether it be a chorus, or a family, or a city, or an army he may preside over.

7. Then Nikomachides replied,—By Jove, Sokrates. I never expected to hear you assert, that good house-managers would naturally be good generals?—Come

3 *Χορῶν διδασκαλίας*. It was the duty of the choragus to instruct, by means of the best musical artists, (*οἰδῆς*) the performers he intended to introduce upon the stage. The instructor was the *χοροδιδασκαλός*, originally the poet himself. The choragus should also supply his troop with crowns, festal ornaments, and dresses suited to the festival.

⁴ *Ταῦτα*, i.e. Poets, harpists, flute players, and other performers, with which the Attic stage was crowded, at a representation.

⁵ *Ξὸν τῇ φυλῇ*. The victory belonged not to the individual but to his tribe; in the name of the latter the chorus was introduced.—The Attic citizens were divided into ten tribes, (*φυλαί*) and then again, from the different regions they occupied were divided into *δήμοι*, of which the number was 174.

then, said he, let us consider, the several duties of each, that we may see whether they be identical, or differ somewhat?—By all means, said he.

8. Is it not the duty of both to render compliant and obedient those under their authority?—Most certainly, said he.—What then, should not both command the fitting persons to do their several duties?—This is right too, said he.—And surely it is incumbent. I think on both, to punish the evil and honour the good.—Certainly, said he.

9. And wherefore should it not be honourable for both to render their subjects well disposed?—This I assent to also, said he.—And do you think it the interest of both, to gain for themselves allies and auxiliaries or not?—Truly it is their interest, said he.—Is it not incumbent on both to be careful of their means?—Most undoubtedly, said he.—Is it not the duty of both to be zealous and energetic in their own occupations?

10. All these points, said he, belong equally to both; yet still, to fight is not likewise a common trait.—Yet will not both assuredly have enemies?—This is surely the fact, said he.—Then is it not the interest of both to master them?

11. Certainly, said he; but waving that, tell me how skill in economy will benefit in this case.—Here doubtless it will be of the highest importance, said he; for the good economist, knowing that nothing is so beneficial or profitable, as by fighting to conquer your enemy; and that nothing is so injurious and prejudicial as to be defeated, zealously will seek out and procure every thing for the acquisition of victory, and also will carefully consider and guard against all things tending to cause defeat; vigorously too will he engage, if he sees his preparations likely to gain the mastery; and, what is most important above all I have stated, if he be unprepared, he will guard against engaging.

12. Do not, Nikomachides, despise these men skilled in household management: for the care of private property, differs from that of public, only in amount, while it has all else exactly similar: but what is most impor-

tant, neither is managed without men, nor are private affairs managed by men of one nature, and public affairs by those of another; for managers of public matters command men not different in nature from those whom managers of private affairs command; and they who know how properly to manage them, successfully conduct matters whether public or private; but those who know not how, commit errors in both.

CHAPTER V.

INTRODUCTION.—In this chapter Sokrates is represented as discussing with Perikles, the younger, how the Athenians might revive to their ancient fortitude, glory, and felicity.

Firstly, he thinks, they should be reminded of the great and noble actions of their ancestors.—Then we should prove, that by their own indolence and carelessness alone they had fallen from their high estate.—And so that they should renew the training which their ancestors had pursued, or adopt the systems of the Lacedæmonians.—He considers that considerable importance should be attributed to military affairs, and that the state should select and appoint over its armies, the most skilful and experienced generals (§ 25.)—He then shews how the boundaries of Attica, could be best protected from invasion.

1. BUT once conversing with Perikles,¹ son of the celebrated Perikles, he said: I have hopes, Perikles, that under your generalship, our city will become superior and more glorious in the deeds of war, and will master her enemies.—And Perikles replied, I would wish it to be as you say, Sokrates, but how this result may happen, I cannot find out.—Do you wish then, said Sokrates, that by discussion on these points, we should investigate without preamble, by what means there is a possibility?—I do wish it, said he.

2. Do you know, said he, that the Athenians are no way inferior to the Bæotians in number?—I do know that, said he. Whether do you think you could select more vigorous and beautiful forms of person, from the Bæotians, or the Athens?—Athens, I think, is not inferior in this advantage.—Which people do you think to be more kindly disposed to each other?—The Athenians, said he: for many of the Bæotians, being pillaged

¹ This Perikles was the illegitimate son of the great Perikles. When the legitimate sons of the latter, Xanthippus and Paralus were removed by death, the Athenians naturalized this individual, “ἀνεγράψαντο εἰς τοὺς φράτορας, ὄνομα θίμενοι τὸ αὐτοῦ, Scil. Perikles.” He was elected Strategus with Thrasyulus and Erasinides, and after the fatal success at Arginusæ, and alleged neglect of the dead, (Olymp. 93, 2), was condemned to death.

by the Thebans, are hostilely disposed towards them. At Athens, I see no such thing.

3. But of all people they are most fond of honour and of most kindly temper; traits which most excite men to face peril in order to gain glory, and defend their country.—In these characteristics too, the Athenians are not liable to fault.—And sure there exists no people, who can boast of more numerous or magnificent exploits of their ancestors, than the Athenians: incited by this fact, many are induced to cultivate manly prowess, and to be bold in courage.

4. All this you say true, Sokrates: but you are aware, that, since the slaughter of the thousand in Lebedeia,² under Tolmides, and that under Hippokrates³ at Delium,⁴ the reputation of the Athenians has suffered in comparison with the Bœotians; and the spirit of the Thebans is elevated in comparison with that of the Athenians: so that the Bœotians who formerly did not dare without the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians, even on their own soil, to face the Athenians in the field, now threaten, that unaided and single-handed, they will make an inroad into Attica: while the Athenians, who formerly when the Bœotians were unaided, ravaged their territory, now are full of fear lest the Bœotians should devastate Attica.

² Lebedeia, a city of Bœotia, midway between Haliartus and Chæronea: from the proximity of situation this battle is variously called, “the battle of Lebedeia,” or, Chæronea, or, Coronæa. The Athenian general was Tolmides.—*Συμφορά*, means the slaughter inflicted by the Bœotians on the Athenians.

³ Hippokrates, general of the Athenians, slain by the Bœotians.

⁴ *Ἐπὶ Δηλίου*. This battle took place Olymp. 89. 1.—424. Ant. Christ.—Strabo and others assert, that Sokrates was present and engaged. Delium was a temple and precinct of Apollo, situate in Bœotia: in the lapse of time a little town sprung up around it.—*Περικλῆς* acutely remarks, that this battle is always styled *ἐπὶ Δηλίου*, or *περὶ Δῆλιον*—but never *ἐν Δηλίου*. *Ἐν* appears to be used when the name of the town includes also the neighbouring district, or islands, &c.—*Ἐπὶ*, when the place is only of a very narrow limit, and without any reference to its neighbourhood. Thus here, *Δῆλιον* is the name, not of a city with its district, but of a temple which had indeed a *τῆμενος*, but no tract of land in which the battle could be waged.—*Κῦνκ*.

5. And Sokrates replied: I blush indeed that these things should be so, yet I think that under present circumstances, the state is more favourably disposed for any worthy governors:¹ for confidence begets in men carelessness, indolence and disobedience, but fear renders them more alert, obedient, and well-ordered.

6. You may conjecture this from the conduct of men on ship-board; for doubtless when they apprehend no peril, they are full of confusion; but as long as they dread a storm or an enemy, they not only execute every command, but are hushed in silence, anxiously awaiting the next order, like dancers in a chorus.²

7. Well then, said Perikles, if under present circumstances, they will yield especial obedience, it would be now time to discuss our means to excite them to rival their ancestral prowess, and glory, and happiness.

8. If haply then, said Sokrates, we wished them to reclaim money which others had possession of; by proving this sum to be their inheritance and property, thus we should best urge them to reclaim it: but since we certainly wish that they should strain for a pre-eminence in valour, we must shew that this attribute belonged to them above all people from ancient time; and that if they now are zealous for it, they will be the most powerful of all.

9. How could we possibly teach them this? by reminding them, as they have constantly heard their ancestors were the bravest, of the most ancient we know of by tradition.

10. Do you mean the trial between the gods, which Kekrops and his assessors decided from their virtue?³—

¹ Ἀρχοῦντι . . . ἐτακτίζονται, i.e. erga ducem faciliore, benigniore, magis obsequioso animo affecta esse. ut Cyrop. vii. 5, 45.

² Ὡς περ χορεύεται. “Hic enim semper Coryphæum respiciunt.”
—SCHNEID.

³ Οἱ περὶ Κέκροπα, this phrase signifies the whole bench of Judges, seated with Kekrops. Writers of the silver age use the phrase οἱ περὶ to denote a single individual. Kekrops is traditionally said to have adjudged the contest between Minerva and Neptune for the possession of Attica.

Yes, that, and the rearing and birth of Erekhtheus:⁴ and the war, in his time, against the possessors of the whole adjoining continent:⁵ and the war waged by the sons of Herakles against the Peloponnesians,⁶ and all those conquered by Theseus: in all which achievements they were clearly the bravest of all the men in their time.

11. And if you wish, add also, what their posterity,⁷ who lived not long before our time, have effected: as well contending single-handed⁸ against the sovereign lords of wide Asia, and Europe as far as Macedon; who possessed, too, power and means far beyond their forefathers, and had performed alone the greatest deeds; as also uniting with the Peloponnesians, won the prize of valour both by land and sea. These, doubtless, are celebrated as far surpassing the men of their own time.—No doubt they are so celebrated, said he.—

12. And consequently, though many migrations occurred in Greece, they ever remained in their own land:⁹ and many who had mutual disputes for their just rights, submitted to their arbitration, and many when outraged by stronger powers, fled to them for refuge.

13. Then Perikles replied; and I in truth wonder, Sokrates, how our city declined to the worse,—I rather think, said Sokrates, that just as others, through excessive power and pre-eminence sinking into carelessness, eventually fall behind their antagonists; so also that the Athenians through their great superiority neglected

⁴ Comp. *Iliad* ii. 547.

⁵ Ερεχθίδος μεγάλῃτορος, ὅν ποτ' Ἀθήνη
Ορέψε, Διὸς Ουγάτηρ, τίκε δὲ Ζεῖδωρος Ἄουρα.

⁶ Ἐπείρου, *i.e.* Thrace, whose limits in the most ancient times reached up to the frontiers of Attica.

⁷ Ερ Ηρακλειδῶν, *i.e.* The war carried on by the descendants of Herakles against Eurystheus and the Peloponnesians.

⁸ Οἱ—ἀπόγονοι, *i.e.* The Athenians who, in the age of Miltiades, Themistokles, and Aristides, warred against the Persians.

⁹ Καθ' ἑαυτοὺς, he omits to mention the faithful Plataeans, Comp. *CORN. NEP. MILT.* c. 5. "Hoc in tempore nulla civitas Atheniensibus fuit auxilio præter Plataenses."

¹⁰ Δέμεναν, hence, the Athenians prided themselves as being ἀντόχθονες, and γηγενεῖς.

self-cultivation, and on this account became deteriorated.

14. Under present circumstances then, said he, by what line of conduct could they recover their ancestral excellence?—and Sokrates replied: That does not appear to me to be anything mysterious: but if they find out the pursuits of their ancestors, and practise them no less diligently than they, they will be no less inferior to them: but even if they do not all this, yet if they imitate those who now hold pre-eminence,¹ and practise the same pursuits as they do, conducting the same duties in a manner similar to them, they will become no way inferior to them, and if they practise more diligently, will be even superior.

15. You say, said he, that honourable perfection is far distant² to our city: for when will the Athenians reverence their elders, as the Lacedæmonians do?³ men who begin with their own parents to practise contempt to their elders. Or when will they exercise their bodies so? who not only themselves neglect perfection in bodily habit, but even laugh at those who study it.—And when will they yield similar obedience to their rulers? who even pride themselves upon contemning their magistrates.—Or when will they, like them, be of one mind? who, instead of co-operating with each other for mutual benefit, insult each other, and have more envy against themselves, than men of other countries. More than all other men are they at variance, both in private

¹ Πρωτεύοντες, i.e. the Lacedæmonians. Herbstius remarks, that, throughout his whole writings Xenophon praises the constitution of Lacedæmon, and prefers it much to that of his own country.

² Ὡρῶν πον, “longé, credo, opinor, ni fallor.” The connection of the sentence is this, “Since, by adopting the discipline of Lacedæmon, you think you can recall the Athenians to their pristine valour and glory, you seem to hint, that at present the Athenians are far inferior to the Lacedæmonians.”

³ Comp. CIC. CAT. MAJ. xviii. 63. Lysandrum Lacedæmonium dicere dicunt solitum, Lacedæmone esse honestissimum domicilium senectutis. Nusquam enim tantum tribuitur ætati, nusquam est senectus honoratio.

and public meetings, they institute more suits against each other, and they prefer to make gain thus at each other's cost, than to benefit themselves by benefiting others: and while conducting their public affairs as if they belonged to a foreign state, they also contend violently regarding them, and rejoice most to obtain power for such contests.

17. From all this conduct, great ignorance and cowardice springs up in our state; and great enmity and hatred towards each other has been engendered among its citizens; wherefore I am constantly in alarm, lest an evil may fall upon the state far beyond its ability to bear.

18. O Perikles, said Sokrates, by no means think that the Athenians are disordered with such incurable depravity: see you not, their skilful discipline in maritime affairs, how orderly they obey their commanders⁴ in the gymnastic contests, and in the choruses they obey their teachers, in a way inferior to none.

19. No doubt it is strange, said he, that men of this class⁵ should obey those set over them; while the heavy-armed, and the knights, who appear to be pre-eminent for virtue and honour above the citizens, should be the most disobedient of all men.

20. Then Sokrates replied, O Perikles, does not the council of the Areopagus⁶ consist of persons who have been most fully approved of?⁷—Certainly, said he—Do you know any, asked he, who decide trials at law, and perform all other matters, more honourably or

⁴ These are the instructors, in the παιδοτροφίαι, who trained the young in the palæstra.

⁵ This class, *i. e.* such persons as actors, ναῦται ἐρέται, ἐπιβάρται, were generally men of the lower order or slaves: on the other hand the ὀπλῖται and ἰππεῖς were citizens of the higher class.

⁶ This was the most ancient council of the Athenians, and derived its name from a hill sacred to Mars, the scene of the legend of his trial. Their Judges tried only capital charges.

⁷ Δεδοκιμασμένων, *i. e.* who had performed their magistracy with praise and honour, and at its close were applauded by the votes of the people.

legally, with more dignity or justice?—I by no means blame its members, replied he.—Do not then wholly despair, said he, as if the Athenians were naturally not lovers of order.

21. Yet surely in military affairs, where it is particularly incumbent to be prudent, and well ordered, and obedient to authority, they attend to nothing of the kind.—Possibly, said Sokrates, persons by no means skilful command them in these duties. Do you not see, that no person, unless fully competent, attempts to guide harpers or choristers, or dancers, nor competitors in wrestling or the Pankratia ; but that all who take the lead in such matters, are able to shew, whence they have learned those accomplishments over which they now preside ; while the majority of our generals recklessly take command without a moment's previous study.

22. I do not think you to be such a character, but I think you will be able to tell us clearly at what time you commenced to learn strategy, and when you began to learn wrestling. I believe too that you have received, and kept in memory many of your father's principles of warfare ; and that you have collected many from every quarter, whence it was possible to learn anything useful for conduct in the field.

23. I believe you have felt much anxiety, lest you might unwittingly be ignorant of anything useful for strategy : and if you felt you were ignorant of any such thing, you sought out persons skilled in these arts, sparing neither rewards or thanks, that you might learn from them what you knew not, and might find them admirable assistants.

24. And Perikles replied, I am aware,¹ Sokrates, that you thus speak, not from a real opinion that I have been diligently careful on these points, but from a wish to teach me, that it is the duty of one who intends to assume the conduct of an army, to study all these matters ; I agree with you then on all these topics.

¹ Perikles understood the irony of Sokrates, by which it was his habit to commend an individual for a virtue he did not possess, and thus induce him to endeavour earnestly to possess it.

25. Have you ever thought of this, Perikles, that before the frontier of our country there lie great mountains,² stretching down into Bœotia, through which there are narrow and precipitous defiles leading into our territory, which lying in the midst is girded³ by impregnable heights.—Certainly, said he.

26. Well then, said he, have you heard this, that in the territory of the great king, the Mysians and Pisidians,⁴ occupying lofty situations, and wearing light armour, are able to make descents on, and devastate much of the great king's country,⁵ and to live in freedom themselves.—This, too, I am aware of, said he.

27. And do you not think that the Athenians, up to the time of active youth, if armed with light weapons, and occupying the mountains that lie before our land, would prove a barrier to our foes, and form a powerful bulwark for the citizens of this country? And Perikles replied; I think, Socrates, that all this would be useful.

28. If then, said Sokrates, these principles please you, commence them at once; for whatsoever of them you effect will be honourable to you and advantageous for the city: and even if you do not succeed in any respect, you will not injure the state, or disgrace yourself.

² Cithæron, Cærastæ, and other mountains form the frontier of Attica.

³ The chief mountains within Attica are Parnes, Brilessus, Hymettus, Laurium (famous for its silver mines), Lycabettus, Pentelicum, and Corydālus.

⁴ The Mysians were located in Mysia: Pisidia lay between Pamphylia, Caria, Phrygia and Lycaonia.

⁵ The king of Persia was *κατ' ἐξοχήν* called simply ὁ βασιλεὺς or ὁ μέγας βασιλεὺς by the Greeks.

CHAPTER VI.

INTRODUCTION.—Glaukon, a young and thoughtless person, was influenced by an extravagant desire to obtain the management of the state, although he was wholly ignorant and inexperienced. Sokrates, by his usual method of interrogation, leads him to confess his utter deficiency. He then shews him, that unless a minister has acquired the most perfect knowledge of state policy, he can neither render the state safe, or himself of reputation.

1. WHEN Glaukon,¹ the son of Ariston, attempted to harangue the populace, through a desire to be a minister of state, although not yet twenty years of age,² not one of all his other friends was able to induce him to withdraw, lest he should be dragged down the bema,³ and made a laughing stock : but Sokrates, being kindly disposed to him through Charnides, the son of Glaukon, and on account of Plato,⁴ alone induced him to retire.

2. For meeting him by chance, he inspired him with a wish to hear him, by the following words.—O Glaukon, said he, do you intend to preside over the ministry

¹ This Glaukon was brother to Plato the Philosopher.

² From their eighteenth year the citizens of Athens were in full possession of all political rights, and could take part in the management of state affairs. See Thirlw. Hist. Greece, Vol. I., App. 1.

³ Φίλων οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο παῦσαι ἐλκόμενόν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ βῆματος, &c. . . . “*nemo eum abducere poterat, quin de suggestu detraheretur et irrideretur.*” Schneider cites, in illustration, Plato, Protag. p. 139. C. where it is mentioned, that occasionally wretched orators were dragged from the bema, and driven from the assembly by the τοξόται : a body of men kept to serve as the police of Athens, and called so from the bows, τοξά, with which they were armed.

⁴ Aulus Gellius states that a spirit of rivalry and opposition existed between Xenophon and Plato, and asserts that hence there is no mention of the name of the latter in the works of the former. Cobet, and Boëck consider the whole story of their rivalry to be a fabrication.

of our city?—I do, indeed, Sokrates, replied he.—By Jove, said he, it is an honourable office, if any other among men be so. For it is clear, that if you gain it, you will be able yourself to obtain whatever you may happen to wish for, and will be competent to benefit your friends; you will raise to dignity your father's family; will aggrandise your country; and will be celebrated, first in the city, and afterwards in all Greece. Perhaps, too, like Themistokles, you will be famed even among the barbarians, and wheresoever you may be, you will be admired of all.

3. When Glaukon heard this, he was proudly elated, and gladly waited with him.—And after these words, Sokrates said, Then Glaukon, is not this at least evident, that if you wish to gain honour for yourself, your city must be benefited by you?—Without a doubt, said he.—In the name of heaven, said he, do not conceal⁵ but tell us, by what act you will commence to benefit the state?

4. But when Glaukon was silent, as if then for the first time considering with what act he should begin; Sokrates said, if you desired to aggrandise the family of a friend, you would endeavour to make it more wealthy than before, and would you not endeavour, in like manner, to make the state more wealthy?—Certainly, said he.

5. Would it not be richer, he asked, if its revenue came in to a greater amount?—Naturally, said he.—Tell me then, said he, from what sources the revenues of the city arise, and their probable amount? for it is clear you have considered them in order that if any of them be deficient you may increase it, and if any fail, you may procure an addition.—But, by Jove, said Glaukon, I have never considered these points.

6. Well, if you have neglected this, said he, tell me at least, the expenses of the city? for it is evident you intend to remove all superfluous expenditure.—By Jove, I never had opportunity to turn my attention to

⁵ Ἀποκρύπτειν τι refertur ad res extra nos positas, *occulere aliquid*; ἀποκρύπτεσθαι τι, contra, ad id quod in nobis est, *celare aliquid*.—Κῦην.

these either.—Well then, we defer to render our city richer, for the present; for how is it possible for one who knows not its expenditure and income to provide for such matters.

7. Yet Sokrates, replied Glaukon, it is quite possible to enrich our city at the expense of her enemies.—Yes, most assuredly, said Sokrates, if one be stronger than their foes, but if he were weaker, he would very likely lose his all.—You say the truth, said he.

8. Therefore, said he, the minister who deliberates as to whom he should levy war upon, ought to know both the force of his own state, and that of its enemies.—If, indeed, the force of his own state be superior, he should advise it to commence the war, but if it be inferior to that of the foe, he should persuade it to act with caution.—You speak correctly, replied Glaukon.

9. First, then, said he, enumerate to me, the infantry and naval forces of our city, and then that of her enemies.—But, by Jove, replied Glaukon, I could not possibly tell you that, thus at a word, from memory.—Well, if you have it written out, bring it, said he, for I would be very glad to hear this.—But, by Jove, said he, I have not that written out at all.

10. Well then, said he, we will put off our deliberation regarding war at first: for very likely on account of the magnitude of the subject, as you have but just commenced your generalship, you have not yet examined it.—But, certainly, I am quite sure that you have had concern regarding the protection of the country: and you know how many fortresses are in favourable positions, and how many not so, and how many soldiers are sufficient to garrison them, and how many are not; and that you will advise the Athenians to increase advantageous fortresses, and to remove the useless.

11. By Jove, said Glaukon, I intend to remove them all, for they keep guard so carelessly,¹ that the

¹ Οὕτως . . . φυλάττεσθαι, ὥστε κλέπτεσθαι τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας. i.e. *quod tam male excubiae aguntur (φυλακαὶ φυλάττονται) ut nostrorum agrorum proventus surripiantur.* The verb ἀρπάζειν, “openly to plunder” is opposed to κλέπτειν, “to pilfer secretly.”

produce of our country is secretly stolen.—Yet, if one were wholly to remove them, said Sokrates, do you not think that whosoever pleases will have power openly to pillage? Yet, continued he, whether have you personally gone, and examined into this, or how do you know that guard is ill kept?—I conjecture it, said he.—Well, said Sokrates, we will discuss about these matters also, when we no longer rest on guesses, but have a certain knowledge.—Perhaps, said Glaukon, that is the better course.

12. I know, said he, that you have not visited the silver mines, so as to be able to tell, why a less amount is derived from them now than heretofore.—I have not gone there, said he.—Besides, by Jove, continued Sokrates, the place is said to be unhealthy, so that when it is necessary for you to deliberate about this point, that excuse will be sufficient for you.—I am trifled with!² exclaimed Glaukon.

13. However, I am sure you have not neglected this point at least, but have diligently examined for how long a period the corn produced in our territory is able to sustain the city, and how much it requires in the year; lest the city should ever, without your knowledge, fail in its supplies; but that from accurate knowledge you may be able, by giving proper counsel regarding the necessities of life, both to assist the city, and preserve its existence.—You mention a gigantic matter indeed, said Glaukon, if it will be necessary for me to take measures on such important subjects.

14. Yet, assuredly, said Sokrates, no one can properly manage his own household, unless he is aware of all it requires, and by his care should supply it with every thing: but, since a city is composed of more than ten thousand houses,³ and it is a difficult matter to take

² Kühner agrees in this interpretation with Bornemann “qui recte dicit verbum σκώπτομαι aptum esse Glauconi, quia seri rem tractari, non jocosè, voluerit: qua de re Sokratem postea omnibus cavillationibus abstinuisse censet.”

³ Boeckh (Econ. Athen. I. p. 43.) shews that Athens, with the harbour Piræus, had inhabitants to the number of 180,000, i.e.

precautions for so many households at one time, why do you not endeavour to benefit one, at first,—suppose that of your uncle,¹ for he stands in need of help. And if you succeed in this, then you will attempt to do so for more; but if you be not able to benefit a single one, how would you have ability for many? Since, if one were not able to carry a talent weight, is it not clear, that he must not attempt to carry a heavier burden.

15. But, truly, said Glaukon, I would benefit my uncle's family, if he would but comply with my advice.—And then, said Sokrates, do you, who are not able to persuade your uncle, think you will be able to persuade all the Athenians, together with your uncle, to yield to your counsels?

16. Take care, Glaukon, he said, lest through desire of reputation, you may reach the reverse. Do you not see, how very slippery it is to speak of, or attempt, what one knows nothing about? Consider among other men all you know to be such as evidently to speak and attempt what they do not know, and whether do they appear to you, for this conduct, to meet with praise rather than censure? and whether are they more admired or despised?

17. Then think of those, who know the subjects on which they speak; or which they do, and as I think, you will find in every act, that the most highly admired and applauded are of the number of those who have most knowledge; while those held in infamy and contempt are of the ignorant.

18. If, then, you desire to gain reputation and admiration in the city, endeavour really to become most skilled in what you wish to attempt; for if, when in this you surpass others, you should then attempt to manage state affairs, I should not wonder if you very easily obtained the object of your desire.

including males and females, bond and free. In the silver mines there were located 20,000, and throughout the country region about 300,000. So that the whole number of the Athenian population would be about half a million.—*Oikíai*, sunt *domus*, *ædificia*; *oíkoι*, *familiæ*.

¹ i.e. Charmides, see iii. 7. 1.

CHAPTER VII.

INTRODUCTION.—Sokrates exhorts Charmides, a man of great worth, and well acquainted with the management of policy to seek office in the state.—A man of knowledge, says he, should not deprive the state of his services, for if he does, he will be liable to the charge of indolence and carelessness. Charmides, too, had intimate friendship with many influential persons, and since he could affect such men by his reasoning, much more would be able to sway the multitude.

1. ONCE beholding Charmides the son of Glaukon, a man worthy of estimation, and of far more ability than those who managed the state's affairs at that time, yet hesitating to address the people, or to take part in the management of the city's affairs, he said: 'Tell me, Charmides, if any one who had ability to conquer in games where crowns are given as prizes, and thus both to gain honour for himself, and render his country more celebrated in Greece, yet should not wish to enter on a contest, what sort of a character would you consider that man to be?—It is quite clear, said he, that he is faint-hearted and cowardly.

2. But if any one, said he, were able, by taking part in the business of the state, both to benefit the city, and through this to gain honour for himself, and yet should shrink from doing so, would he not justly be considered a coward?—Perhaps so, said he: but why do you ask me the question?—Because, said he, I think, though you are fully capable, you hesitate to exert your talents thus: and this too, when it is your duty to interfere, as being a citizen.

3. But by what act have you perceived my ability, that you thus condemn me?—In those meetings, said he, in which you associate with those who do manage state affairs: for when they communicate any thing to you, I perceive that you give admirable counsel; and when they commit errors, you rightly censure them.

4. But it is by no means the same thing, Sokrates,

said he, to discuss matters privately, and to exhibit one's powers before a full assembly.—Yet, replied Sokrates, the man who is able to count, counts no less exactly in a multitude, than alone: and they who play the kithara best in private,¹ are also the most excellent performers in public.

5. Are you not aware, replied he, that shame and timidity are naturally inherent in mankind, and affect us far more evidently before a multitude, than in private conversation?—And yet I am impelled to inform you, that though you feel no shame towards the most intelligent, or timidity before the most powerful, you are yet ashamed to speak to the most imprudent and the weakest.²

6. Is it of the fullers among them, or cobblers, or builders, or smiths, or ploughmen, or merchants,³ or those who barter wares in the Agora, and think only how they may buy for little and sell at a profit, that you are ashamed? For of all such persons the assembly is composed.

7. In what do you suppose your conduct to differ from that of him, who being superior to the practised Athletæ,⁴ yet fears the untrained? for, though at your ease you hold conference with those who are superior officers in the state, notwithstanding some of them insult you,—and though you are far superior to those who practise to address the people—you shrink from delivering your sentiments among those who have never thought of political affairs, and who have no slight against you, through an apprehension of being laughed at.

¹ Κατὰ μόνας, Boss supposes the ellipse to be χώρας. Kühner prefers to supply δυνάμεις “significat hæc loquutio idem fere, quod κατ’ ἰδίαν, privatim, seorsum.”

² Compare Cic. Tusc. v. 36, 104, “An quidquam stultius, quam, quos singulos sicut operarios barbarosque contempnas, eos aliquid putare esse universos.”

³ Ἐμπόρους, The ἐμπόροι were properly “merchants” who embarked and traded personally from port to port, and so are here opposed to οἱ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ μεταβαλλόμενοι.

⁴ Ἀσκηταί “per excellentiam appellantur Athletæ (in Palæstra exercitati), quibus opponuntur οἱ ἰδιῶται, qui omnino dicuntur ii, qui artis sunt imperiti.”

8. What then, said he : do not persons in the assembly appear to you often to ridicule even those who speak correctly ? — Well, so do those whom you address in private. Wherefore, I wonder, when you so easily put down them, should they attempt this, that you imagine you will not be able by any means to manage the others.

9. My good friend, do not be ignorant of your own powers, and do not commit an error similar to that of the majority of men. For these, rushing with eager curiosity to scrutinize the affairs of others, are not induced to examine their own ; do not then abstain from this through indolence, but strive the more to attend to your own powers ; and do not neglect the interests of the city, if any thing can be rendered better by your means : for if these interests be admirably managed, not only will the other citizens, but also your friends and yourself, reap the greatest benefits.⁵

⁵ Cicero (ad Quinct. Frat. iii. 6.) has thus imitated this clause, “ *Cessator esse noli* (μὴ ἀπορρηθῇς) *et illud γινῶθι σεαυτὸν noli putare ad arrogantiam minnendam solum esse dictum, verum etiam ut bona nostra norimus.*”

CHAPTER VIII.

INTRODUCTION.—SOKRATES avoids the captious questions of Aristippus concerning good and evil, by stating that nothing is good or evil *per se*, but only so with reference to some particular object.—He states also that the beautiful is included in the useful, and that the good and useful differ not.

1. WHEN Aristippus attempted to confute Sokrates, in the same way as he had been confuted by him before; Sokrates wishing to benefit his disciples, answered not in the style of those who are guarded lest their answers should be turned against them,¹ but as those who are convinced that they ought to act as became them.²

2. For he had asked Sokrates, “whether he knew anything to be good,” in order that if he mentioned any of such things as food, or drink, or money, or health, or strength, or daring, he might prove that this was sometimes an evil. But Sokrates, aware that if any argument should confound us, we would require one to free us from our difficulty, answered in the manner he thought it best to do.³

¹ Μη πυ ὁ λόγος ἐπαλλαχθῇ “ne quid responderet ejusmodi, quod propter ambiguitatem aliquam detorqueri in alienam ab ipsius mente sententiam posset, aut quo adversarius abuti ad ipsum capiendum posset.”—ERNEST.

² Ως ἂν πεπισμένοι μάλιστα πράττειν τὰ δεόντα. The meaning is: Sokrates did not answer in the method of those who take great precautions, to gain the better in argument, caring little whether their reasoning be just or false; but replied in the manner of those who, free from all vain sophistry, seek truth alone, imbued with the idea that what ought to be done, they should do.

³ Sokrates answered Aristippus, as he thought it best and most prudent to answer him, namely by denying anything to be absolutely good, and asserting *good* only to exist in reference to some other object: and in this mode of answer there was included an antidote (τὸ παῦσον) against Aristippus, who sought ἐνοχλοῦν τὸν Σωκράτην by a captious interrogation.

3. Whether, said he, do you ask me if I know any thing good for a fever?—Indeed, I do not, said he.—For ophthalmia?—Nor for this, said he.—For famine?—Nor for famine, said he.—Well then, said he, if you ask me, whether I know anything good, which is a good with reference to no one thing, I neither know it, or wish to know it.

4. But when Aristippus asked him, “if he knew any thing beautiful?”—Very many things, he replied.—Are they all similar to each other?—Nay, some of them are most dissimilar.—How then, said he, can that which is beautiful be unlike the beautiful.—Because, by Jove, said he, to a man beautifully formed for running, another is dissimilar, namely he who is beautifully formed for wrestling; a shield too though beautifully formed for defence in front, is as dissimilar as possible to a javelin, beautifully formed for power of stroke and rapidity of flight.

5. You give an answer now, no way different from your previous answer, when I asked you if you knew any thing good.—And do you imagine, replied Sokrates, that the good is one thing, and the beautiful another? do you not know that with reference to the same things all that is beautiful is also good? For first of all, virtue is not a good with relation to some things, and beautiful with regard to others; and again, in the same way, and with relation to the same objects, men are called good and beautiful; and in reference to the same objects too, the bodies of men are both beautiful and good; and in the same way also all other things, which men use, are considered beautiful and good, with reference to their utility.

6. Pray then, said he, is a dung basket a beautiful thing?—Yes, by Jove, said he, and further, even a golden shield is hideous, if the former be beautifully formed for its respective uses, and the latter badly. Do you mean then, said he, that the same abstract things may be beautiful and yet hideous?

7. Yea, and further, by Jove, that the same things are good and evil: for often times what is good for

hunger,¹ is bad for a fever; and that which is good for a fever, is bad for hunger; and frequently beauty, as respects swiftness in the race, is a blemish with respect to wrestling, and beauty as regards wrestling is a blemish as regards swiftness: for all things are good and beautiful, in reference to their being admirably constituted: and evil and hideous, in reference to their being badly constituted.

8. And when he said, that those houses which were beautiful, were also useful, he appeared to me to teach us, what sort of houses we should build. He reasoned on the matter thus. Pray, if a man is likely to have a house such as it ought to be, ought he not to plan this, how it might be most useful, and most pleasant to live in? When this was acknowledged, he said: Is it not pleasant that it should be cold in summer, and pleasant that it should be warm in winter?

9. And when they used² to assent to this, he asked, In houses that face the south, does not the sun in winter time shine into the piazzas,³ while in summer, proceeding over our heads, and above the roof, it affords a shade? Therefore, if it be right that this should be so, should we not build them more lofty towards the south, that the winter sun should not be debarred; but the portions towards the north we should build lower, that the cold winds might not blow upon it strongly?

10. But to speak briefly, where the owner⁴ during all seasons would most pleasantly retreat, and most safely store up his property, that would naturally be the pleasantest and most beautiful abode: but paintings and

¹ Τὸ . . . λιμοῦ ἀγαθόν, Scil. "food," as τὸ πυρετοῦ ἀγαθόν is "abstinence."

² Kühner considers by the use of the optative that Xenophon wished to indicate the *constant habit* of Sokrates in speaking of the construction of dwellings, &c.

³ Παστάδας, Schneider thinks the πάστας or περιστυλος of the later Greeks to be the same as the Homeric αἶθουσα, "a portico."

⁴ Ἀυτός, i. e. dominus, domus possessor.

frescoes⁵ deprive one of more pleasurable content than they afford. For temples and altars, he said, the most becoming place was that which might be most open to view,⁶ and free from the very tread of men. For it was pleasant to pray the moment one beheld them, and pleasant too to approach them in perfect purity.⁷

⁵ Various interpretations have been given of the words γραφαὶ εἰς καὶ ποικιλίαι.—1. γραφαὶ *opera picturæ graviora*, ut ex historia aut mythologia. Ποικιλίαι, autem *minoris artis picturæ*, ut flores, vel *simplicis coloris inductio*.—WEISKE.

2. "Ποικιλίαι, *opus interstitium, lacunaria*, et ornamenta similia."—SCHNEIDER.

3. "Ποικιλίαι intelligendā esse censeo *ornamenta parietibus illita*, quæ ποικίλματα dicta in (Econ. ix. 2)."---HERMANN.

⁶ Altars and temples, but more particularly the latter, were usually surrounded by a circuit wall (περιβόλος), the area included within which was usually thickly planted with trees and shrubs. Sokrates disapproves of this manner, since he wished the place to be ἐμφανεστάτων, fully exposed to view, as if the worshippers could thus fancy they saw the deity before them, and could address him as if present. "Alii ex Vitruvio i. 7, intelligunt locum excelsum, quod arque defendi potest."—KÜHN.

⁷ Ἀγνῶς ἔχοντας, Weiske interprets by "*pedibus non pulverulentis aut sordidis*." Schütz, much better, thinks that the words have reference to the fact, "si via, quæ ad templum ducat, parum frequens sit, facilius adituri ab omni piaculo puros se servare possint."

CHAPTER IX.

INTRODUCTION.—Various definitions are given of fortitude, wisdom, temperance, madness, envy, hatred, command, happiness.

The best pursuit of human life is *εὐπραξία*, the difference between this and *εὐτυχία*.

1. AGAIN, being interrogated, whether fortitude was acquired by education, or endowed by nature? I think, replied he, that as one body is naturally formed more powerful in enduring toil, than another body, so that one soul is produced by nature more confident against dangers than another soul. For I see that persons living under the same laws and institutions differ much from each other in courage.

2. I think, however, that every natural endowment may be increased with regard to courage by instruction and training; for it is clear that Scythians and Persians if they had received bucklers and spears, would not dare to fight with Lacedæmonians; and it is evident that even the Lacedæmonians would not fight against Thracians, if armed with light bucklers and javelins, nor would they contend against Scythians with bows and arrows.

3. And I see in all other points similarly, that men both differ from each other by nature, and gain great improvements by practice; and from this it is clear, that both the talented, and the more dull by nature, should learn and practise those objects in which they desire to become worthy of repute.

4. But prudence¹ and temperance he did not separate,

¹ *Σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σοφροσύνην ὅν ἐνῆριζεν.* The *Σοφία* here mentioned is the knowledge of those things from which virtue springs; and is wholly different from the *σοφία* mentioned below, iv. 6, 7.

According to the opinion of Sokrates no one can be *σοφός*, i. e. acquainted with all that is right and good, without being at the same time *σώφρων*, i. e. "temperate," "self-restrained."

For the man who was aware of what was beautiful and good, and knew how to practise both ; and he who knew what was disgraceful, and guarded against it, he judged to be both prudent and temperate. And being further interrogated, if those who knew well what conduct they should pursue, and yet did the direct reverse, were in his judgment prudent and temperate ? No more, said he, than I would consider the imprudent and intemperate to be so : for I consider that all men select from every thing possible what they consider to be most conducive to their own interest, and do this. I think then, that they who do not do wisely, can be neither prudent or temperate.

5. But he said, that justice and every other virtue was also prudence : since all that was just and effected virtuously was both honourable and good : and that those who knew these, would never prefer anything else to them ; and that they who were not acquainted with them, never would be able to effect them : nay, would actually commit error if they should attempt them ; and hence, that the prudent alone effected what was beautiful and good :² but the imprudent could not do so, nay erred even if they did attempt it. Seeing then that justice and all other beautiful and good things are the immediate acts of virtue, it is clear that justice in the abstract, and every other virtue, is prudence.

6. Madness, he said, was the contrary to prudence ; he did not, however, think that ignorance in the abstract was madness : but to be ignorant of oneself, yet to imagine and even believe that one knew what he really did not know, he considered to border most closely upon madness. The multitude, he said, do not say that they are mad who err in matters of which the many are ignorant, but designate as madmen those who err in what the many are acquainted with.

² The train of reasoning of the whole passage is thus : justice and every other virtue is wisdom, but all just and virtuous things are also beautiful and good ; he who knows all that is beautiful and good (*i. e.* *sapiens*, σοφός) will prefer nothing else to these ; and so (οὔτω) the wise man will do all that is beautiful and good.

7. For if any one should so firmly believe himself to be so tall, as to stoop when passing through the gates of a city wall, or so strong, as to attempt to lift up houses, or undertake any other act in things evidently impossible, him they declare to be mad : but they who err in slight matters do not appear to the many to be mad, but just as they assert "vehement desire" to be "love," so, a "great aberration of intellect" they call "madness."

8. And investigating "envy" what it might be, he found that it was a certain sorrow, not indeed arising from the misfortunes of friends, nor from the success of enemies. But he said, that those alone felt envy who were annoyed at the good success of friends. And when some wondered, if any one really having a friendly feeling towards another, should be grieved at his success, he reminded them, that many are disposed with such feelings towards another as to be incapable of neglecting them if they fare ill, and who would assist them in misfortune, while they yet are grieved at their good fortune. This feeling, he said, could not arise in the breast of the wise man, but the foolish ever were affected by it.

9. And with regard to idleness, what it might be : he said, he found that all men did something, yet still that the majority were idle : for gamblers at dice, and buffoons attempted to do something, yet all such persons were in reality idle ; for it was allowed them to go and do something better than this. He thought that no one had leisure to leave a better line of conduct, and effect the worse : but if any one should attempt this, he said, he really acted badly in this, because he had no leisure to do so.

10. Kings and magistrates, he said, were not they who held the ensigns of authority, nor those elected by every common person,¹ nor those chosen by lot, nor those who acquired power by violence, or by deceit, but those only who knew how to govern.

11. For when any person would acknowledge that it was the part of a ruler to enjoin what each should do, and the part of the subject to yield obedience, he used to shew,

¹ Ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων. i. e. a plebe, multitude, see 1, 1, 14.

that in a ship the skilful pilot was the governor; while the owner of the vessel and all the others in his ship, were subjects to that skilful man; and in agriculture, the possessors of farms: in pharmacy, the sick: in gymnastics, those who studied athletic arts; in fine, all other persons, who had any office requiring care, personally took the management of it, if they considered themselves equal to its superintendence,—but if not, they yielded obedience not only to professors of that art who might be present, but sent for those at a distance, in order that by following their directions they might effect what they ought. In wool-spinning, he used to demonstrate, that even women commanded over men, because the females knew how to spin wool, while men were ignorant of the art.

12. And were any one to instance in opposition to this, that a tyrant need not yield obedience to upright advisers. How pray, said he, is he free from the necessity of obedience, since there is a sure penalty impending over him who does not obey a prudent monitor? For in every matter, he who does not obey a prudent adviser, doubtlessly errs, and by the committal of an error, entails a penalty.

13. But if any one should assert that a Tyrant has the power even to put to death a prudent monitor: What! said he, the man who slayeth the best of all his allies, do you think he is free from punishment, or punished in any trivial way? Whether do you think, that one who should perpetrate such an act, could remain in safety, and not rather quickly perish by such conduct?

14. When one asked him, what object of study appeared to him to be best for man?—he answered, “good conduct.”—And when further interrogated whether he thought “good fortune” to be an object of study, he answered, “Fortune” and “action,” I think to be diametrically opposed, for when a person, without seeking it, meets casually with any success, that I think to be “good fortune;” but when a person by learning and practice meets the result of success, that I think to be “good

conduct," and they who aim at this appear to me to live well.

15. He said the best men, and those most loved of heaven, were they who in agriculture, performed zealously their rustic labour,—in medicine, those who skilfully practised pharmacy—in civil administration, politics; but the man who did nothing zealously, he asserted to be neither useful for any thing,¹ or loved of God.

¹ Χρήσιμον οὐδέν, *utilem ad nullam rem*: Thus ii. 7. 7, οὐδέν χρήσιμα.

CHAPTER X.

INTRODUCTION.—Sokrates endeavoured to benefit artists by discussing with them on the correct principles of art.

1. First he shews in what the chief excellence of painting consists. The art of painting he considers to consist not only in accurately depicting the semblance of the bodily members, but in expressing the various emotions of the mind.
2. He then shews that in statuary not only the limbs should be imitated, but a life-like appearance should be given to statues by mental expression.
3. He then considers what constitutes the proportion and suitableness of armour.

1. WHENEVER he conversed with men skilled in art, and who pursued these arts for the sake of gain, he proved useful to them. For, once visiting Parrhasius² the painter, and conversing with him, he asked, pray, Parrhasius, is painting the representation of visible objects? for representing them by means of colours you perfectly imitate substances, whether hollowed or projecting, dark or lightsome, rough or smooth, hard or soft, young or old. You speak the truth, said he.

2. And since you imitate only the beautiful forms, seeing that it is not easy to meet with one man having every member perfect, do you collect the most beautiful portions of separate individuals from many, and thus exhibit whole figures³ most beautiful in appearance in all their parts? Yes, thus we do, said he.

3. What then, said he, do you take off that character of mind, which may be most interesting, agreeable, friendly, desirable, and loveable? or is this inimitable?—How, Sokrates, could this be imitated, which has neither

² We must remember that when Sokrates is said to have held this discussion, Parrhasius was very young. He attained not fame as a statuary until some time after the death of Sokrates, Olymp. 95. 1.

³ Ὅλα τὰ σώματα = *corpora in omnibus suis partibus*.

symmetry,¹ or colour, or any of these characters which you just now mentioned, and is not even visible?

4. Yet is it not sometimes seen, said he, that a man looks on others with a bland or hostile look?—I think so, he answered.—Is there in the eyes, any expression that may be imitated?—Undoubtedly, said he.—And in the success or adversity of friends, do those who are anxious for them appear to have the same countenance as those who are careless?—No, by Jove, said he, for the former have a sparkling countenance at their prosperity, but downcast in adversity.—Is it possible to imitate these expressions, asked he?—Most certainly, answered Parrhasius.

5. And surely magnificence and liberality of soul, meanness and illiberality, temperance and prudence of character, and insolence and tastelessness, appear clearly both by countenance and gesture, whether men stand or move.—You speak the truth, said he.—Are these imitable?—Certainly, said he.—Whether then do you think men look with more pleasure on paintings, by which the expression of beautiful and good and loveable character is portrayed,² or those which express the degrading, evil, or detestable?—There is a wide difference indeed, Sokrates, said he.

6. But on one occasion visiting the studio of Kleiton the statuary, and conversing with him, he said,—That you model subjects of various forms, Kleiton, runners and wrestlers, pugilists and pankratiasts, I both see and know,—but that which principally wins the minds of men by means of the sight, namely, that they should be life-like, how do you produce this effect in your statues?

7. When Kleiton, perplexed, did not quickly answer.

¹ Συμμετρίαν. Comp. Plin. xxxv. 10. “Parrhasius *symmetriam* picturæ dedit, primus argutias vultus, elegantiam capilli, venustatem oris, confessione artificum in lineis extremis pulniam adeptus, &c.”

² Τὰ καλὰ ἤθη. Schneider thinks that Sokrates desired to persuade Parrhasius to imitate the amiable, honourable, and good, rather than the vicious, hideous, or hateful.

Pray, said he, by moulding your work according to the forms of living animals, do you cause your statues to appear more like life?—Certainly, said he.—Do you not then, said Sokrates, by assimilating what is by the particular gesture, drawn up, or drawn down,³ what is compressed together, or severed, what is strained or relaxed, render your work far more like reality, and natural?—Certainly, said he.

8. But to imitate the affections of bodies engaged in any act, does it not give certain feelings of pleasure to the spectators?—It is natural it should, said he.—Then, the eyes of combatants should be represented as threatening, and the countenance of the conquerors be imitated as if they were full of joy?—Assuredly so, said he.—It is right, therefore, said he, that a statuary should assimilate the actions of the mind by bodily forms.

9. But coming to Pistias, a maker of corslets, (since he had shewn Sokrates some corslets admirably made)—by Juno, said he, O Pistias, this is a beautiful invention, that the corslet should cover that part of a man's body which requires protection, and yet should not hinder the action of his hands.

10. But tell me, O Pistias, said he, wherefore do you sell your corslets at a larger sum, though you make them neither stronger or of more precious material,⁴ than others?—Because, of a truth, said he, I make them more in proportion.⁵—Whether, said he, do you demonstrate this proportion by measure or weight, and hence value them higher? for doubtless you do not make them exactly equal, or similar,⁶ if you do make them to fit.—Indeed, by Jove, I do; for a corslet would be no use without that.

³ Τὰ τε ὑπὸ τῶν σχημάτων κατασπώμενα, &c. "Quæ per corporis positiones et motiones universumque habitum in singulis corporis partibus deorsum et sursum trahuntur."—Κῆν.

⁴ Οὔτε πολυτελεστέροις, "Neque pretiosiore materia, ut auro et variegatos."

⁵ Ὑπομόν. The ὑπομόνος τοῦ θώρακος is that concinity and harmony with which all the parts are exactly suited to each other, "proportion."

⁶ ἴσους . . . ὁμοίους :—ἴσος signifies the perfect equality of all the parts : ὁμοίος their similarity.

11. Regarding, said he, the bodies of men, are not some proportionate, others devoid of all proportion?—True, indeed, said he.—How then, said he, do you make a corslet proportionate, if it fits a body devoid of all proportion?—By making it fit exactly, said he: for that which fits exactly is proportionate.

12. You seem to me, said he, to mean proportion not independently considered, but with reference to the wearer; as if you were to say, that that shield is proportionate which suits its wearer, as is a cloak; and other matters appear to be similarly affected according to your words: but, perhaps there is some other advantage and that no trifling one, attached to this fitness.—Tell me, said he, Sokrates, if you have any thing to advise?

13. Those which fit, replied he, oppress less with their weight than those which do not fit, though both of the same weight; for those which do not fit, either hanging wholly from the shoulders, or pressing hard upon some other part of the body, are difficult to be worn and annoying; but those which fit, since, the weight¹ being distributed, they are supported partly from the clavicle and shoulder-blade, partly from the shoulders, partly from the breast, and from the back, and from the stomach, appear not like a burden at all, but a natural appendage.

14. You have mentioned, said he, the very point for which I deem my work to be most valuable. Some persons indeed rather purchase ornamented and gilded shields.—But, truly, said he, if on this account they purchase corslets which do not fit, they appear to me to purchase an ornamented and gilded annoyance.

15. But, said he, since the body does not remain in the same position, but at one time is curved, at another raised erect, how can accurately-made corslets fit?—By no means, said he.—You mean then, said he, that those most exactly made² do not suit, but those which do not hurt in the use.—You have said the very fact, Sokrates, and you most rightly understand the matter.

¹ Διειλημμένοι τὸ βῆρος, i. e. Lorica ἀπόρρουσα pondus per singulas corporis partes, quas tegit, distributum habet.—Κῦμν.

² Ακριβῆς θώρακις, i. e. lorica corpori accurate adaptatæ.

CHAPTER XI.

INTRODUCTION.—Theodota, a courtesan of most engaging manners, by the liberality and generosity of her lovers, lived in the highest splendour. With her Sokrates converses on the value of friends, and the proper method to obtain and retain them. Having talked much in a jocular strain, he states that the art of acquiring friends is important and dignified (§ 1—9).—True and lasting affection is not procured by the mere beauty of the person, without benevolence and real affection of mind (§ 9—12). In the gratification of passion we must guard against satiety.

1. A BEAUTIFUL woman at that time being resident in the city, whose name was Theodota, a lady willing to cohabit with one who gained her affections; one of those then present made mention of her and said, that the beauty of this woman was beyond all language to express, and that to represent her beauty,³ painters frequently visited her, to whom she exhibited as much of her person as she could with decency. Let us go to see her, said Sokrates, for it is not possible by hearing to learn that which surpasses language.—And he who mentioned her, said, follow me and come at once then.

2. And so having gone to Theodota, and having found her standing for a painter,⁴ they admired her. And when the painter ceased; Good sirs, said Sokrates, whether ought we rather to feel gratitude to Theodota, because she hath exhibited to us her beauty; or she to us, because we have admired her? Whether, if the display be profitable to her, should she entertain gratitude to us; or if the sight be so to us, should we feel it towards her?

3. And when some one said that he spoke justly, he proceeded. Accordingly she at the present moment gains

³ Ἀπεικασόμενους, forming, modelling for their own use. Painters used to take representations of her appearance, that the image might serve as a model of beauty in their ideal compositions.

⁴ Καταλαβύντες, "*deprehendentes eam pictori ad deformandum adstantem.*"

praise from us, and when we shall announce this matter to others, she will be still more profited; but we already desire to embrace what we have beheld, and retire excited, and long for her on our departure: hence it is natural that we will pay court to her, and she be courted.—Then Theodota replied:—by Jove, if these things be true, it were necessary that I should feel gratitude to you.

4. After this, Sokrates seeing her adorned most sumptuously, and her mother beside her, with dress and ornaments¹ of no common kind, and numerous and beautiful handmaidens, and these in no neglected apparel, and the house richly furnished in other respects, said; Tell me, Theodota, have you any farm?—I have not, said she.—But perhaps you have a house supplying your income?—No house, said she.—Have you no handicrafts?²—None, said she.—Whence then do you acquire the necessary supplies?—If any one, she replied, becoming my friend, desires to serve me, he is my means of life.

5. By Jove, Theodota, said he, this possession is splendid, and far more valuable is it to possess a flock of friends, than of sheep, and goats, and oxen; but whether do you commit the matter to fortune, to decide if any friend, like a fly, unsought, should wing his way to you; or do you practise any art to attract them?

6. How, said she, could I devise any plan for this?—You could, said he, and far more becomingly than the spiders do. For you know how they hunt their prey to support life. They weave fine webs, doubtless, and whatever may be entangled in them they use as food.

7. And do you advise me then, said she, to weave a net? Certainly, said he, for you should not think, with-

¹ *Θεραπεία*. Herbstius considers this word to mean here “attendants,” “female servants;” but Kühner remarks that this would be absurd, since *θεραπαινῶν πολλὰς* follows.—Bornemann and Sauppe rightly interpret the word by *ornatus muliebris*, corresponding to the meaning of the Latin *cultus*.

² *Χειροτέχνας*. These were slaves trained to mechanical employments, and furnished with materials and occupation by their owners, to whom they were a source of considerable income. Thus, the father of Demosthenes is said to have had ten armourers and thirty-three chair-makers among his slaves.

cut some art, you could take friends, the most valuable prize of all. Do you not see how many arts the hunters practise for an article of little worth, the hares?

8. For because the hares feed by night, they obtain dogs which hunt by night, and with these they chase them: and because they retire by day, they acquire dogs of a different kind, which perceiving by the scent the path by which the hares may have departed from the pasture to their forms, track them out. And because they are so swift, as quickly to run out of view, they procure other dogs of rapid speed, that they may be caught by running; and because some escape even from these, they place nets across the path by which they fly, that falling into them they may be ensnared.

9. By what similar method, said he, could I hunt down friends?—If, said he, instead of a dog, you procure a person who will track out and discover the lovers of beauty, and the wealthy; and when he has found them, will drive them into your nets.

10. What sort of nets have I, said she.—One at least, and closely embracing its prize,—your person. And within it a soul, by which you understand, how much you gladden by a glance, and rejoice by a word; and that you should cheerfully receive the zealous lover, and close the door on the self-conceited; anxiously you should visit a friend in his illness, congratulate him in his success, and with your whole heart gratify the man who cares for you. I am sure you know how to love, not only coquettishly, but benevolently. And not by mere words but deeds you influence your friends to be most grateful.—By Jove, replied Theodota, I practise none of these arts.

11. Yet, said he, it is of much consequence³ to attack a man⁴ by means best suited to his disposition and rightly: for you never could take or retain a friend by force, but by kind services and pleasure this animal is

³ Πολὸν διαφέρεις, &c. i.e. "magnum facit discrimen, multum interest, ut in hominem nos ita geramus, ut natura ejus fert et ut par est."

⁴ ὄντιον, here used to express "man." The word is suited to the metaphorical run of the sentence.

easily captured and domesticated.—You speak the truth, said she.

12. You should then, said he, request of those who are anxious for your love, such favours only as they can perform with least cost, and then you should return the compliment in the same way ; for thus they will become your greatest friends, and they will love you for the longest time, and most greatly benefit you.

13. And you will gratify them most, if in their urgent want, you will share your personal possessions with them ; for you see that the sweetest viands appear disagreeable, if one offer them before the appetite desires ; nay, they even excite loathing in the satiated ; but if when you have excited hunger, you should then offer food, even if it be far coarser, it appears exceedingly agreeable.

14. How then, said she, could I excite this hunger in any of my lovers ?—If when they are satiated, said he, you would offer them none of your favours, or suggest them to their mind, until, ceasing from repletion, they may again require you. When they do require you, let fall hints of your favours in the most elegant style of language, and with an apparent desire to gratify them, and then fly off, until they feel the most impatient desire for you : for at such a moment it is more advantageous to give the same gifts, than before they desired them.¹

15. And Theodota said, what then ? will you, Sokrates, become my companion in this chase of friends ?—Yes, by Jove, said he, if you will persuade me.—And how can I persuade you ? said she. —You will seek and devise this if ever you should need me. Visit me then frequently, said she.

16. And Sokrates, joking upon her indolent ease, replied : But, Theodota, it is not easy for me to idle my time ; for much business, both public² and private, allows

¹ Ὑπομνήσκεις . . . δεικνῶσι, " Si amoris tui appetentes et consuetudine quam maxime pudica et eo, quod te eam prebes (φαίνεσθαι), quæ et gratificari illis, et rursus effugere velis, donec quam maxime amorem tuum appetant."

² By ἴδια πράγματα Weiske correctly understands the discussions held by Sokrates with his disciples ; τὰ δημόσια is to be understood as used in irony, for Sokrates τὰ πολιτικά οὐκ ἐπραττε.

me no freedom from occupation: besides I have other mistresses³ who will allow me to depart from them neither by day or by night; learning from me, as they do, love charms and incantations.

17. Are you acquainted with these arts also, Sokrates?—Influenced by what other reasons do you think that this Apollodorus and Antisthenes⁴ have never left me? and wherefore have Kebes and Simmias come to me even from Thebes? Be sure that this result was not obtained without many philters, love spells, and incantations by magic wheels.⁵

18. Lend me, then, that magic wheel of yours, that I may set it going against yourself.—But, by Jove, said he, I do not wish to be drawn to you, but that you should come to me.—Well, I will go, said she; only receive me.—I will receive you, said he, if another mistress more beloved than you be not within.⁶

³ Mistresses=φίλας; “amicæ a Sokrate per ironium appellantur amici.”

⁴ Antisthenes, founder of the Cynic school. Σωκράτει σχολάζουσιν ἀντιθέμενοι. Symp. iv. 44.

⁵ Ἰύγγων, various explanations have been offered for this word; the best is the following—

“Ἰύγγξ is a little bird which builds in the hollows of trees, called by the Latins *torquilla*, by the French *torcon*, by us the *Wry-neck*, from the never-ceasing motion of its little head. From this peculiarity, the ancients believed it to be endowed with magic influence, and used it in incantations to excite love. They bound the bird to a wheel having four spokes, and then rapidly revolved the wheel, while the charm was being chaunted. Hence the wheel itself was called by the name of the bird, “Ἰύγγξ.”—Κύβη. In general, Ἰύγγξ denotes τὸ ἐφελεον τὴν δυάνοιαν εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ ἔρωτα, Suidas.

⁶ Ἐνδον ᾗ. “Venuste, ut nihil supra: est enim propria meretricum amatorum excludentium formula: ἔνδον ἔτερος.”—RÜHNKEN.

CHAPTER XII.

INTRODUCTION.—In this chapter Sokrates endeavours to shew the benefit of gymnastic exercises not only to strengthen the body, but also to improve the mind. He considers the injury done to the bodily frame, by inactivity and neglect, and how great are the advantages arising from exercise and care.—The health and strength of the body is useful not only for all actions of muscular exertion, but also for all the occupations of the mental powers.

1. SEEING Epigenes, a very young man, and one of his associates, but who was weak of frame from neglect,—he said, O Epigenes, how very unlike an athlete,¹ is your frame!—Yes, said Epigenes, for I am not an athlete.—You are no less an athlete,² said Sokrates, than they who are about to contend at the Olympic games. Do you think that a contest at the risk of life against our foes, which the Athenians proclaim whenever circumstances require, can be a light one?

2. And yet on account of the weakness of their bodies, many perish in the dangers of war, or are saved by dishonourable means; many are taken alive for the same defect, and thus captured pass the remainder of their lives, if such should be their fate, in the bitterest slavery; or falling into the most grievous necessity, and paying as ransom sometimes more than they possess, they pass the remainder of their lives in want of the necessities of life, and suffering every hardship; many too are blasted with infamy, being thought cowards, merely from the impotency of their bodily frame.

¹ Ἰδιωτικῶς . . . τὸ σῶμα ἔχεις, i.e. "non athletic corpore constitutus es—corpus infirmum habes propter neglecta corporis exercitia." The ἰδιῶται are above (111, 7, 7,) opposed to the ἀσκηταί, who are called emphatically οἱ ἀθληταί, hence he who neglects bodily exercise is called ἰδιώτης.

² Θυδὲν γε μᾶλλον. Scil. ἰδιώτης εἶ, i.e. you are not a whit less an athlete virtually, than they who are about to contend in the Olympic games; they contend for a prize or for glory, you should fight for the salvation of your state.

3. Or do you slight the evil consequences of this weakness of frame? or do you think such calamities easy to be endured? I do believe that all the labour one should endure who is attentive to the training of his body, to be far lighter and far more agreeable than those hardships.—Or do you consider an ill-condition of body, to be more healthful or useful than a good-condition?—or do you despise the results arising from good muscular training?

4. And yet the results to those of an ill-condition of frame, are directly the reverse of those which befall a good-condition; for they who have their body well trained are both healthy and strong; and through this advantage, many are saved with honour from the dangers of war, and escape every peril; many, too, assist their friends, and benefit their country, and for these services they are deemed worthy of praise, and acquire great glory, and meet with the highest honour: and so they pass the remainder of their lives more agreeably and honourably, and leave to their children fairer fortunes for the enjoyment of life.¹

5. And though Athens does not publicly require the practice of warlike exercises,² we ought by no means therefore to neglect them in our private capacity: nay, we should practise them the more. For be well assured that in no other contest, or in any act whatever, you will by any means come off inferior because you have trained your body better than others. For the body is useful for the employments of mankind: and in all the services rendered by the body, it will make the greatest difference if that body be well exercised.

6. Since, even in that, in which you think the service of the body is least required, namely, in mental thought,

¹ Ἀφορμὰς εἰς τὸν βίον, i. e. *præsidia vitæ, opes*. See 11. 7. 11.

² Τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, i. e. the toils and exercise of athletes, which are also for war. Xenophon censures the Athenians, with tacit praise of the Lacedæmonians: for though at Athens there were contests of ὀπλομάχοι, yet there, every citizen was not by law obliged to practise them, as at Lacedæmon.

who knows not, that even in this many fail greatly from their bodily ill-health? Owing to ill-health of body, forgetfulness, want of heart, melancholy, and madness, frequently attack the mental powers with such violence, as to drive out all previous knowledge.

7. Those who have their bodies in good condition have great security, and freedom from all danger of suffering any such disaster owing to a bad constitution. Nay, it is far more likely that a good constitution will be useful to obtain results directly contrary to those which arise from a bad constitution. And yet, in order to gain results the contrary to what we have stated, what would a man of sense refuse to undergo?

8. It is shameful, also, that one should grow old, before he has seen what he could arrive at, by becoming most comely and strong in body. This no one can see who neglects it; for these advantages come not without practice.

CHAPTER XIII.

INTRODUCTION.—In this chapter various brief sayings of Sokrates are mentioned.

1. We should not be offended at the rudeness of an unpolished person, more than at ugliness of appearance.
2. Fasting is the best remedy for loathing of food.
3. We should not be hard to please in food or drink.
4. When you are about to chastise a slave for a fault, first see whether you labour under the same failing yourself.
5. He who can walk about many days in succession, could also perform one continued journey for the same length of time.—It is better also to set out a day before the usual time, than to hurry upon your road.
6. It is disgraceful that a man trained in gymnastic arts, should be overcome by a slave in enduring toil.

1. A CERTAIN individual became enraged, because, when he had saluted another person, the latter did not return his salutation : Sokrates then said : it is strange that you are not incensed at meeting any person deformed in body, since you are annoyed, at meeting a person boorish in disposition.

2. When another said, that he could not enjoy his meals ; Akumenus,¹ said Sokrates, prescribes a good remedy for that : when the other asked, what may be its nature ?—To put a check to your appetite, replied Sokrates,—for by thus checking it, you will eat more agreeably, cheaply, and wholesomely.

3. Another complaining that the water spring which he used for drinking at his home, was warm. Well then, said Sokrates, when you wish for a warm bath, you have it ready at hand.—Nay, replied the other, it is too cold to use as a bath.—Are your domestics then inconvenienced by drinking of it, or bathing in it ?—No, by Jove, replied he ; I have often wondered rather, with what pleasure they use it for both purposes.—Whether

¹ Ἀκουμένος, a celebrated physician, the friend of Sokrates. Many read ἀκούμενος (part.) denying a physician of such a name to have existed : but see Plat. Phæd. 227. A — Symp. 176. B.

is the water-spring in your house, or that in the temple of Æskulapius, the warmer?—That in the temple of Æskulapius, said he.—Whether is your water-spring, or that in the temple of Amphiaraus, the colder to bathe in? That in the temple of Amphiaraus, replied he.—Think then, said Sokrates, that very likely you are harder to please than your servants, or even the sick.

4. A master had violently beaten his attendant;¹ Sokrates asked him, why he was so incensed against his servant.—Because, replied he, though most stupid, he is a perfect glutton, and is the greatest lover of money, though the idlest person possible.—Have you ever thought, said Sokrates, which of the two requires more blows, you or your servant?

5. And when a certain individual feared a journey to Olympia: why, asked Sokrates, do you fear this journey? Do you not even in your own city, walk about nearly the whole day? And similarly on your journey thither, after your morning walk, you shall breakfast; and after another walk, shall dine, and take your rest. Do you not know that if you extend in continuous length,² those several walks which you take, in five or six days you might readily arrive at Olympia from Athens? And far more pleasantly will you go on your journey, if you start a day too soon rather than a day too late; for it is annoying to be forced to lengthen your day's journeys beyond a moderate extent; but to set out on your road, a day in advance gives the greatest ease; it is far better therefore to hasten your departure, than to hurry when on your road.

6. When another said, that he was utterly wearied³

¹ Ἀκόλουθον = *pedisequum, servum*. Properly the word denotes a young slave, whose duty was to attend upon his master, and accompany him in public; “a page,” or “follower.”

² Ἐκτείνων, the meaning is, “if you were to continue in one unbroken length the different walks which you daily take, so as to make up one long walk out of numerous short ones, you might arrive even at Olympia, without yet walking more than you usually do at home.”

³ Ἡαρεῖσθαι, “*defatigatus esset*” proprie significat *distendere*, æpe autem habet vim *defatigandi, vexandi, enecandi*.—KÜHN.

by a long journey ; Sokrates inquired whether he carried any burden. No, by Jove, I did not, excepting my cloak.—Did you travel alone ? said he, or did a servant attend you ?—A slave attended me, he replied.—Was he empty handed, or did he carry anything ? He carried, by Jove, the bedding and other utensils.—And how did he get over the journey ?—Far better I think, than I did, replied the other.—Well then, said Sokrates, if you were obliged to carry his burden, how do you think you would have fared ?—Very badly, by Jove, said he ; or rather, I would not have been able to carry it at all.—And can you think it becoming a man trained in all exercises, to be able to bear so much less fatigue than a slave ?

CHAPTER XIV.

INTRODUCTION.—This chapter contains extracts from the table-talk of Sokrates.

1. It relates how Sokrates managed that in club feasts one should not endeavour to surpass another in the quality or quantity of his contributed viands.
2. He should be called *Ὁψοφάγος*, who eats flesh alone or with very little bread.
3. The man who puts morsels of various viands at once into his mouth, destroys the whole science of cookery.
4. He may be truly said “to banquet,” who lives on wholesome and plain food, easy to be acquired.

1. When a number of persons met for a club supper, some having brought with them very little meat, others bringing a great deal, Sokrates ordered the attendant either to place the least portion for the use of all, or to distribute his share to each. They who brought a great deal for themselves were ashamed to participate in that which was placed for general use, if they did not also contribute their store. They contributed therefore their portion also to the common stock. And when they partook of no more than they who brought but little, they ceased to purchase delicacies at great cost.

2. Perceiving one of those who dined with him, to reject the bread, and to eat only the meat; when a conversation had arisen regarding a proper name to be given to any particular act; can we say, cried Sokrates, for what particular act a man should be called Carnivorous? For men in general eat their meat with bread, if it be laid before them, but I think they are not called carnivorous for that.—By no means, said one of the company.

3. What? said he, if any one should eat the meat without the bread, not to strengthen his frame,¹ but to

¹ *Ἀσκήσεως*, properly said of athletes, who eat an enormous quantity of flesh in order to strengthen their muscular powers.

gratify his appetite, whether does he appear to be carnivorous or not?—Scarcely any one else could be called carnivorous, replied the other.—Then another of the company asked; what should he be called who eats a great deal of meat with very little bread?—I think, said Sokrates, that such a person should justly be called carnivorous; and when other men pray to the gods for abundance of fruits, he should pray for abundance of flesh.

4. When Sokrates had thus spoken, the young man, thinking that these words had been uttered as a hint to himself, did not cease to eat the meat, but took a portion of bread;—Sokrates perceiving this, said; ye who are near him, observe, whether he eats the bread as a relish for the meat, or the meat for the bread.

5. When he saw another of the company tasting many different viands, on the same piece of bread; pray, said he, can there be any cookery more extravagant, or more destructive to the viands, than that practised by him who eats a great number of sauces together, and takes into his mouth, seasoning of very different natures, at once? For as he mixes many more sauces than the cooks do, he makes it more costly; and by mixing together condiments which they rejected as unsuitable, if they act rightly, he errs and destroys their art.

6. And yet is it not ridiculous to provide himself with cooks, perfect artists in gastronomy, and still, though he can claim no acquaintance with their profession, to alter the flavour of the dishes prepared by them?—But besides this, another evil befalls the man accustomed to partake of many viands together: for if he have not variety laid before him, he immediately fancies himself to be stinted, missing what he was used to. But he who is accustomed to accompany one sort of bread with one kind of meat, will pleasantly taste that one, when variety cannot be had.

7. He said too, that in the Attic dialect “to enjoy good cheer,” means the same as “to eat,” and that the word “good” was added, to express the fancy for what would disorder neither body or mind, and might be easily procurable. The phrase “to enjoy good cheer,” he accordingly referred only to those who live moderately.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.—Sokrates loved youths ; but not those remarkable for beauty of person, but those only who excelled in mind and talent. He judged of their excellent endowments by their facility in learning, their retentive memory, and zeal in pursuing what was useful.—In order, however, that youths thus naturally talented, should become useful to themselves, their friends, or the state, he considered they should undergo a course of instruction by which they would be enabled to distinguish right from wrong, good from evil (1—2) ; and the more so, since admirable natural abilities, if not properly directed, more easily deteriorate into viciousness (3—4). Those youths who relied upon their riches, and supposed they could obtain whatever they desired by their aid, he reduced to a proper mode of thinking, by shewing that riches cannot make a man able to distinguish good from evil, or to execute what is useful and just.—The man who cannot do what is useful, cannot be happy ; and he who has acquired no knowledge of any science, cannot in any thing excel ; and he who cannot excel in any thing, cannot enjoy worthy reputation among men.

1. So beneficial was Sokrates in every act and way, that even to one of moderate understanding, if he considers this, it will be evident that nothing was more profitable than intimacy with Sokrates, or *discussion* with him, at any place, or regarding any act ; since even to recall his memory, now he is no more, benefits in no slight degree those who were wont to associate with him, and who embraced his tenets.¹ For even by his jocular, no less than by his serious mood, he profited his followers.

2. For frequently he declared he loved some individual ; yet he proved it was not those whom nature had

¹ Ἀποδεχομένους ἐκείνων, *i. e.* “ qui ejus disciplinam sequebantur.” ἀποδέχεσθαι τινα vel τι est, “ probare aliquem (alicujus sententiam) vel aliquid.”—KÜHN.

endowed with a person admirable for beauty he desired, but those blessed with souls adapted to virtue. He conjectured what natures were excellent, by their swiftly learning whatever they applied to; and retaining in memory whatever they might once have learned; and by their desire for all those branches of learning by means of which one could regulate well his family, or the state, and could, in fine, well manage men or human affairs. Such persons he considered, if instructed, would not only be happy themselves, and regulate admirably their own households, but would be able to render happy other men and cities also.

3. However, he did not make advances in the same way to all. Those who supposed themselves to be endowed with good natural powers, but despised instruction, he used to persuade that the noblest endowments of talent require education most: instancing that the horses best in breed, naturally being high-spirited and mettlesome, if broken in when young, proved most manageable and excellent; but if they were not broken in, were ungovernable and worthless. And so hounds of the best blood, since they were enduring of toil, and spirited in attacking beasts, if well trained² became most excellent for the chase, and in the highest degree useful; while, if untrained, they were useless, rabid, and disobedient.³

4. And similarly, also, men of the noblest nature, being most firm in soul, and energetic in accomplishing whatsoever they should take in hand, if instructed and educated, proved most worthy and beneficial, for they effected then numerous and important services: but if uninstructed and ignorant, they turned out most worthless and injurious. For since they were incompetent to judge what it was their duty to do, they frequently attempted

² Ἀχρεῖας = "*instilutis*," a word peculiarly used of horses. The word "untrained," ἀναγώγους, here applied to hounds, is applied above to horses, iii. 3, 4.

³ We must remember that even Sokrates, as described by Plato, taught that great virtues and great vices flowed from the same source; and that much good cannot be expected from one who could not do much evil also if he pleased.

improper actions, and being high-souled and energetic, were difficult to be restrained or swerved from their purpose. Wherefore they perpetrated many and heinous evils.

5. Those who were of a haughty spirit in consequence of their riches, and thought they had no need of education; but supposed their wealth would suffice to effect all they desired, and to gain honour from man, he admonished, by saying, that he was silly, who supposed himself able without education to distinguish between what was beneficial and injurious in human conduct. Silly also was the man, who, though he could not distinguish between them, yet fancied, because he procured all he wished by means of his wealth, that he would be able also to do what was beneficial. Infatuated was he, who though he was unable to pursue a beneficial course, yet supposed he acted rightly, and that he had provided honourably or sufficiently the necessaries for good conduct in life. Infatuate also was whoever imagined that by reason of his wealth, ignorant though he was, he would be believed to be worthy in character; and when he was good for nothing, thought he could be held in estimation.

CHAPTER II.

INTRODUCTION.—In the preceding chapter Sokrates shews that men endowed with good natural abilities, and also those possessed of wealth, need instruction, if they wish to benefit themselves or others. In this chapter he shews by the example of Euthydemus—a youth self-opinionated, and who supposed he could even govern the state without any education—that many thought they knew all things, while they knew nothing and needed instruction, by which accurate knowledge alone can be obtained.

Firstly, he shews the utter folly of attempting to meddle in state affairs without a perfect education, or to suppose that all necessary knowledge arises intuitively in man (1—2); then, in a satirical vein, he attacks those who address the populace, stating that they have been beholden to no man for any knowledge; he then shews that the art of government is most difficult, and therefore requires greater training (6—7). Finally, by questions regarding justice and injustice, good and evil, wealth and poverty, he reduces Euthydemus to confess that he was utterly ignorant of all things, and needed the instruction of Sokrates himself.

The aim of the whole chapter, however, is, that all the knowledge of man should rest upon SELF-KNOWLEDGE (*γνῶθι σεαυτὸν*) from which the greatest blessings arise to man (21—29). In many parts of the dialogue Sokrates assumes the character of a Sophist, but only to convince a self-opinionated youth of his ignorance and self-conceit. That all his sentiments are not made seriously and with real intention, can be understood from other chapters of this book, as, well as from the concluding words of the present chapter (*ἀπλούστατα . . . κράτιστα εἶναι*). Hence it is that he attributes *σοφίαν* to even doubtful goods, citing the instances of Dædalus and Palamedes (33), and also, since he calls even happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*) a doubtful good, being made up of doubtful goods. For it is clear from these books that in the sincere opinion of Sokrates, happiness was the *summum bonum*. But seeing that happiness is constituted of goods which may prove injurious if ill applied, we must use all care, circumspection, and prudence, so that we may use these in such a manner, as that they may not impede our felicity, but increase it.

1. I WILL now relate how he assailed those who supposed they had acquired the best education, and entertained high opinions of their own wisdom. For when

he learned that Euthydemus, the beautiful,¹ had collected numerous extracts² from the most celebrated poets and sophists, and from this imagined that he excelled all his cocvals in learning, and entertained great expectations that he would far surpass all in ability of speech and action—and when he found that by reason of his youth he had not yet entered on the Agora, but that if he desired to effect any business, he usually sat in the shop of a bridle-maker, near the Agora—Sokrates, with certain others of his company, entered the shop.

2. And first, when one inquired, “whether it was in consequence of his intimacy with one of the sophists, or from his own natural talents, Themistokles so far excelled all his fellow-citizens, that the state ever turned her eyes to him when she required an able minister,” Sokrates, wishing to provoke³ Euthydemus, said it would be quite absurd to believe that without fit instructors men could not become able even in worthless trades, if we were to imagine that ability to conduct a state, the most important art of all, arose in men from unassisted natural endowments.

3. Again Euthydemus happened to be present, and Sokrates perceiving him about to depart from the company, and anxious lest he should be supposed to admire Sokrates for his wisdom, the latter said, “from the conduct he pursues, it is palpable that this Euthydemus, when he reaches the proper age,⁴ will not refrain from proffering his advice, should the state propose a public deliberation regarding any matter;⁵ he also appears to me to have already concocted an admirable preamble for

¹ Τὸν καλὸν, which name Heindorf considers merely to arise from Attic courtesy, as in Plat. Pha-dr. p. 278. ξῖ'Ισουκράτην τὸν καλὸν.

² Γράμματα, here with the meaning of συγγράμματα or συγγεγραμμένα, i. e. “*præcepta et exempla e scriptoribus excerpta*.”

³ Κινεῖν, *laccessere*, ad loquendum excitare.

⁴ Ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γενόμενος, when he shall have reached the years of manhood. ἡλικιὰ properly denotes the age of a man from his eighteenth year to his fiftieth.

⁵ Τῆς πόλεως λόγον προτιθείσης, when the herald, the people being convened in assembly, gave liberty to address the people upon a proposed subject, by the usual formula τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται.

his public orations, from an anxiety not to be supposed to have learned any thing from any person, for it is clear that in the opening of his speech he will form the exordium to this effect.

4. "Men of Athens, from no man at any time, have I acquired any information, nor though I heard that some were competent in speech and action, was I anxious to meet with them; nor have I been solicitous to have any able person for my teacher. Nay, I have done quite the reverse, for I have been always anxious not only to avoid instruction from any one, but even the very supposition that I had. Nevertheless, I will proffer you that advice which occurs to my mind from unassisted talent."

5. And similarly then should they form their preamble who desire to obtain a medical diploma from the state;⁶ for thus undoubtedly should they begin their statement.

"Men of Athens, from no individual at any period have I learned the healing art, nor have I sought that any physician should be my teacher. For I have continued anxious to avoid not only to learn anything from physicians, but even the bare supposition that I had studied this art at all. Nevertheless, confer on me the office of physician, for I will endeavour to learn the art by trying experiments on you."⁷ Then all those present laughed at this form of preamble.

6. But when Euthydemus evidently now attended to the words of Sokrates, yet still avoided to speak himself, and supposed that by his silence he would invest himself with the reputation of wisdom, Sokrates, wishing to put an end to this conduct, said,—No doubt it is strange, why those who are desirous to be competent players of the harp, or flute, or skilled in horsemanship, or any other such art, endeavour most constantly to practise that in which they desire to excel, and that not unassisted, but by aid of persons supposed to be most skilled; doing and enduring all things, so as not to

⁶ ἰατρικὸν ἔργον λαβεῖν, "*publici medici munus accipere*." Weiske concludes from this passage, that at least the higher order of physicians were appointed in the popular assembly.

⁷ Schneider aptly compares Plin. II. N. xxix, "*Discunt (medici) periculis nostris, et experimenta per mortes agunt.*"

attempt any thing without their direction, as if they believed that otherwise they could never attain to reputation.—While of those who wish to become powerful in oratory or the conduct of state affairs, some think that without study or preparation, by uninstructed talent, and suddenly, they will be able to accomplish this.

7. And yet these latter are so much more difficult in execution, in proportion to the comparative fewness of those who succeed, although very many attempt it; it is clear therefore that those who desire to manage these affairs stand in need of greater and more intense study than those who desire the former.

8. At first Sokrates uttered such sentiments, while Euthydemus heard him without attention, but when he perceived him to remain more readily when he conversed, and to listen more zealously, he came unattended to the saddler's-shop. And when Euthydemus sat down beside him: Tell me, Euthydemus, said he, have you in reality collected many extracts from men who are reputed wise?—Yes, by Jove, Sokrates, he replied; and I am still collecting them, until I shall possess as many as I can.

9. Truly, by Jove, I respect you, said Sokrates, because you have not preferred to acquire treasures of gold and silver rather than of wisdom; for it is clear you consider that silver and gold are unable to render men better, but that the sentiments of wise men enrich their possessors with virtue. And Euthydemus rejoiced to hear these expressions, as he supposed Sokrates thought he had properly sought for wisdom.

10. When Sokrates perceived him to be delighted with this praise, he said,—Through a desire to become excellent in what particular art, O Euthydemus, do you collect these extracts?—And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should give, Sokrates again said,—Is it to become a physician? for the writings of physicians are numerous.—Euthydemus said, by Jove, I wish not that.—Well then, do you wish to become an architect? for an instructed person is requisite for that art?¹—By no means, said he.—Do you desire to

¹ Γνωμονικῶν . . . καὶ τοῦτο δὲ τοῦτο is the accusative of the object, "*prudenti homine etiam ad hanc rem opus est.*"

become a good geometrician, like Theodorus?²—Nor a geometrician, said he,—Well, do you wish to become an astronomer?³—When he denied this, he asked,—Do you wish to turn Rhapsode? for men say you possess the whole poems of Homer.—No, by Jove, said he, for I am aware that the Rhapsodes know his verses accurately, while personally they are most foolish.⁴

11. Then Sokrates said: Is it possible, Euthydemus, that you desire that particular virtue, by means of which men are engaged in public life, skilled in economy, able to command, and beneficial to other men and to themselves?—And Euthydemus replied, It is that particular virtue, O Sokrates, I so ardently seek for.—By Jupiter, said Sokrates, you desire the most honourable, and the highest art; for it is the art of kings, and is designated as kingly; but, continued he, have you ever considered whether it is possible for an unjust man to be excellent in this art?—Certainly, I have, said he, and it is not possible to be even a worthy citizen without justice.

12. What then? said Sokrates, have you acquired this characteristic?—I think, Sokrates, he replied, I will appear as just as any other.—Are there then any works of the just, as there are of artists?—There are, no doubt, said he.—As artists then are able to exhibit their works, would the just be similarly able to shew forth their own works?—Well! said Euthydemus, why should I not be able to mention fully the works of justice? Surely I can, and also the works of injustice. Since every day we can hear and see no small number of such acts.

13. Do you wish then, said Sokrates, that we should write a delta on the one side, and on the other an alpha? And then, what appears to us to be a work of justice

² Theodorus was a native of Cyrenæ, and the preceptor of Sokrates. See below, iv. 7, 3.

³ Ἀστρολόγος, much the same meaning as our "Astronomer," and the Latin *astronomus*. Thus ἀστρολογία is the same as *astronomia*, below iv. 7, 4. The Latin writers of the Golden age used *astrologus* and *astrologia*, not *astronomus*, or *astronomia*.

⁴ This judgment refers to the Rhapsodes of the period of Sokrates, not to those of an older period, who were held in considerable honour.

shall we place under delta, and whatsoever seems to belong to injustice, under alpha?—If you think there is need of these letters, describe them, said he.¹

14. And Sokrates having described them, as he said, continued—Does falsehood then exist among mankind?—Indeed it does, says he.—In which class shall we place this? inquired Sokrates.—Clearly under injustice.—Does deception exist also?—To a great degree, he replied.—Under which head shall we range this?—It is quite evident this also must be classed under injustice.—What then! do malpractices exist?—They do surely.—The enslaving of men?—This is also rife, said he.—And shall none of these things be placed under justice, in our judgment, O Euthydemus?—To do so would be strange indeed, he replied.

15. What then, if any person when elected general should reduce to slavery an unjust and hostile city, should we say that he commits injustice?—No, assuredly, he replied.—Shall we not say that he acts justly?—Certainly, he said.—What then? if in his warfare against them, he should practise deceit?—This, too, would be just, he replied.—And if he should secretly steal and openly plunder their property, will he not act justly?—Most assuredly, he said. But at first I fancied you asked me these questions only respecting our friends.—Well then, said he, all that we have already placed under the head of injustice, must we place them all under the head of justice?—So it appears fitting, he replied.

16. Do you wish then, that having so placed them, we should now lay down our definition, thus, that towards enemies it is just to commit such things, but unjust to do so towards our friends; and that with reference to the latter, a general should act without the smallest guile?—Undoubtedly, replied Euthydemus.

¹ In this discussion Sokrates does not so much wish to strip Euthydemus of his reputation as regards justice, but to strip him of his own self-conceit and pride for his wisdom. When Euthydemus at one moment pronounces the same thing to be just, at another unjust, he clearly shews his ignorance of what he professed to know, and therefore that he had not any true or real claim to wisdom.

17. What then? said Sokrates, if any general seeing his army disheartened should falsely allege that auxiliaries were approaching, and by that falsehood should check the despondency of his troops, should we consider that conduct to be deceit?—I think we should place that under justice, said he.—And if, when a son requires medicine, and would not take the drug, his father by deceit should give him the medicine, as if it were a dainty, and by using that falsehood should restore him to health, under which head shall we place that act of deceit?—I think we should class this under the same head.—What further? said he; if any one, when his friend was influenced by despair, fearing lest he should commit suicide,¹ should privately remove or openly take away² his sword, or other such weapon; under which head should we class this act?—This, by Jove, said he must also be arranged under justice. •

18. Do you mean, then, that even towards our friends we must not on all occasions act without some guile?—We must not, indeed, said he; nay, I retract my previous assertions, if it be allowed.—Assuredly, said Sokrates, it is much better to alter than to decide incorrectly.

19. Well now, of those who deceive their friends in order to injure them (that we may not leave even this topic unexamined), which is more unjust? he who commits the wrong intentionally, or he who does it unwittingly?—O Sokrates, I no longer put confidence in the answers I give; for all that I previously stated now appears to me to be very different from what I then supposed,—but, nevertheless, let me say, That he who tells a falsehood intentionally, is more unjust than he who does so unknowingly.³

¹ Διαχρήσεται αὐτόν,—"διαχρῆσθαι et καταχρῆσθαι, *interficiendi* notatione instructa construuntur cum accusativo."—Kühn.

² See note on iii. 6, 11.

³ In this and the succeeding section, Sokrates does not express his own sentiments, for what in those passages he asserts, are opposed to his own doctrines as stated elsewhere, (*e. g.* iii. 4, 5, sqq.—iv. 6, 6. See Proleg.) regarding the nature of justice and other virtues. Here he assumes the character of a Sophist, in order more

20. Do you think there is an art and science of justice, just as there is of literature?—I do think so.—Which would you consider the better scholar, he who purposely should read or write incorrectly, or he who should be incorrect unwittingly?—The man who should do so intentionally, said he, for whenever he pleased he could do both correctly.—Accordingly he who purposely writes ungrammatically may be a good grammarian, but he who does so unintentionally is ignorant of grammar?—Yes; why not?—Whether does he who lies and deceives purposely know the principles of justice, or he who deceives unintentionally?—He who does so intentionally.—Accordingly, do you say that he who knows the science of literature is a better grammarian than he who does not?—Yes.—And that he who knows the principles of justice is more just than he who knows them not?—Methinks I do say so; but I think I say so without knowing why.

21. What then, pray? The man who wishes to tell the truth, yet when describing the same road, at one time should say it led towards the east, at another time towards the west; or when stating the result of the same calculation, should at one time state it as greater in amount, at another time as less, what sort of a character does he seem to be?—It is quite manifest he knows not what he fancied he knew.

22. Are you aware of any persons being called servile?—I am, said he.—Whether is it for their intelligence or ignorance?—Doubtless, for their ignorance.—Pray, is it for their ignorance of brass working they obtain this name?—Not at all.—But perhaps it may be

fully to convict Euthydemus of frivolity and self-conceit. For he who *knowingly* does injury to a friend, if we look to the point of *knowledge*, is more just, has a greater knowledge of justice, than he who does wrong unwittingly: but if we look to the act of injury, he is more unjust than the other. But he alone is to be called “just,” who knowing what is just, also executes it, not he who only has the knowledge without the execution. And so he who designedly and of set purpose writes ungrammatically, if we consider the point of *knowledge* merely, is a better grammarian than he who writes or reads ungrammatically without knowing that he does so; but not so, if we regard the act alone.

for their ignorance of architecture?—Neither on that account.—Is it for their ignorance of shoemaking?—Certainly it is not for one of these reasons: nay, the case is directly the reverse, for the majority of those who know these trades are servile.—Pray then is this the term for those who do not know what is beautiful, good, and just?—So I think, said he.

23. We ought accordingly, by straining our utmost in every way to take care that we may not be servile.—But, by the gods, Sokrates, he said, I altogether thought that I had pursued that line of study, by means of which I considered I would be instructed in all that was fitting for a man desirous of perfection; but now, can you imagine the despair I am in, when I see that after all my previous labour I am unable to answer when interrogated concerning what a man ought assuredly to know, and that I know no other course whatever, proceeding by which I might become better?

24. And Sokrates said: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever yet gone to Delphi?—I have twice, in truth.—And did you perceive that sentence, *KNOW THYSELF*, which is written upon the temple wall?¹—I have, said he.—Whether then had you no curiosity for the inscription; or did you pay regard to it, and attempt to examine yourself, as to the character you might be?—By Jove, I did not examine myself, for I thought I knew myself quite well already: for scarcely could I have known any thing else, if I did not know myself.

25. Which of the two characters do you think knows himself—he who knows only his name; or he, who acts as they who purchase horses, who think they do not know the animal whose disposition they may desire to know, until they diligently examine whether he be obedient or disobedient, strong or weak, swift or slow, and other points of advantage or disadvantage, which have reference to the proper services of a steed—so he by having

¹ Τὸ γινῶθαι σεαυτὸν. See Cic. Tusc. 1, 22, 52, and comp. Plat. Phædr. p. 229. Οὐ δύναμαι πω, καὶ αὐτὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γινῶναι ἐμαυτὸν.

examined his own nature, as to what character he may be with reference to human uses, hath become fully acquainted with his own powers?—My opinion is, he replied, that the man who knows not his own powers, does not know himself.

26. Is not this evident, he said, that men gain the greatest blessings in consequence of their self-knowledge; and the greatest evils, from mistaking their own character? For they who know themselves, know what course they should fitly pursue, and thoroughly distinguish what they can do, and what they cannot: and by attempting only what they know, they procure all they need, and prosper in success: and also by abstaining from what they do not know, they are free from error, and escape ill-success. And by this advantage they are able to form an estimate regarding other men, and by their dealings with others, they procure for themselves what is good, and avoid what is evil.

* 27. They who know not their own character, but form a wrong opinion of their powers, are affected with a similar error as regards all other men, and all human affairs.¹ They know not what they need, nor what they do, nor whom they have dealings with, but making mistakes in all these points, they fail of obtaining all advantages, and fall into every disaster.

28. And they who know what they do, being successful in their attempts, become celebrated and honoured: and men of similar prudence² gladly have intercourse with them: while they who are unsuccessful in their attempts desire that they should counsel for them, and wish to place them before themselves, and trust all their hopes of advantage to them, and for all these reasons they love them beyond all other men.

29. But the others, not knowing the nature of what

¹ Πρὸς τε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους. ὁμοίως διακείμεντας, i. e. "similiter, uti se ipsos, ita alios homines et negotia humana ignorant."—SCHN.

² Ὅτι τε ὅμοιοι—"qui similes iis sunt prudentia, vel qui simili prudentia utuntur," others render it by "*qui similiter, quod cupiunt, assequuntur.*"

they do, and making an infelicitous choice,³ and failing in whatsoever they attempt, not only are fined and punished;⁴ but also for this cause, are visited with disrepute and ridicule, and pass their lives under contempt and degradation. You perceive also that even of cities, which through ignorance of their own strength war upon those more powerful, some are razed to the ground, and others become enslaved instead of free.

30. And Euthydemus replied; That it appears to me, we should make self-knowledge of the utmost importance, be well assured: but regarding the point from whence one should commence this self-examination, I look to you for aid, if haply you will be inclined to conduct me.

31. Well then, said Sokrates, I suppose you fully know what sort are good and evil things?—Yes, by Jove, he replied, for if I did not know this, I would be more worthless even than a slave.—Come then, said he, and enumerate them to me.—Truly it is by no means difficult, said he: for in the first place, I consider health to be a good, and sickness to be an evil; and in the second place, the causes of each of them, *i. e.* drink, or food; and of pursuits of life, those which conduce to health, I consider to be blessings, those which tend to sickness, to be evils.

32. Therefore, said Sokrates, both health and sickness, when they are the causes of any good, would be goods themselves, but when the cause of evil, are evils.—When is it possible, inquired Euthydemus, that health should be the cause of evil, or sickness the cause of good?—Then, said he, when some by reason of their strong health participating in some shameful expedition by land, or injurious attempt by sea, are destroyed,

³ Κακῶς . . αἰρούμενοι, Weiske explains the participle, as if passive, "*infelicitèr ad aliquod negotium vel munus delecti.*" Bornemann thus renders, "*pluribus propositis rebus, quæ aut peragendæ sunt aut evitandæ, malam vel infelicem facientes optionem.*" Scil. διὰ τὸ ἐαυτοὺς ἢ τὴν ἐαυτῶν δύναμιν μὴ εἶδεναι.

⁴ Ζημιοῦνται τε καὶ κολάζονται. Ζημιοῦν = *damno aliquo*, ut *pecunia*, aliquem punire ob rem contra leges factam: κολάζειν = punire aliquem *verbis, verberibus*, &c. ad emendandum.—Kühn.

while those who were left behind on account of their weakness are preserved.—You speak the truth, said he, but do you see also, that the one by reason of their vigour, share also in the advantages, while the others fail to gain them by reason of their weakness?—Accordingly, whether should we rather pronounce to be blessings or evils those things which at one time benefit us, at another injure us?—That question is not quite clear, said he, according to this mode of argument.

33. But wisdom, Sokrates, is unquestionably a blessing, for what act will not the wise man perform better than the unwise?—What then? said Sokrates,¹ have you not heard of Dædalus,² how on account of his wisdom he was seized by Minos, and compelled to be his slave. And thus at the same time he was deprived both of his father-land and liberty: and when he attempted to fly from Minos together with his son, he lost his child and could not save himself, but was driven to Barbarians, and among them again was forced to be a slave?—Such indeed are the legends, said he.—And have you not heard of the calamities of Palamedes?³ for all sing of him, how he was destroyed by Odysseus through envy.—This is also related, said he.—How many others also, said he, do you suppose to have been carried to the Great king,⁴ in consequence of their wisdom, and exist there as his slaves?

34. Most likely, O Sokrates, happiness is an unquestionable good.—Yes, Euthydemus, if we do not consider as one of its ingredients any questionable good.—What! said he, can anything tending to happiness be

¹ This passage is remarkable for its Sokratic irony. Below, iv. 5, 6, where he utters his real sentiments, he calls σοφίαν, i. e. intelligence and wisdom, the summum bonum: and above, iii. 9, 5, he clearly states all virtue to be σοφία.

² See note upon i. 2, 13. And comp. Ovid. Met. viii. 159. Hygin. 39, 40.

³ Palamedes discovered the pretended madness of Odysseus and thus incurred his hatred: Odysseus accused him of treason, and succeeded in having him put to death by stoning.—Herbstius aptly compares Philostr. Heroic. p. 707. Παλαμήδην δὲ οὐδὲν ἢ σοφία ὤνησε τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἀποθανεῖν διαβληθόντα.

⁴ See note upon iii. 5, 26.

a questionable good?—No, said he, unless we attach to happiness as its elements, beauty, or strength, or riches, or reputation, or any other of such things.—But, by Jove, we must add these as elements: for how could we be happy without them all?

35. Well thus, by Jove, we will add as its constituents, things from which many severe disasters befall mankind. Since many for their beauty are ruined by those who are excited by passion¹ for their bloom of youth. And many, through confidence in their great strength, by undertaking works too great for them, involve themselves in no small disasters.—Many too, are destroyed, being enervated and plotted against, in consequence of their wealth; and many have suffered extraordinary disasters from their high reputation and power in the state.

36. Undoubtedly, said Euthydemus, if I do not speak rightly, even in praising happiness, I confess I do not know even what I ought to pray for from the gods.—Yet perhaps, said Sokrates, through your confident belief that you already knew these points, you have never examined them; but since you prepare yourself to be the chief minister of a democratic state, it is clear, that you know what is a Democracy.—Assuredly, said he.

37. Do you think it possible for one to know what is a democracy, if he know not what is the *Demus*?—By Jove, I do not.—What then do you think the *Demus* to be?—The poorer citizens—Do you know then who the poor are?—Why should I not?—Do you know then who the rich are?—Just as well as I know who are the poor.—Now what sort of persons do you say to be poor, what sort wealthy?—I think those who have not a sufficiency of means to pay² for the necessities of life, are poor; those who have more than a sufficiency, to be rich.

38. Have you ever perceived, that some who have

¹ Παρὰκινεῖν intransitively, means “to be excited,” influenced by sudden passion, *mente exciti*, i. e. *deliri, vesanum esse*.

² Τελεῖν, Sauppe refers to those citizens, who being enrolled in a particular class, pay the public taxes assigned upon that class. now since these are said τελεῖν εἰς τάξιν τινα, he takes the present

very trifling means indeed, find not only in them a sufficiency, but also from them make savings, whilst to others the largest sums are not sufficient?—I have indeed, said Euthydemus, for very properly you have reminded me : since I know certain tyrants who through absolute want, are compelled to commit injustice, as if they were the poorest.

39. Accordingly, said Sokrates, if this be so, we must class these tyrants among the Demus ; and those who possess but little, provided they be good managers, among the rich ?—Euthydemus then said, my ignorance doubtless, forces me to concede even to this ; and I am doubtful whether it would not be my best plan to be silent ; for the probability is, that I know absolutely nothing.

He went away very desponding, despising himself, and thinking that in reality he was a servile person.

40. Many persons who were reduced to this state of mind by Sokrates, no longer came to meet him ; and these he considered to be more foolish. But Euthydemus supposed that he could not become a man of honourable repute in any other way, save by associating with Sokrates as much as possible. He therefore never left his side unless it were absolutely necessary ; he imitated also some of his pursuits.

And when Sokrates perceived that he was thus affected, he no longer confounded him, but in the simplest¹ and clearest way declared to him all he considered he ought to know, and what he thought best for him to practise.

passage to mean the same as if it were written τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας τελεῖν εἰς ταῦτα εἰς ἃ δεῖ. KÜHNER takes the verb here, to mean simply "to pay," *solvere*, *pendere*, as above ii. 9, 1. ἀργύριον τελέσαι, (see 10, 6)—and εἰς ἃ δεῖ, "ad vitæ necessitatibus satisfaciendum."

¹ Ἀπλούστατα, "sine ulla dissimulatione," i. e. laying aside the character of the sophist, and no longer using irony.

CHAPTER III.

INTRODUCTION.—In the present chapter Sokrates teaches that temperance, (*σωφροσύνη*), that virtue which appeases the desires and keeps under restraint the passions, should be thoroughly learned, before one took any part in state affairs, either as an agent or an orator. But before all things, he taught his pupils to have proper views regarding the Deity.

The chief heads of his discourse are as follows :—

That the gods exercise providential care for man is plain, since they have provided all things he requires (3—9). Even other animals are created and preserved solely for human uses, (10). Besides the senses given to wild beasts, God has given to man reason and language, by which we can communicate our thoughts, and cultivate wisdom and utility. Even concerning secret events, the gods give us signs (11—12). Although the gods cannot be seen in person, yet they are understood by their works, and hence we should pay them due honour, (13—14), and these honours should be proportionate to our means.

1. SOKRATES was by no means urgent that his disciples should rapidly become powerful in speech or action, and of inventive genius;¹ but before these qualities were acquired he thought a spirit of self-control should be implanted.* For he thought that those who were powerful in the above qualities if devoid of self-control, were more inclined to injustice, and more able to commit wrong.

2. And he endeavoured in the first place to render his disciples discreet regarding the gods. Some accordingly who were present when he habitually conversed with others on this topic, related his words to me : and I also was present when he conversed with Euthydemus to the following effect.

3. Tell me, said he, O Euthydemus, did it ever occur to your mind to consider how very anxiously the gods have provided all things which men required ?—He answered,

² How Sokrates taught his pupils to be *πρακτικοί* will be related in chap. v.—how to be *διαλεκτικοί* in chap. vi. and how *μηχανικοί* chap. vii.

No, by Jove ; it has not.—But do you not know in the first place we stand in need of light, which the gods afford us ?—Yes, indeed ; said he, for if we had not that, we would be in the same predicament as the blind, as far as the use of our eyes is concerned.—And moreover they afford us who require rest, night, the most genial season of repose.—This, said he, calls for our gratitude.

4. And, he continued ; since the sun, being brilliant, distinguishes clearly the watches of the day,¹ and all other things: but night, in consequence of her gloom, is indistinct, do they not cause the stars to shine forth by night, which declare to us the watches of the night, and by this aid we effect many objects we need ?—This is the case, said he.—And further, the moon marks out clearly for us not only the divisions of the night, but those of the month also.—Certainly, said he.

5. And what of this, that since we require food they raise it for us from the earth; and for that purpose bless us with seasons, which ripen for us not only all things we absolutely need, many and various as they are, but even fruits which give us delight ?—These, said he, prove strong love for man.

6. What of this, that they should bestow on us water, so valuable to us, that it causes all things useful to us to spring forth, and unites with the earth and seasons in bringing them to maturity ; it helps also to nourish ourselves, and being mingled with all our nutriment renders it more easy of digestion, more nourishing and pleasant ; and since we require it in vast quantities, that they afford it to us most lavishly ?—This, said he, is an act of kindly providence.

7. And that they should provide us with fire also, an

¹ ὥρας, these were ὄρθρον, μεσημβρία, δέιλη, ἑσπέρα. The ὥρα, or "watch," in Xenophon's age, was the fourth part of the day, not the 24th part, as our "hour." Each of the latter was designated, from the sun dial, σημεῖον, or στοιχεῖον. The ὥραι of the night were the three "watches," φυλακαί. The best known δὲ which was the μεσονύκτιον. The ὥραι μηνός are mentioned below iv. 7, 4, i. e. τοῦ μηνός τὰ μέρη as here : these were the three decades ἱσταμένος, μεσοῦν, and φθίνων.—The ὥραι of the year, so often mentioned, are the "seasons."

aid to guard against the cold, a means of dispelling darkness, a co-agent for every art and in all things that men prepare for their advantage? For to speak briefly, of all things useful for life, men procure nothing of any value without the aid of fire?—This latter blessing, surpasses all the former, in proving love to man.

8. [And² that they should have so abundantly diffused the air around us everywhere, not only as a defence and support of life; but that seas should pervade through it, and that men from every quarter, and by sending to foreign lands, should thus procure what they require, is not this beyond all calculation?—It is unutterably so, said he.]—And that the sun, when in the winter tropic he turns towards us, should approach us to bring some things to maturity,³ and to dry up others whose season has passed away; and having effected these objects, should not approach too near, but turn his track away, lest by giving us more heat than need required he might injure us: and again, when in his departure he may arrive at that precise spot, when it is clear to us, that if he departed further we should be frozen by the cold, he again should turn to us and approach us; and that he should revolve in that precise spot in heaven, where remaining he could most benefit us?—By Jove, said he, this appears to have been ordained solely for the benefit of man.

9. And again, since it is evident, that we could not endure the heat or cold, if either should come upon us suddenly, that the Gods should have ordained the sun to approach us so gradually, and so gradually to retire that

² [Τὸ δὲ καὶ αἶρα, . . . ἀνέκφραστον]. This passage is preserved only in one manuscript, that of Meermann. It is by most critics supposed to be spurious. 1. From the use of the adverb ἀφθόρως, for which you would expect ἀφθονον. 2. The form of the aor. διαχῦσαι, is particularly suspected. 3. The expression πρόμαχον ζωῆς, is too affected for the simple style of Xenophon. 4. The words ἀλλὰ καὶ πελάγη περᾶν but ill agree with the preceding sentences. 5. The form ἀλλαχόθι is met with in no other passage.—In many MSS. there is a hiatus between τὸ δὲ καὶ αἶρα down to τὸ δὲ τὸν Ἥλιον, and it is supposed some scribe attempted to fill up the vacuum with the present passage.

³ Herbstius aptly compares Hom. Od. vii. 119, 199.

imperceptibly we find ourselves in the greatest intensity of both?—Said Euthydemus, I am thinking of this point, whether the gods can possibly have any other office than to serve men; but this alone embarrasses me, that all other animals participate in these advantages.

10. Yet is it not evident, said Sokrates, that all these animals are produced and nourished for the sake of man?¹ For what other animal reaps so many advantages from goats, and sheep, and horses and oxen, and asses, and other living creatures, as man? I think that men reap more advantage from these than from the fruits of the earth; at least they derive support, and amass money, no less from the former than the latter;² and a large class of men do not use the fruits of the earth for food, but pass their lives nourished only by the milk, and cheese, and flesh of cattle: and all men domesticate and train useful animals, and use them as assistants in war and other respects.—I agree with you, said he, in this, for I see animals much stronger than we are, become so tractable to man, that they can use them for any purpose they please.³

11. What think you of this, that since there are very many and beneficial objects, but differing in nature from one another, the gods should have conferred on man senses suitable for each of these, by means of which we enjoy all blessings? And that they should have implanted in us reasoning powers, by means of which discussing concerning sensible objects, and holding these discussions in memory, we learn how far each object may be beneficial; and we form many contrivances by means of which we enjoy all blessings and eschew all evils?

12. And that they should have given us faculty of speech, giving instruction by which we impart all blessings to each other, and communicate them, and also

¹ Ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκα. The same sentiment is expressed by Cicero, N. D. ii. 62.

² Ἀπὸ τούτων, i. e. ab animalibus, ἀπ' ἐκείνων, a plantis.

³ Ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται. Scil. χρῆσθαι, “ad quodcunque iis uti volunt.”—KÜHN.

enact laws and enjoy constitutional government?—In every way, Sokrates, the gods appear to exert the greatest concern for men.—And what of this, that if we be unable to foresee what is expedient regarding the future, in this they should assist us, by means of divination informing of future events, those who question them and teaching them, in what way these may on each occasion eventuate best?—O Sokrates, they appear to conduct themselves towards you even in a more friendly manner than towards others, since even without an inquiry, they previously indicate to you what it is right to do, and what not.

13. And that I state the truth, you yourself will experience, if you do not expect that you should see the bodily forms of the gods,⁴ but if it will satisfy you, when you consider their works, to venerate and honour the deities. Consider too, that it is in this unseen way the great gods indicate their will;⁵ for even the lesser divinities,⁶ when they give us blessings, do not present any of them, by coming forth to manifest view. And so THE ONE GOD who formed the universe,⁷ in which are all things beautiful and good, and who holds it together, and ever giveth to those who consult him, perfect, wholesome, and undecaying intimations, which quicker than thought unerringly assist us. HE, I say, is mentally seen by his performance of the mightiest

⁴ *Τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν.* Editors usually compare Cic. N. D. i. 12. "Xenophon . . . facit . . . in iis, quæ a Sokrate dicta retulit, Sokratem disputantem formam dei quæri non oporteri: eundemque et solem et animum deum dicere, et modo unum, tum autem plures deos."

⁵ *Ὅτως ὑποδεικνύουσιν,* Scil. "in divinatione formam dei quæri non oportere."—Κῆριν.

⁶ *Οἱ τε γὰρ ἄλλαι,* Sokrates and his followers, Plato, the Stoics, and Cicero, asserted that besides the one great and supreme God, there were other deities far inferior indeed to him, but yet infinitely superior to mortals in intelligence and power; and that the chief Deity used these as the agents and ministers in the government of the world.

⁷ The very name of the universe *κόσμος* denotes both its "beauty" and its "extent:" a similar meaning is embraced by the Latin "mundus."

actions, but is unseen by our bodily eyes, while he administereth them.¹

14. Reflect too that the sun which appears so brilliantly to all, submits not himself to be precisely seen by man, but if any one boldly attempts to gaze upon him, he deprives him of sight. You will find too that the ministers of God are unseen, for that the thunder is launched from above is clear, as also that it conquers every thing it meets with, but it is unseen, when it cometh, when it striketh, and when it departeth. The winds too are unseen, although their effects are manifest to us, and we perceive their coming.² Nay further, the soul of man, which, if any part of man does, partakes in the highest degree of the divine essence, that it lords over us is evident, but is itself unseen. It is right that one should bear these beings in mind, and not despise those unseen beings, but judging of his power from its results, should honour the divine nature.

15. O Sokrates, said Euthydemus, that I will not neglect the Deity even in a slight degree, I am fully determined; but I am disheartened at this feeling, that no man ever could with adequate gratitude requite the benevolence of heaven.

16. But do not be disheartened at this, O Euthydemus, said he: for you see that the god in Delphi, when one consults him how he would gratify the gods, answers, "by obedience to the cities ritual:"³ and doubtless it is the ritual every where to appease the gods with sacrifices to the best of our ability; how then could one more honourably or more piously honour the gods, than by acting as they themselves prescribe?

17. But it is right that we should not do less than our ability, for when any one should act thus, he evidently then does not duly respect the gods. It is

¹ We must remember that in this discussion, Sokrates does not intend to prove that the gods exist although they come not into our sight, but to teach us that the bodily form of the gods should not be expected to be rendered apparent by acts of divination.

² Ernesti remarks, that similarly in the sacred scriptures, thunder and tempests are called the ministers of God?

³ *Νόμος πόλεως*, see 1, 3, 1.

right accordingly, that he who fails not to honour the gods to the best of his ability, should be of good courage, and should hope for the greatest blessings. For no one would be wise, who should hope for greater blessings, from any others, than from those who are able to benefit in the highest degree : nor could one be more wise in any way than by pleasing them. And how could one please them more effectually, than by yielding the greatest obedience to them ?

18. By expressing such sentiments, and by personally acting in this way, he rendered his disciples more pious and more wise.

CHAPTER IV.

INTRODUCTION.—In the preceding chapter the views of Sokrates regarding the proper method of considering the nature of God (*σωφροσύνη περὶ θεοῦ*) is explained: Xenophon now declares, how both by instruction, example, and life, Sokrates inspired his disciples with proper sentiments regarding justice, (*σωφροσύνην περὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης*). First, a statement is made regarding the justice of his own conduct in life: and next, his principles regarding that virtue are disclosed in his discussion with the Sophist Hippias.

1. CONCERNING justice also, he never concealed the sentiments he entertained, but declared them also by his acts, by conducting himself in his private capacity in accordance with law, and usefully; and in his public capacity being ever obedient to the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined both in the city and on military expeditions, to such a degree, that in comparison with all others he was pre-eminently obedient to discipline.

2. And also, when he was Epistates in the public assembly,¹ he did not permit the people to give their votes in opposition to the law, but in his defence of the laws opposed such violent passion of the populace, as I do not think any other living man could withstand.

3. When the Thirty Tyrants also enjoined on him any order in opposition to the law, he did not obey them: for both when they frequently enjoined him not to hold conversation with the young, and on one occasion ordered him and some other citizens to lead back to the city a certain individual² to be put to death, he alone yielded not obedience, because the command which was imposed on him, was contrary to law.

¹ This incident is mentioned more fully above, i. 1, 18.

² This individual was Leon, a Salaminian, but who was an engaged citizen of Athens. He had gone into Salamis, from Athens, as a voluntary exile, lest he should be put to death by the Tyrants, who thought the best method to acquire men's wealth, was to put to death its rightful owners.

4. And when he was defendant in the action brought by Meletus,³ although others on their trial habitually spoke so as to gain the favour of the judges, and flattered them, and made entreaty contrary to the laws, and by means of such practices many persons had often been acquitted by the Dikasts, he did not wish to do anything in violation of the laws,⁴ however usual, before the court. Nay, though he would at once have been acquitted by his judges, had he even in a slight degree adopted any of these practices, he preferred rather to die abiding by the laws, than to live by their violation.

5. Many a time he spoke to this effect with others, but I was a witness to a discussion of the following nature, which he held with Hippias of Elea⁵ regarding justice. For Hippias returning to Attica after an interval of time⁶ met Sokrates as he was remarking to some person, how strange it was, that any one desirous to have another trained to be a shoemaker, or architect, or smith, or horseman, could not be at a loss where he should send him and thus obtain his object. And also, that many say that every place is full of individuals, who teach how to train a horse, or ox, to be subservient to the rein of any one.⁷ While if any person should

³ Concerning the accusers of Sokrates, see above, i. 1. 1.

⁴ A regular law of Athens prevented defendants having recourse to prayers, entreaties, or artifice; compare Pollux. viii. 117, concerning the Areopagus: προσιμιάζεσθαι οὐκ ὀκνέειν οὐδὲ οἰκτίζεισθαι.

⁵ Hippias was the most celebrated sophist of the age, and is well known to most readers from the Dialogues of Plato. There is a remarkable passage concerning him in Quinctil. xii. 11, 21, "ut Eleum Hippiam transeam, qui non liberalium modo disciplinarum præ se scientiam tulit, sed vestem et annulum crepidasque, quæ omnia manu sua fecerat, in usu habuit."

⁶ Hippias, as the succeeding passages prove, had then arrived for the second time at Athens. His powers of oratory had caused him to be employed on various embassies, in this occupation he had arrived at Athens.

⁷ Δικαίους, "Egregie autem Xenophon didit δικάιους, non usûs alio quodam vocabulo, quia hic de δικαιοσύνη sermo est, et λεπέλε ludit ambigua vocis significatione, cum sit *justus et idoneus*,"—VOIGTLANDER.

wish either to learn justice himself, or get his son or his domestic instructed in it, they said they knew not where he should go so as to succeed in his desire.

6. And Hippias hearing these sentiments, as if to jeer him, said : O Sokrates, are you still repeating the same identical expressions, which a long time ago I heard from you?—And Sokrates replied, what is still more strange, Hippias, I not only always state the same things, but also concerning the same topics : but you, perhaps, from your extensive learning, never state the same thing concerning the same subject.—Undoubtedly, said Hippias, I do always endeavour to speak something novel.

7. Regarding matters of which you have scientific knowledge, as for instance, concerning letters, if any one were to ask you how many letters and what sort make up the name Sokrates,¹ whether would you mention one class of letters at one time, and now try to mention another kind? Or regarding numbers, to those who asked you, whether twice five made ten, would you not give the same answer now which you did before?—Regarding these subjects, Sokrates, like yourself, I also always give the same answer : however, regarding justice I fancy that now I am able to make a statement, which neither you or any other can gainsay.

8. By Hera, said Sokrates, you mention your discovery of a very important advantage, if the Dikasts will cease giving contradictory votes, and the citizens will cease to dispute regarding justice, and no longer be parties in suits of law, or be distracted by factions : and if cities will cease to be at strife and war regarding their just rights. For my part, I know not how I can let you go, until I have heard this great advantage from its discoverer.

9. But, by Jove, he replied, you shall not hear it, until you first shall declare, what you consider justice to be : for it is quite enough that you deride others, by

¹ Ὅσα καὶ πῶς Σωκράτους ἐστὶν “*quot et qualis literæ sint in nomine Sokratis*.” The same example is used by Plato, *Alkib.* i. p. 113, A.

asking questions and confuting all,² while you yourself never wish to submit a statement, or declare your own opinion regarding anything.

10. What! said he, O Hippias, 'do you not know that I never cease demonstrating what I conceive to be justice?—And what pray, asked Hippias, may this definition of yours be?—If I do not demonstrate it by word, said he, I do by acts: and do you not think that acts are more convincing proof than words?—Far more convincing, indeed, said he, for very many who speak justly, act unjustly, but no one who acts justly, could be unjust.

11. Have you ever known of my bearing false witness, or bringing a malicious accusation, or involving my friends or the city in sedition, or doing any other unjust thing?—I have not, said he.—Do you not consider it justice to refrain from injustice?—You are clearly now, Sokrates, endeavouring to avoid declaring your opinion, as to what you think to be justice, for not what the just do, but what they do not, you state in these words.

12. But I for my part thought, said Sokrates, that a disinclination to commit injustice was a sufficient proof of justice: but if you do not think thus, consider whether this will please you better, for I assert that what is conformable to law is just.—What! do you assert this, Sokrates, that what is legal is also just?—I do indeed, said he.

13. Well, I do not understand you, as to what is the nature of things you mean by legal, or what by just. —Do you know³ the "laws of the city?" said he.—I do, replied Hippias.—What do you consider these to be?—What the citizens compiling, have written out, as to what one ought to do, and what to avoid doing. Accordingly he would be a lawful person who conducted himself in the city according to them, and lawless he who transgresses them.—Certainly, said he.—Therefore he

² Concerning the usual mode of disputation, pursued by Sokrates, see Proleg.

³ Γινώσκειν, "non solum est *cognoscere*, sed etiam, *nosse*, h. e. actio cognoscendi e præterito tempore pertingit ad præsens."—Künz.

who acts in obedience to them, acts with justice, and he who disobeys them, with injustice?—Undoubtedly, said he.—Accordingly he who does what is just, is just; he who does what is unjust, is unjust? why not?—Accordingly the lawful man is just, the lawless, unjust.

11. Then Hippias said, O Sokrates, how could one think the laws, or obedience to them, to be a matter of importance, since frequently, the very persons who enacted them, reject and alter them?—Well, so do cities which commence war: they frequently make peace again, said Sokrates.—Assuredly, they do.—And what difference is there between your censuring those who are obedient to the law, on the ground that these laws may be annulled: and reproaching those who are admirably disciplined in war, because peace may possibly be made? or do you really blame those who zealously aid their country in time of war?—By Jove, I do not, replied Hippias.

15. Do you not know, said Sokrates, that Lycurgus of Lacedæmon made Sparta in no other respect superior to other cities, than by imbuing it with a spirit of obedience to the laws, above all others? Are you not aware, that of the magistrates in cities those are considered best, who may most effectually cause their citizens to be obedient to the law? does not that city whose citizens are most obedient to the laws, pass most happily the season of peace? is it not most irresistible in war?

16. Yet unanimity¹ also appears to states to be the greatest blessing: and most frequently in these states, the elders and leading men, exhort their citizens to harmony: and every where, throughout all Hellas, it is an established custom, that the citizens should take an oath to observe unanimity: yet I think that all this is done, not that all the citizens may give the victory to the same chorus,² or praise the same flute players, or

¹ The reasoning is this, "Concord which is acknowledged to be the greatest preservative of a state, consists in nothing else but the observance of the laws."

² *Κρίνομεν*, i. e. that all should unanimously give the victory to the same choruses: "Notioni eligendi facile admisceatur notio probandi."—Kuhn.

prefer³ the same poets, nor be delighted in the same things, but that they may yield obedience to the laws. For as long as the citizens abide by these, the cities themselves are most strong and happy; but without unanimity, neither can a city be well governed, nor a family prosperously managed.

17. And in a private capacity, by what means could one render himself less liable to be fined by the city, or more likely to meet with honour, than by his being obedient to the law? How else would he meet with fewer defeats in the courts of justice, or how prevail more often. In whom would one repose more confidence by entrusting his money, sons, or daughters? whom would the city deem more worthy of faith than the man who obeys the law? From whom rather would parents, or connexions, or domestics, or friends, or citizens, or strangers obtain justice? In whom would the enemy repose greater trust regarding truces, or treaties or compacts concerning peace? To whom do men prefer to be allies, than to the law-observing man? to whom with more trust would allies confide the leadership, or command of fortresses, or cities? from whom would one expect to meet with gratitude, when he has conferred a favour, rather than from the law-observing man? Or whom would one prefer to serve, than him from whom he thinks he will meet with a grateful requital? To whom would one more wish to be a friend, and less desire to be a foe, than to such a character? On whom would any be less likely to war, than on him to whom he would most prefer to be a friend and least of all an enemy? one to whom the majority would desire to be friends and allies, and the fewest be inclined to be enemies or foes?

18. I accordingly, O Hippias, shew the legal, and the just to be the same: now if you know anything to contradict this, impart it.—And Hippias replied, by Jove, Sokrates, I do not think I hold any sentiments to contradict what you have spoken regarding justice.

19. Do you know that there are certain unwritten laws, Hippias?—Yes, those which have the force of law

³ *Αἰρῶνται* “ut iisdem poetis præmia decernant in ludis scenicis Baccho sacris.”—SCHNEID.

in every land, regarding the same points.—Can you assert, then, that men enacted these?¹—How could they, replied Hippias, since they could not all convene together, and are of divers languages?—Whom then do you consider to have enacted these laws?—I believe that the gods have enacted these laws for man: for amongst all mankind, the first natural law is to venerate the gods.

20. Is it not the established law every where, to respect one's parents?—This also is the law, said he.—And that parents should not have improper intercourse with their children, or children with their parents?—This Sokrates, does not appear to me, to be a law of God.—Why pray? asked Sokrates.—Because, he replied, I see some nations which transgress this.

21. Well, and so they break the law in many other points: but all who violate the laws laid down by God,² suffer a punishment which it is not possible for man to escape, in the way that some who have transgressed laws laid down by man occasionally escape punishment, partly by escaping notice, partly by violence.

22. What punishment is there which they cannot escape, who as parents have intercourse with their children, or as children with their parents?—The greatest of all, by Jove: for what greater punishment could parents suffer, than to be producers of a wretched progeny?

23. How pray, said he, can those be parents of a wretched offspring, when there is nothing to prevent their being goodly themselves, and to beget children from goodly persons?—Because, by Jove, not only should parents who beget children from each other, be goodly, but also in the full vigour of their age.³ Or

¹ ἔθεντο "Homines dicuntur θεῖσθαι νόμους, quia sibi met ipsis constituent: dii autem θεῖναι, quia aliis, scil. hominibus."—ERNESTI.

² ὑπὸ θεῶν κειμένους, "a diis latos." See KÜHN. Gr. Gr. T. ii. § 392, b,

³ One may well wonder at the strangeness of the arguments of Sokrates, who here adduces nothing against so incestuous an intercourse except the difference of years. Weiske considers that the mutual duties of parents and children do more to prevent such alliances than the difference of age: but more likely they are prevented by a natural and instructive abhorrence for such unions, indiginate in humanity, since we see that even beasts avoid them.

do you think that the seed of those who have already reached their prime vigour, is congenial⁴ to that of those who have not yet reached their prime, or that of those who have long passed it?—By Jove, replied Hippias, it is not likely it should be congenial.—Which then is better? asked Sokrates.—Clearly that of those in their prime vigour.—Is not that of persons not yet in their prime energetic?—It is not likely to be so.—Surely, therefore it is not right to become parents under such circumstances?—Doubtless not, he replied.—Therefore, they who have thus become parents, beget children in a manner they should not.—So I think, said he.—What other then, said he, become parents improperly, if these do not?—I agree with you, said Hippias, in this point also.

24. What? Is there not every where a virtual law to benefit in turn those who benefit us?—It is the law, said he, but this is frequently transgressed!—And accordingly those who transgress it suffer punishment, in being deprived of valuable friends, and being compelled to seek the aid of those who detest them. And are not those who benefit others, who thus experience their kindness, good friends to themselves? and are not those who do not in turn requite such persons, hated by them for their ingratitude? and yet, on account of the great advantage obtained by intimacy with such characters, do they not seek their acquaintance above that of all others?—Most truly, Sokrates, replied Hippias, all this seems to suit the character of the deities. For that the laws themselves, should in themselves involve penalties on transgressors, appears to me the part of a far better legislator than any human being.

25. Whether then, Hippias, do you consider the gods to enact by these laws, justice, or what is different from justice?—Not by any means what is different from justice, he replied, for scarcely could any other lay down justice in his laws as their peculiar object, save the Deity.—Therefore, Hippias, it pleases the

⁴ Σπουδαία, “semina ad robustos liberos procreandos idonea.”

gods, that what is just, and what is legal, should be considered the same thing.¹

In delivering such sentiments and by carrying them into practice, he rendered his disciples more just.

1 LANG lays down the following as the connexion of the argument, "The gods give just laws—whatever is in accordance with these laws, is νόμιμον:—Therefore every act which is νόμιμον in the divine laws, is δίκαιον.—Therefore in this definition the gods agree with men or with me. For above § 12, Sokrates had said that even in human laws νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι: and rightly too, if human laws were understood to be, such as they ought in fact to be, *i. e.* wholly in accordance with the natural or divine laws."

CHAPTER V.

INTRODUCTION.—In this chapter Xenophon relates how Sokrates rendered his pupils *πρακτικωτέρους*, not absolutely *πρακτικούς*. Sokrates desired not to teach fully the arts of war or peace, but merely to lay down certain rules by the adoption of which, men could better fulfil their duties in either state.

Temperance (*ἐγκράτεια*, self-restraint) he states to be the supreme law of all actions, and should consequently be the foundation of all. He taught this virtue, therefore, not only by example, but by precepts. The heads of his doctrine in this respect are laid down in a discourse with Euthydemus.

1. BY what methods he rendered his associates, more fit for business, I will now mention. Forasmuch as he considered self-control to be the greatest advantage² to one likely to perform any thing excellent, first by his example he shewed to all his pupils that he practised this virtue beyond all other men; and secondly, by his discussions he urged his pupils to self-control even beyond all other virtues.³ Always, therefore, he continued to be mindful himself of every thing tending to virtue, and to remind his disciples of them.

2. But I remember his having discussed with Euthydemus on the subject of self-control, to the following effect.—Tell me, said he, Euthydemus, do you consider liberty to be an honourable and noble profession for an individual or a state!—To the greatest degree, he replied.

3. He then who is held subject by the pleasures of the body, and by reason of these is not able to execute what is best, do you consider him to be free!—By no means, said he.—Perhaps you consider liberty to consist in doing what is best, and accordingly he who is influenced by powers which hinder his effecting these, you consider not to be free!—By all means, said he.

² The order of the Greek construction is *νομίζων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὑπάρχειν ἐγκράτειαν*.

³ Πάντων μάλιστα, “πάντων neutrum est et non ad subjectum, sed ad objectum πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν referendum est: Sokrates inter omnes res maxime ad continentiam adhortabatur.”—Künn.

4. Do not, therefore, the intemperate appear to you absolutely to be without freedom?—Yes, by Jove, and deservedly.—Whether do the intemperate appear to you merely to be prevented from doing what is best, or also to be compelled to perpetrate the basest actions?—They appear to me, said he, to be compelled to do the latter, no less, than they are prevented from doing the former.

5. What sort do you consider those masters to be, who prevent the execution of what is best, and force to the accomplishment of what is worst?—The basest that can be, said he.—What species of slavery do you think the basest?—That which is imposed by the basest masters.—Are not the intemperate, therefore, slaves, in the very worst slavery?—So I think, said he.

6. Does not intemperance seem to you to eradicate from men, wisdom, the greatest good, and to impel them to the contrary? Or does she not seem to prevent our attention to what will benefit us, and hinder our perception of that, by drawing us away to pleasure? and oftentimes to strike with perturbation¹ those who do know the difference between right and wrong, and thus compel them to prefer the worst in preference to the better?—This is the case, said he.

7. To whom, Euthydemus, should we say that temperance was less suitable than to the man without self-control? for assuredly, the works of temperance and intemperance are directly opposite.²—I agree in this, said he.—Do you think that any thing hinders to a greater degree the concern for what is becoming, than intemperance?—Surely not, said he.—And do you think any greater evil can come on man, than that which urges him to prefer the prejudicial to the useful; and to pursue the former eagerly, and to neglect the latter; and, in fine, forces him to pursue conduct opposed to that which wise men pursue?—There is no greater evil, said he.

¹ Ἐκπλήξασα, “ἐκπλήττειν omnino est aliquem vehementer movere et percellere, ut quasi extra se rapiatur, sic. Symp. iv. 23, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἔρωτος ἐκπλαγόντα.

² Ἀλλά, &c. The order of construction is σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκρασίας ἔργα (the subject) ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ ἐναντία (prædicate.)

8. Is it not reasonable then, that self control should be the cause to men of what is opposite to the effects of intemperance?—Altogether so, said he. —Is it not reasonable that the cause of such opposites should be the best?—It is reasonable, said he.—Is it therefore reasonable, O Euthydemus, that self-control should be the best thing for man? It is reasonable indeed, Sokrates, replied Euthydemus.

9. Have you ever considered this point, Euthydemus?—What point? said he.—That intemperance is not able to lead men even to pleasure, the only thing to which she seems to lead them; while temperance causes us to have greater pleasure than any thing else.—How so? said he.—Because intemperance, by not permitting men to bear up against hunger, or thirst, or desire, or wakefulness, (by reason of which deprivations alone, men really enjoy food, and drink, or love, and cease from toil, and indulge in sleep with pleasure; waiting and holding out until these objects become as delightful as possible) in reality prevents our having any enjoyment worth mention, in pleasures which are necessary and continual.³ But temperance alone by causing men to endure the deprivations I have mentioned, alone also causes that we should have any enjoyment worth mention, in the objects stated.—You speak what is indubitably true, said he.

10. Nay, moreover, intemperance is an obstacle to our learning any thing honourable or good, and to our practice of any pursuit by which one could well regulate his own body, or admirably manage his household, or become useful to his friends and his state, or master his enemies. Yet from such things not only the greatest utilities but also the greatest pleasures are derived. For the temperate by effecting such advantages, enjoy their fruits, while the intemperate have share in no advantage. For who could properly be said to have less right to participate in such things, than they, who are not allowed to effect

³ Τοῖς ἀναγκασιότατοις τε καὶ συνεχεύουσιν, i. e. pleasures which are necessary, as being natural, and constantly recurring, as the desire of food, drink, sleep, &c.

such actions, wholly influenced by a craving anxiety for immediate pleasures?

11. And Euthydemus said, You seem to me, Sokrates, to say, that he who is subservient to bodily pleasures, has no connection with any one virtue.—Yes; he replied; for what difference is there between an intemperate man and the most ignorant brute? For how will he differ from the cattle, devoid of understanding, who never regards what is best and seeks only to effect pleasure by any means? The temperate alone have the privilege of considering what is most excellent in human affairs; and by separating them, both by word and act into classes, to embrace the good and avoid the evil.

12. And thus, said he, men become most excellent and happy, and most able to discuss; for he said, that the term “TO DISCUSS,”¹ was derived from deliberating in common, and separating objects into classes. It was the duty of every one, he said, to render himself most ready at this, and to study this above all things. For from this art men became most excellent, most worthy of command, and most skilled in argument.

¹ Διαλέγεσθαι est *cum altero disputando, bona a malis, vera a falsis discernere*; ita quidem ut rerum notionēs indagentur et explanentur.—KÜHN. See the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

INTRODUCTION.—Sokrates instructed his disciples to reason well and on right principles. He thought that those who had distinct and settled ideas of things, could well communicate them with others. This art of reasoning consisted in investigation and definition of the essential properties of things or virtues.

The examples of Sokratic definition here given, are of PIETY, (2—4).—JUSTICE (5—6).—WISDOM (*σοφία* 7.) —THE GOOD AND BEAUTIFUL (8—9).—MANLINESS (10—11).—Then follow definitions of MONARCHY, TYRANNY, PLUTOCRACY, DEMOCRACY, &c.; and some hints regarding his usual method of disputation.

1. By what means he rendered his disciples more skilful in argument, I will now endeavour to mention. For Sokrates considered, that if men knew what might be the essential nature of each thing, they would be able also to explain this to others; but if men did not know this, he said it was no wonder that they erred themselves, and caused others to err also. Therefore he never ceased to consider with his disciples, what might be the essence of each thing. It would be a long task indeed, to go through all the objects he defined: but as much as will be sufficient to shew the method of his investigation, so much will I mention.

2. Firstly then, he somehow thus investigated regarding PIETY. Tell me, said he, Euthydemus: what sort of feeling do you consider piety to be?—He replied; the fairest in the world.—Can you tell me then, what sort of a character the pious man is?—I think, said he, the man who honours the gods.—Is it allowable to honour the gods in any way one pleases?—No; he replied, but there are certain laws, in accordance with which it is necessary to do so.

3. He therefore who observes these laws, would naturally know, how one ought to honour the gods?—I think so, said he.—He who knows how to honour the gods, will not think it right to do so in any other way, than as he knows?—Doubtless not, said he. Besides does any one honour the gods in any other way than as he thinks he should?—I do not think so, said he.

4. He therefore who knows what conduct is legitimate towards the gods, will honour the gods legitimately?—Certainly, said he.—He who honours them legitimately, honours them as he ought?—Why not?—And he who honours them as he ought, is pious?—Assuredly, said he.—Therefore, he who knows what conduct is legitimate towards the gods, would be correctly defined by us,¹ to be the pious man?—So I think, said Euthydemus.

5. Pray is it lawful to conduct oneself towards men, in the manner any one pleases?—No:—But since among these also, he who knows what line of conduct is legitimate, (in strict accordance with which men should act towards each other), will be a lawful person; will not those therefore who conduct themselves towards each other in accordance with this, conduct themselves as they ought?—Why not? said he.—They who conduct themselves as they ought, do they not also conduct themselves well?—Certainly, said he.—They who conduct themselves towards men well, will they not also well conduct all matters of which men are the object?—Surely, said he.

6. Do those who act as the laws direct, act justly?—Certainly, said he.—Do you know then, what sort of acts are called just?—Acts which the laws order, said he.—Therefore, those who act as the laws order, do what is just and as they ought?—Yes, said he; how not?—They who do what is just, are not they themselves just?²

¹ ἡμῶν = "*nostro judicio*."

² This clause has been omitted by several critics, as it is repeated below. LANG and KEHNER restore it, the former asserting that for two reasons it should be restored—1, because it contains the middle term of the syllogism; and 2, because it occurs in all MSS. The line of argument in the first syllogism is as follows.

MAJOR. They who do what is legitimate towards their fellow men, do what is just.

MIN. They who do what is just, are just.

CONCL. Therefore, they who do what is legitimate towards their fellow men, are just.

*The second syllogism runs thus:—

MAJOR. They who know what is just, (necessarily) do what is just (iii. 9, 4.)

MIN. They who do what is just, are just.

CONCL. Therefore, they are just, who know what is just.

I think so, said he.—Do you think that any yield obedience to the laws, unless they know what the laws order?—I do not, said he.—Do you suppose that any of those who know what they ought to do, think that they should not do them?—I do not, said he.—Do you know any persons who act in a manner different from what they think they ought?—I do not: said he.—Accordingly, those who know what acts are legal among mankind, do these acts which are just?—By all means, said he.—And are not they therefore just men, who do what is just?—Who others can be so? said he.—Will we then be right in our definition, if we define just men to be those who know what conduct is legal as regards men?—I think so, replied Euthydemus.

7. What now shall we define WISDOM to be? Tell me, regarding those who seem to you to be wise, are they wise as concerns what they scientifically know, or are there any men, wise in that which they do not scientifically know?—They are wise in what they know, clearly, said he: for how could one be wise in that which he does not know?—Are the wise, then, wise by their knowledge?—By what else could a man be wise, except by his knowledge?—Do you think that wisdom can be anything else, than that by virtue of which men are wise?³—I do not, said he.—Knowledge, therefore, is wisdom?—So I deem, said he.—Do you think that any one man can know all things that be?—No, by Jove, nor even a comparatively small portion of them.—It is not possible then, that a man can be wise, on every subject.—No, assuredly; said he.—Each then is wise, in that of which he has scientific knowledge?—So I think, said he.

8. Should we then, thus examine the question regarding GOOD.—In what way? said he.—Do you think the same thing is beneficial to all?—I do not, said he.—What then? asked Sokrates; does not that which is beneficial to one, appear to you to be prejudicial to another?—Very much so; said he.—Would you say

³ "ἢ σοφοί εἰσιν, "Num vero putas quiddam aliud esse sapientiam, quam quo homines sapientes sunt."—LEUNCL.

that anything else was good, except what was beneficial? I cannot, said he.—Therefore what is in itself beneficial is a good to him to whom it may be beneficial?—So I believe, said he.

9. Can we define the beautiful in any other way, than just as we usually call the person beautiful, or a vase or any other thing which you know to be beautiful, if any thing beautiful exists.¹—I cannot, indeed: said he.—Will it not, then, be also beautiful to use each thing for that purpose to which each severally may be useful?—Certainly; said he.—Can each thing be beautiful with regard to anything else, than that with reference to which it will be beautiful to use each thing?—It can be beautiful with regard to nothing else; said he.—That which is useful therefore, is beautiful, as regards that for which it may be useful?—So I think; said he.

10. O Euthydemus, do you enumerate manliness, among the beautiful?—I think it the most beautiful thing, said he.—You consider manliness, therefore, to be useful for not the least important matters?—I think it useful for those of the highest importance, said he.—Do you think, with reference to terrible and perilous things that it is useful to be ignorant of their real nature?—By no means: said he.—Accordingly, men who do not fear such things, because they do not know their nature, are not to be called manly?—No, by Jove: said he.—For if so, many mad men, and even cowards would be manly.—What then of those who fear things not terrible in their nature?—Still less should they be called manly.—Those therefore who are good with respect to terrible or dangerous things, you consider to be manly; and those who are evil concerning the same, to be cowards?—Assuredly, said he.

11. Do you consider any other persons to be good with reference to such objects, than those who are able

¹ ἢ, τί ἐστίν, ὀνομάζουσιν. It is quite useless here to give the various conjectures of critics upon this passage. LANG retains the old MSS. reading, and thus explains "Num possumus pulchrum aliter [ac bonum] definire, an pulchrum vocas, si quid pulchrum est (τί ἐστίν) vel corpus, vel vas, vel aliudquid, quod ad quancunque rem (πρὸς πάντα) pulchrum est?" and so KÜNNER.

to manage them well?—No; these alone, said he.—Cowards, therefore, you deem those, who manage such things badly?—Whom else; said he.—Do not each manage them as they think they ought?—How else, said he.—Do they, who are not able to manage them rightly, know how they ought to manage them?—Doubtless not, said he.—Have they, then, who know how to manage these things well, ability to do so likewise?—They alone have ability, said he. What then? do they who fail not in their attempts, manage these matters badly? I do not think so, said he.—Do they then, who manage these badly, fail in their attempts?—It is natural they should, said he.—Accordingly they who know how admirably to manage matters dangerous and perilous, these are manly; while they who fail in this, are cowards?—So I think, said he.

12. Monarchy and Tyranny, he considered to be both species of command, but yet to differ widely from each other. For he considered monarchy to be command over men with their own consent, and according to the laws of the several free states.² But Tyranny to be command held against the will of the people, and not in accordance with the laws, but just as the ruler pleased. And wheresoever magistrates were appointed out of those who performed what was enjoined on them by law,³ that form of government he called an Aristocracy; when appointed according to property, he called the government a Plutocracy; when from the whole people, a Democracy.

13. And if any one were to oppose him regarding any statement, who had nothing definite to say, and who, without proof, asserted, that some other person

² *Τῶν πόλεων*, not *states* simply, but *free states*. Thus in the opinion of Socrates, Athens under the rule of Aristides and Themistokles was a kingdom (*βασιλεία*) since these statesmen were endowed with supreme authority, and yet held rule by the consent of their citizens and in accordance with the law. On the other hand, in the time of Kleon or Alkibiades, Athens was under a tyranny. •

³ *Ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτιθέμενων* “ex iis, qui civitatis leges rite explicit.”—Xenophon, or Socrates, had Sparta in view when giving this definition.

whom he mentioned, was wiser, or more skilled in public life, or more manly, or superior in any such other quality, he used to recall the whole statement to the proper subject of discussion in the following manner.

14. You assert that the individual whom you praise, is a better citizen, than the person I recommend. What then? must we not first examine what are the works of a worthy citizen?—Let us do so.—Accordingly, as far as administration of state monies is concerned, will he not be superior who renders the state more affluent?—Certainly; said he.—And in war, the man who renders it superior to its foes?—Why not?—And in embassies, he who maketh friends of enemies?—Naturally, said he.—And in addressing the populace, he who checks sedition, and inspireth harmony?—So I think, said he.—And so, when the arguments were brought back to the point, the truth became evident even to the person who had contradicted him.

15. And whensoever in argument he would go through any topic, he commenced by statements most universally acknowledged, thinking this to be the stability of reasoning. And so, far more than any man I know, he rendered his hearers of the same opinion with himself. He used to say, that Homer attributed to Odysseus the character of a “cautious orator,” as being able, by adducing points well acknowledged among men, from that basis to form his speeches.

CHAPTER VII.

INTRODUCTION.—Xenophon describes how Sokrates rendered his followers *μυχανικοὺς*, *i. e.* more full of contrivance and expertness in action. He wished that they should be sufficiently able, without others aid, to perform the various duties of life. Hence he teaches merely as much of each art, as he considered would be necessary. Geometry, Astronomy, and Arithmetic, he considered should only be learned, as far as was practically useful. Too deep an investigation he thought to be useless and even prejudicial. Above all he dissuaded his pupils from subtle investigations regarding celestial objects, or the intentions of the Deity regarding them. He urges that they should take especial care of their health, and thus avoid the necessity for a physician. If one sought knowledge above human wisdom he should avail himself of divination.

It may appear strange why Sokrates should thus limit the pursuit of science, especially when he had himself pursued it deeply. But it must be remembered, that the sole object of Sokrates was to reform and amend the moral conduct of men, to render the youth good and useful citizens; he limited therefore the studies of the sciences by what was practically useful in life, and what would not prevent the study of other things at least as useful. It is very probable also that Sokrates spoke thus to the generality of the youth; and that if a few, of minds framed to understand and pursue these sciences had formed his auditory, he would have given very different counsel. For above all men, Sokrates could suit his language and his precepts to men of every capacity and of every taste. He discussed with Xenophon, in a very different way, from that which he adopted in his discourses with Plato.

I. From what I have already stated it appears clear, that Sokrates without disguise declared his real sentiments to those who associated with him; but that he took diligent care to render his disciples of sufficient ability for actions suited to their powers, I will now state. For above all men whom I am acquainted with, his especial object was to know in what particular employment any of his pupils was likely to be skilful. Of all the knowledge, which befits an honourable and educated man, whatsoever he knew himself, he taught more zeal-

¹ *Ἀντάρκτις ἐν ταῖς προσηκούσαις πράξεσιν* “*qui ipsi, sine aliorum ope, ad officia sibi commissa rite explenda idonei sunt.*”—*Kühn.*

lously than any other, and for whatsoever he was himself inexperienced in, he used to bring his pupils to those who knew them well.

2. He taught also to what degree, a well-educated man should be versed in any science.¹ For instance;² he said that one should learn Geometry so far, as that he should be capable, if ever he had occasion, to receive land accurately by measurement, or hand it over to another, or to divide it into portions, or mark it out for tillage.³ And he said, it was so easy to learn this much, that whosoever gave his attention to the principles of measurement, and also knew the dimensions of the earth, might cease to learn farther,⁴ as being then skilled enough in the method of measuring it.

3. But he wholly disapproved of studying Geometry up to unintelligible diagrams: for, he said, he did not see, how these could profit one, (and yet he was by no means inexperienced in such investigations):⁵ and he said, that such minute studies would wear out the whole life of man, and prevent his learning many other and beneficial sciences.

4. He urged men also to learn Astronomy;⁶ and yet even this science, only so far as to understand the periods of night,⁷ and the month, and the year, for the purpose of travelling by land or sea, or watch and ward; and all things which are executed by the night, or month, or year. And men should be able to use certain indications of these, while they marked out the periods of the seasons stated. He said it would be very easy to obtain this much knowledge from those who hunted by

¹ Πράγματος "negotii ex doctrina et scientia pendentis."—SCHNEID.

² Ἀντίκα, "exempli gratia," for this meaning see Ruhnck. Tim. Lex. p. 56.—Cypri. i. 6, 9, iii. 1. 29.—Zeu. Vig. p. 393.

³ Ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι, "opus delineare."—LANG. Ἀγρὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐργάζεσθαι.—CORAY "Ad opus faciendum agri portionem assignare."—ERNESTI.

⁴ Ἀπείναι, "ut apud Latinos victorem discedere," to succeed in knowing.

⁵ Sokrates had Theodorus of Cyrene as his instructor in Geometry. See above, iv. 2, 10.

⁶ Ἀστρολογίας, see above, iv. 2, 10.

⁷ For the meaning of ὥρα, see above, iv. 3, 4.

night,⁸ and from pilots, or others whose business it was to know these things.

5. But to learn Astronomy so minutely, as to know what objects are not in the same periphery⁹ with the sphere, and the planets, and unsettled stars,¹⁰ and their distances from the earth, and period of their orbits,¹¹ and to spend our time seeking to know the causes of all this, he strongly forbid. For, though he was by no means unacquainted with these investigations,¹² he said, he saw no use in them: and that their study would wear out the life of man, and prevent his learning many useful sciences.

6. And regarding celestial matters, he dissuaded his disciples from becoming subtle speculators regarding the way the Deity contrived each of them. For he considered that this could never be discovered by man; nor did he believe that any one acted gratefully to God who scrutinized such points as He did not wish to make clearly known. He said, moreover, that he was in danger of losing his senses who turned his mind anxiously upon these investigations. Just as Anaxagoras¹³ lost his reason, who prided himself most in explaining by the power of his reason, the plans of the deities.

⁸ *Νεκτοθηρῶν*, From Oppian *Haliut.* iv. 640, we learn that by night fishermen pursued their occupation. Hunters also gained their prey by night. *Hor. Od.* i. 1, 25.—*Cic. Tusc.* ii. 17.—*SCHNEIDER* reads *νυκτοτηρῶν*, i. e. “watchers by night,” *φρυκτωροί* or *πυρσενται*.

⁹ *Τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορᾷ ὄντα*, “quæ non communi eodemque cæli motu circumacta proprio sibi motu feruntur.”

¹⁰ *ἄσταθμήτους ἀστέρας*, i. e. “the comets,” *Diogenes* *Apoloniates* had established *ἀστέρας εἶναι τοὺς κομητας*. And some *Pythagoreans* had very early some idea of their periodic return, *εἰς τὸς ὁρισμένοι χρόνου περιδικῶς ἀνατέλλειν*. *Plut. Plac. Phil.* iii. 2.

¹¹ *Περὶ ὁδῶν*, “*tempus, quo confecto ad idem punctum redeunt: non orbitam v. viam.*”

¹² *Archelaus*, a follower of *Anaxagoras*, instructed *Sokrates* in Astronomy. *Comp. Cic. Acad.* i. 15.

¹³ *Anaxagoras* of *Clazomene*, a chief philosopher of the *Ionian* school. He devoted his greatest attention to the study of Nature, whence he is called *Physicus*. He lived in the time of *Perikles*, and died at *Lampsacus*, whither he had gone as an exile. *Comp. Cic. Tusc.* v. 4. 10.

7. For, firstly, Anaxagoras when he said that fire was identical in nature with the sun,¹ did not think of this, that men can easily look upon fire, but cannot turn their gaze upon the sun ; and that men exposed to the full rays of the sun, become darker in complexion, but not so, if exposed to rays of fire. He did not think too, that of all the productions of the earth, nothing can fairly increase without the light of the sun,¹ while if heated by fire, they would all perish. And, secondly, when he said that the sun was a fiery stone, he was ignorant of this, that stone shines not when placed in fire, nor lasts for any long time : while the sun, being more brilliant than all things, yet lasteth throughout all time.

8. He exhorted them also to learn accounts,² and in this, as in the preceding sciences, he desired them to avoid vain investigations : all that was practically useful of this science, he studied and investigated with his disciples.

9. But he encouraged his disciples to take especial care of their health, both by learning whatsoever they could from those who were experienced in that, and by each attending to himself throughout his life, as to what food, or drink, or what sort of employment, was conducive to his health, and how using these, he might live most healthily. For he said, that if a person thus attended to his health, it would be very difficult to find a physician who could know better than himself what was conducive to his health.

10. But if any one desired to obtain greater benefits, than those depending upon human wisdom; he advised him to use the art of divination. For he said, that he never would be devoid of the counsel of heaven, who knew by what signs the gods give to man indications regarding affairs.

¹ Compare Dio z. Laert. ii. 8. ὁ ὅτος (Anaxagoras) ἔλεγε τὸν ἥλιον μὲν ὄρεον ἵνα διέπυρον καὶ μείζω Πελοποννησον.—i. e. "a red hot mass of metal."—Comp. Cic. Off. 971. Sokrates takes μὲν ὄρεος to mean a mass of red hot stone.

² Λογίσμοι, "accounts," by which we calculate income and expenditure, profit and loss : it by no means denotes *Arithmetic* which word has a much wider range of science. The difference between λογιστική and ἀριθμητική is stated by Plato, Gorg. p. 451, C.

CHAPTER VIII.

INTRODUCTION—This last chapter is devoted to the proof that Sokrates was unjustly condemned of falsehood regarding THE DEMON.

His argument is as follows:—

No one can accuse Sokrates of falsehood regarding the directions he asserted to have received from the Demon, because he was not warned regarding his defence—for his death clearly proves on the contrary, the interposition of the Demon, to give him a glorious and happy death. Sokrates of senile age, would soon have died, or if he lived to a more advanced age, he would be afflicted with all the evils incident to senility.

The whole work concludes with a brief summary of the arguments of the several books.

1. AND if any one considers that he is convicted of uttering falsehoods regarding THE DEMON since he was condemned to death, although he asserted that the Demon directed him by signs, as to what he ought to do, and what he ought not—let him consider in the first place, that he was already so advanced in years,¹ that he would have ended his life, if not then, at least in a short time after; and secondly, that he left only the most burdensome time of life, and that in which all lose their powers of intellect: while instead of this, in exhibiting the firmness of his soul, he acquired great glory, both by pleading his cause, above all men, in the strictest principles of truth and freedom, and by bearing his sentence of death, most mildly, and yet most manfully.

“For it is universally acknowledged, that no man of those held in memory, endured death with greater glory. For it was incumbent on him to live for thirty days after sentence pronounced, because the Delian festival took place that month,” and because the law

He was 70 years old at the period of his death -- *Diog. Laert.* ii. 44.

¹ See Plat. *Phaed.* p. 58, and above *ibid.* 3.

permitted none to die by public condemnation, until the sacred embassy should return from Delos; all that time, in the sight of all his disciples, he spent in no other way than the whole preceding period of his life.

3. And yet, above all the men who lived before him, he was especially remarkable for the cheerfulness and tranquillity of his life. And how could any one have died more nobly? or what species of death is more noble, than that by which one most nobly dies? what death can be more happy than the noblest? or what more acceptable to heaven than the happiest?¹

4. But I will relate what I heard² from Hermogenes the son of Hipponikus, regarding him, for he said, that when Meletus had brought his action against him, he himself heard Sokrates conversing on every subject except the trial: and when he said to him, "that it were right for him to consider what defence he should make;" he at first replied, "Do I not then, appear to you to have passed my life with a view to this?" And when he asked "how so?"—Sokrates replied, that he had passed his life in no other occupation, than in considering what was just and unjust, and in doing what was just, and from what was unjust refraining,³ and this he considered to be the best meditation for his defence.

5. Then Hermogenes said again, "Do you not see, O Sokrates, that the Dikasts at Athens, offended at their

¹ Many critics suppose that from the third to the eleventh section has been inserted by some transcriber from the Apology. Weiske thinks the passage genuine, and that Xenophon uses a sorites to prove that the death of Sokrates was *θεοφιλέη*, & his view the premises are:—

1. The death of Sokrates was glorious.

2. His death also was happy.

3. His death was *θεοφιλέη*, since the gods give a happy death only to those whom they love.

² Xenophon, at the time of the death of Sokrates, was absent in Asia, serving under Cyrus.

³ The Greek words are placed in the figure called *Chiasmus*, for which see Kühner Gr. Gr. ii. § 865, 3, and compare Hamlet, Act ii. 7.

Soldiers, scholars, courtiers, eye, tongue, sword.

a b c c b a

language,⁴ have already put to death many who have done no wrong, while they have liberated many unjust persons?" But by Jove, Hermogenes, he replied, when I already attempted to meditate my defence before the Dikasts the daemon prohibited me.

6. And Hermogenes said; you state what is very strange! but Sokrates replied, Do you wonder that it appears better to the Deity, that I should now close my life? Do you not know that up to this time I concede to no man, that he has lived either better or more pleasantly than myself?⁵ For I consider they live most excellently, who have made most excellent studies their zealous pursuit, in order to become most excellent themselves. And most pleasantly have they lived, who have arrived at the most assured conviction, that they did become more excellent.

7. And these results I have perceived up to this time, to have accrued to myself; and meeting⁶ with other men, and comparing myself with others, I have constantly thus judged regarding myself. And not merely do I alone judge so, but all my friends continue to entertain a similar opinion regarding me; not merely through affection for me, (for they who love others may have such an opinion towards the objects of their love), but because they believe, that by associating with me, they have become most excellent.

8. But if I should live a longer period, perhaps it will be necessary that the natural failings of old age could be accomplished in me, that my sense of sight and hearing should be enfeebled, my powers of perception weakened, and I should become more dull in learning, more forgetful in memory; in fine, inferior in all those qualities in which before I was superior.—If I did not perceive this deterioration, life would not be worth the living,⁶ and if I did, perceive it, should not life be more degraded and more unpleasant?

⁴ Λόγῳ παραχθέντες, the majority of books have ἀχθέντες.


⁵ Ὑπέμην' αὖν "non conce-serim quemquam vel melius vel juveniudus quam me vixisse."—Kühn.

⁶ Ἀβυσσος βίος, Comp. Cicero de Amic. vi. 22, (quoting Ennius), "Qui potest esse *vita vitalis*, ut ait Ennius, quæ non in amici mutua benevolentia consistit."

9. And assuredly, if I die by an unjust sentence, disgrace will redound to those who unjustly slay me; for if injustice be disgraceful in itself, is it not disgraceful to do anything unjustly? But what disgrace will it be to me, if others were not able to give a just decision, or act justly regarding me?

10. And I see, that an estimation of men who have gone before, is left among posterity: but far different is that of the unjust from that of the just: and I am assured, that even though I should now be put to death, yet I shall meet with zealous love from men, far different from what they will exhibit towards my murderers. For I know, they will bear testimony to me for all time, that I never wronged, or depraved any man that ever existed: but that I endeavoured to render my disciples better. Such things he said to Hermogenes, and to others.

11. But of all who were acquainted with Sokrates, those who were desirous of virtue, even to this day, continue to regret him beyond all men beside, as being their most efficient instructor in virtue. And since he was such as I have described him—so pious as never to have done anything without the consent of God—so just, as never to have injured any one even in the slightest degree, while he benefited those who enjoyed his friendship, most of all—so temperate, as never to have preferred the pleasant to the good,—so wise, as never to have erred in his judgment of what was good and evil, nor to have required another's counsel, but to have been able unaided to decide regarding these.—Able by his language to declare and define such doctrines.—Able to prove the character of others, to convict those who were in error, and persuade them to embrace virtue and excellence.—Since he was a man of such a character, to me at least he seemed to be such, as the best and happiest of men should be. But if my judgment is not approved of by some, let them compare the conduct of others with his, and then form their opinion.



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